Office of the Historian

Lot 55D128: Black Book, Tab 49: Telegram

The Commander in Chief, Far East (Ridgway) to the Joint Chiefs of Staff

secret
operational immediate
Tokyo, 21 August 1951—5:28 p. m.

C–69346. Reference JCS 95354.1

1. Statements of Communists in sub-delegation meeting at Kaesong yesterday can be interpreted as willingness to discuss line of demarcation [Page 846] on basis of “line of contact” as opposed to “the general area of the battle line”, which to date has been our proposal. Our delegates are exploring this possibility.

2. If we should find an actual willingness to abandon their adamant stand on the 38 parallel and to negotiate a demilitarized zone based on the present approximate line of contact or opposing forces, I would like to be in a position to negotiate along these lines and, if I then consider it advisable, to settle on a demilitarized zone not less than 4 kilometers in width, with the line of contact as the median line thereof.

3. Such a demilitarized zone would eliminate many anticipated serious difficulties of both military and civil control inherent in a 20 mile wide zone, as currently proposed in your instructions to me. It would place opposing military forces outside of small arms range of each other, it would, if accepted, be a face saving device for the Communists, avoiding the necessity of any substantial withdrawal of their armed forces from terrain presently occupied.

4. Negotiation on the foregoing basis will almost certainly be opposed by the ROKA representative. I believe, however, that the effects of that opposition could be minimized, if not eliminated, within our delegation. I further believe that if negotiation on this basis should prove acceptable to the Communists, substantial progress might be made toward the objectives outlined in your 95354.

5. Your authorization is requested to proceed at my discretion as outlined above, if it develops that the Communists are willing to negotiate on the basis of the present line of contact.2

  1. Dated June 30, p. 598.↩

  2. A brief memorandum attached to the source text by Mr. Rusk as well as a manuscript notation by Mr. Matthews on a copy of this message in Lot File 53D413 both indicated that State Department approval of General Ridgway’s request was given following discussions by Secretary Acheson with Messrs. Matthews, Rusk, and Hickerson. The following message was then sent to Tokyo on August 21 in telegram JCS 99477:

    “From JCS. Reur C–69346. You are authorized to negotiate on basis indicated in ref radio. Understood here that this action, if agreed to, will in no way jeopardize ability to defend line Kansas.” (Black Book, Tab 52)

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