795.00/8–3151

Memorandum of Conversation, by Frank P. Lockhart of the Bureau of Far Eastern Affairs

secret

Subject: Briefing of Ambassadors on Korea

Participants: Australia —Mr. Upton, Second Secretary
Belgium —Mr. Callebaut, Attaché
Canada —Mr. Ignatieff, Counselor
Colombia —Absent
Ethiopia —Mr. Tesemma, First Secretary
France —Mr. Millet, Counselor
Great Britain —Absent
Greece —Mr. Kalergis, Minister Counselor
Korea —Ambassador Yang
Mr. Han, First Secretary
Luxembourg —Absent
Netherlands —Baron van Boetzelaer, First Secretary
New Zealand —Mr. Corner, First Secretary
Philippines —Dr. Gamboa, Counselor
Thailand —Mr. Charet, Second Secretary
Turkey —Mr. Esenbal, Counselor
Union of South Africa —Mr. Botha, Second Secretary
United States UNA, Mr. Hickerson
FE, Mr. Merchant
UNP, Mr. Wainhouse
EUR, Mr. Allen
UNP, Mr. Henkin
FE, Mr. Hacklor
FE, Mr. Lockhart
Army, Captain Pope

Captain Pope, after informing the Ambassadors that flood conditions along the Yesong and Taedong Rivers had washed out or covered [Page 869] most of the enemy’s bridges, stated that most military activity was centered in the east-central sector where the United Nations forces were consolidating their positions and were continuing to make slight advances. South Korean forces made some progress in a limited objective attack toward Punchbowl Valley east of the Pukhan River. Sightings of enemy vehicular traffic revealed that the enemy continued to deliver supplies forward in amounts in excess of daily requirements. Captain Pope explained that since the enemy had brought up additional personnel replacements for its units and had begun using more mortar and artillery, the Far Eastern Command had revised upward its estimate of the enemy’s daily requirement. The enemy now needs 50 tons of food, ammunition, petroleum products and other supplies per day to sustain one division in contact or 60 tons per day to sustain one division in attack. In reply to a question by the Canadian representative, Captain Pope stated that he had no new information which would indicate that the enemy intended to launch an offensive. Mr. Hickerson recalled that the Far Eastern Command had estimated that the enemy had the capability of launching and sustaining an attack for 26 days using all of its 46 divisions.

Mr. Hickerson then informed the group that there was little new information to report. The communists had not replied to General Ridgway’s broadcast, he stated. He then read the texts1 of two protests given to the United Nations Command’s liaison officer by the North Koreans: one charged that a United Nations airplane had dropped a parachute flare in the Kaesong area on August 30; the other alleged that a group of ten uniformed South Korean soldiers had entered the neutral zone, captured three military police and subsequently upon retirement murdered two and seriously wounded one of them. These two protests from Nam Il were turned over to the proper authorities, the Air Force Commanding General and the 1st Corps Commander for investigation, Mr. Hickerson stated, and added that replies will be made to these probable fabrications.

Mr. Hickerson asked if these two protests shed any light upon the enemy’s intentions. None of the group saw any new revelation. Mr. Hickerson observed that everything still pointed to deliberate stalling by the communists for some unknown reason and to a continued military build-up on the part of the enemy. Mr. Merchant remarked that the longer the enemy stalled the more there would appear to be some connection with the San Francisco Conference. This remark led Ambassador Yang to observe that the Soviets, according to the press, apparently intended to stay in San Francisco for six [Page 870] weeks. Mr. Hickerson replied that the press had subsequently reported that the Soviets had rented a mansion for only three weeks. The Canadian representative asked whether there was anything substantive behind press reports emanating from the United Nations in New York to the effect that there would be no break-off in the Kaesong talks. Mr. Hickerson suggested that the story resulted from background briefings of the press and stated that there was nothing new in this respect.

It was agreed to hold the next briefing on September 5 at 5 p. m.2

  1. Not here printed.
  2. The record of the meeting of September 5 is not printed.