Subject: Political Steps in Event of Armistice in
Korea.
I today handed to Mr. Tomlinson the attached memorandum in reply to the
memorandum of August 6 left with the Department by the British
Embassy.1 I told Mr.
Tomlinson that this was an informal and unofficial memorandum comparable
to the communication we had received from them.
[Attachment]
Memorandum
The following comments refer to the memorandum of August 6 left with
the Department by the British Embassy.
1. We agree wholeheartedly with the United Kingdom view that we must
firmly maintain that any political discussions after a ceasefire
must in the first instance be confined to Korea alone. (Paras 2, 3).
This we take to mean that unless there were agreement on a political
settlement in Korea, discussion of other Far Eastern questions would
not take place in any conference.
2. The answer to the United Kingdom’s specific question (Para 4) is
that the United States Government would be prepared after a
ceasefire to hold political discussions on a settlement in Korea
which might include in some appropriate way the Chinese Communists
and the North Koreans. The United States does not recognize either
of these regimes as legally constituted governments, but would be
prepared to have them participate in multilateral discussions about
a Korean settlement which, as a practical matter, cannot be solved
without their agreement.
3. In regard to the proper method for bringing about a Korean
settlement, we agree that the Lie proposal for a mediator is not
likely to be acceptable to the Communists and would achieve no
practical results. The United Nations Commission idea is subject to
the same objection. Experience has shown that direct discussions
with the Communists offer the best if not the only hope of solution.
We do not, however, favor the alternatives preferred by the United
Kingdom. The Five-Power or Seven-Power conference reflects an
approach, similar to that of the United Kingdom proposal made last
April, which contemplates a solution of the Korean problem by the
Great Powers, without any participation by the United Nations or by
other countries vitally interested in the Pacific such as Australia,
New Zealand and the Philippines, and at most with only “associate”
participation by the Koreans. (Para 4) According to the United
Kingdom proposal, the same conference would also discuss other Far
Eastern questions thereafter (Para 11). A Five-Power conference has
the disadvantage of seeking to resolve problems by the big powers
alone without regard for all the real parties in interest. Further,
the United States could not agree to any arrangement which might
give the impression that we are treating Peiping as the Government
of China.
4. It is important that the peaceful settlement of the Korean problem
be discussed by the real parties in interest. (The Communists,
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too, seem to have adopted
a similar approach, judging by the discussion to date in regard to
Item 5 of the armistice agenda). As we see it, therefore,
discussions for a Korean settlement should be held by the Republic
of Korea, the North Koreans, the Soviet Union and Peiping as
neighbors with frontier and other interests in Korea, and the United
Nations. The United Nations should be represented by a delegation
from among the nations which have participated in the fighting in
Korea. The United Nations delegation would be designated by the
General Assembly and given broad terms of reference. Any agreement
reached by the delegation with the other interested parties would be
subject to approval by the General Assembly.
5. We agree that the attitude of the Russians on the question of a
Korean settlement will be crucial (Para 6). We see no objection to
discussions with the Russians telling them of the procedural steps
we have in mind. We see no advantage, however, in suggesting
alternative procedures since the Russians will of course pick the
one least advantageous to us. It would in our view be preferable for
the principal allies to reach agreement and thereafter to seek
Soviet agreement on these steps. We recognize, however, that it
might be desirable to raise with the USSR the question of their
participation.
We do not believe there is any advantage in raising the question with
the Russians before there is agreement on an armistice. To do so
might well adversely affect our bargaining position at the
armistice. We can take the initiative by prompt steps as soon as
agreement is achieved.
6. As for the meeting place for a conference, we see disadvantages in
holding a conference on Korea in a European city. We suggest some
point in the demilitarized zone established by the armistice, a
point which can be made neutral in every detail as to
arrangements.
7. We do not envisage that a conference on other Far Eastern problems
would follow immediately in the same forum upon a settlement of the
Korean problem (United Kingdom paragraph 11). In our view, neither
the Five or the Seven-Power conference would be representative of
the United Nations membership on such questions as Chinese
representation and Formosa. After a Korean settlement we would be
prepared to discuss other Far Eastern questions in an appropriate
forum which would include all the parties with interests in the
questions to be discussed.
8. The United Kingdom memorandum refers also to the Department’s
desire to have a General Assembly resolution to “put the record
straight” on Korea. The question of the kind of United Nations
resolution appropriate to note approval of the armistice, and the
body which should adopt it, is only indirectly related to the
problem of political settlement, and is being discussed with the
United Kingdom at length.
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In general, it is our view that (a) the
United Nations should note the armistice with approval shortly after
it is concluded; and (b) in doing so the
United Nations should avoid giving the impression that it has
abandoned its version of what happened in Korea and is prepared to
treat the armistice as a cessation of hostilities between equally
culpable belligerents. We continue to believe that action by the
GA is important in order to avoid
this erroneous impression, but subject to that would have no
objection to an initial step in the SC. Beyond that we agree that we should avoid steps
which might antagonize the Communists and make peaceful settlement
of the Korean problem more difficult.
