Foreign Relations of the United States, 1951, Korea and China, Volume VII, Part 1

Lot 55D128: Black Book, Tab 48: Telegram

The Commander in Chief, United Nations Command (Ridgway) to the Joint Chiefs of Staff

secret   priority

Tokyo, 20 August 1951—5:23 p. m.

C–69262. This msg in 3 parts. Subject is meeting of sub delegation at Kaesong 20 August:

Part 1.

1. Summary: Burke presented UNC position arguments for demilitarized zone in the general area of the battle line. Stated necessity for maintaining present even balance of military effectiveness in order to prevent one side from gaining strength and other losing strength and thereby encourage violation of armistice. Pointed out that the Communist proposal would almost double length of line; that area which we would acquire in west would be indefensible; and that in the east we would be required to retire from defensible positions to indefensible ones far to south. Lee stated that difference of opinion resulted from the fact that we viewed the question from the standpoint of maintaining military balance while they viewed it from the standpoint of military realities and living up to international agreements. He drew distinction between “line of contact” and “general area of the battle line” and stated that as long as we adhere to our position that the demilitarized zone must be in the latter area no progress would be made by the sub committee. At this point Communist delegation advised that they desired to recess to attend memorial services for Chinese officer killed yesterday in neutral zone.

2. They stated the peace loving people of the area had spontaneously organized these services. Communists led up to inviting UN sub delegation to attend services in “honor of first man who had given his life for the success of conferences” by a long tirade aimed at “UN forces guilt proven beyond doubt”. Preliminary statements prior to invitation about same as those contained in Nam Il msg to Joy.¹

3. Hodes decided to express regrets and decline invitation to attend for several reasons. First, our investigation incomplete but no evidence yet that UN forces guilty of incident. Second, the manner in which they led up to the invitation created suspicion as to their motives.

4. Fully realize that the Commies will make propaganda out of the services whether or not we attended.

Part 2. Progress: None.

Part 3. Conclusions: Same as 18 August.

I concur.

1. The message from Gen. Nam Il to Admiral Joy, dated August 19, is printed in the Department of State Bulletin, September 3, 1951, p. 392. The text of Admiral Joy’s reply, dated August 22, is printed ibid., p. 389. In it, Joy pointed out that an investigation by the U.N. Command had shown that none of its forces were involved in the incident but that the attack was carried out by a group of partisan irregulars, some of whom wore civilian clothing.