Foreign Relations of the United States, 1951, Korea and China, Volume VII, Part 1

S/S Files: Lot 59D95, Box 98

Memorandum Prepared in the Department of State¹

top secret
WFM T–10/1

[Washington,] August 18, 1951.

UN Action in Korea in Case of no Armistice

problem

To obtain British and French support for the United States position respecting UN courses of action in Korea in the event no armistice is signed.

u.s. objectives

Without relinquishing the objectives set forth in NSC 48/5,² to develop and maintain for the United States the optimum position of readiness for a general war, to preserve the security of UN forces in Korea, and to bring an end to the aggression by the Chinese and North Korean Communists, with maximum support of UN members and while continuing to seek to avoid precipitating general war. If the enemy seeks a stalemate, we should continue military action along present lines and generally in present position, and intensify political and economic action. If the enemy launches an offensive, we should intensify military action as well.

probable positions of the british and french

1. United Kingdom: would probably be reluctant to intensify hostilities unless clearly forced by Communist action.

2. France: probably similar to the above, conditioned by fear of Chinese Communist action in Indochina.

position to be presented

1. If the enemy, after failure of armistice talks, appears to be attempting to bring about a situation of de facto cease-fire without agreement, the following general courses of action are proposed:

a. Maintain present defensive positions, making only tactical advances to keep enemy off balance and prevent build up, with air and naval activity on same basis as prior to armistice talks.

b. Develop and equip additional effective ROK units.

c. Expedite the organization, training and equipping of Japanese defense forces.

d. Support action by the General Assembly to reaffirm United Nations determination to continue resistance to aggression and to apply additional economic measures against China, up to and including complete economic blockade.

e. Exert efforts to obtain increased military forces from United Nations Members.

f. Conduct intensified psychological warfare operations to maintain and increase world support to UN and to promote dissension within Communist orbit.

2. If, after definitive end to negotiations, Communists launch a massive ground offensive, the following courses are proposed in place of course 1a and in addition to 1b through 1f:

a. Accelerate defense preparations to correspond to the increased threat.

b. After consultation with participating nations, direct CINCUNC to increase scale of military operations to maximum extent consistent with the capabilities and security of available forces, including advances up to the neck of the North Korean peninsula as required by the military situation.

c. After consultation with participating nations, remove restrictions against air attacks on Yalu River dams and power installations.

3. If, in addition to launching an offensive, the Communists include massive air attacks against UN ground, air or naval forces, the following additional course is proposed:

a. After consultation with participating nations to extent permitted by situation, permit United Nations aircraft to pursue enemy planes to landing fields in Manchuria or China (except Port Arthur and Dairen), and, if necessary, destroy such planes after landing, as well as neutralize opposing anti-aircraft protecting these landing fields.

discussion

courses of action in korea in event no armistice is achieved

It is assumed that the courses of action to follow upon a failure of armistice talks will depend on the circumstances surrounding the termination of negotiations and the character and intensity of renewed hostilities by the Communists. We envisage the following possibilities:

I. Alternative One: The following circumstances exist:

(1) There is a definitive end to negotiations;

(2) The Communists launch a mass offensive against UN forces including massive air attacks against UN ground, air or naval forces.

Course of Action:

Military

a. Accelerate present pace of preparations to place the nation in the best possible position of readiness for general war on the assumption that the Communist action has greatly increased the likelihood of general hostilities;

b. Direct the Commander in Chief, United Nations Command (CINCUNC) to increase immediately the scale of military operations in the Korean campaign to the maximum consistent with the capabilities and security of the forces now available or made available;

c. Remove restrictions on advances into North Korea to the neck of the North Korean peninsula;

d. Support a vigorous campaign of covert operations designed:

(1) To aid effectively anti-Communist guerrilla forces in Communist China and Korea; and

(2) To interfere with and disrupt enemy lines of communications;

e. Expedite the organization, training and equipping of Japanese defense forces;

f. Develop and equip additional dependable ROK military units, as rapidly as possible, with a view to their assuming an increasing responsibility for the defense of Korea;

g. Remove all restrictions against attacks in North Korea, the Yalu River dams, and the power installations on the Korean bank of the Yalu River; the question of attacks on Rashin should be reviewed in the light of the then existing circumstances;

h. After consultation with the participating nations to the extent permitted by the situation, extend the area for pursuit and air to air action in air engagement initiated over Korea by permitting UN aircraft to disregard the Korean-Manchurian border during such engagements and to pursue such enemy planes to their landing fields in Manchuria or China (except Port Arthur and Dairen) and, if necessary, destroy such planes after landing as well as to neutralize opposing anti-aircraft fire protecting such landing fields;

i. Take necessary UN and diplomatic measures as outlined below looking toward a complete blockade of Communist China;

j. Re-examine desirability of use of Chinese Nationalist troops in Korea and against China mainland.

In the United Nations

a. Ridgway report on breakdown of armistice;

b. Provided it is concluded at the time that the results thereof would be effective in obtaining increased support for the UN action in Korea, adoption of a GA resolution re-affirming UN determination to carry on the fight, and requesting further assistance;

c. Additional economic measures against China, looking toward complete economic blockade, including possible alternatives to naval blockade, e.g., calling on nations to control their own shipping, or to agree to have UN help them control shipping.

Diplomatic

a. Additional vigorous efforts to obtain increased military forces from those countries already participating as well as to obtain contributions from countries which have not yet contributed military forces.

Psychological Warfare

a. Program to inform world that Communists are responsible for prolongation and extension of hostilities, that UN will continue all efforts to keep area of hostilities limited to that required by military necessities, and that UN intends to make every effort to avoid World War III;

b. Efforts to maintain and increase world support for continued UN action;

c. Efforts to spread dissatisfaction among Chinese people;

d. Efforts to drive wedge between Peiping and Moscow;

Domestic

a. Presidential address to nation;

b. Preparation of domestic opinion for greater sacrifices and increased mobilization pace;

c. Public campaign to stress patience and resist pressures for preventive war or measures likely to extend hostilities in the Far East.

II. Alternative Two: The following circumstances exist:

(1) There is a definitive end to negotiations;

(2) The Communists launch a massive ground offensive against UN forces;

(3) The enemy does not initiate massive air attacks against UN ground or naval forces and his counter-action to UN air attacks is not sufficiently strong so as seriously to interfere with the effectiveness of UN air operations.

Course of Action:

Military

a. Continue preparations to place the nation in the best possible position of readiness for general war on relatively short notice making every additional effort necessary to achieve the present objectives on schedule;

b. Direct the Commander in Chief, United Nations Command (CINCUNC) to increase immediately the scale of military operations in the Korean campaign to the maximum consistent with the capabilities and security of the forces now available;

c. Remove restrictions on advances into North Korea to the neck of the North Korean peninsula;

d. Support a vigorous campaign of covert operations designed;

(1) To aid effectively anti-Communist guerrilla forces in Communist China and Korea; and

(2) To interfere with and disrupt enemy lines of communications;

e. Expedite the organization, training and equipping of Japanese defense forces;

f. Develop and equip additional dependable ROK military units, as rapidly as possible with a view to their assuming an increasing share of responsibility for the defense of Korea;

g. Remove all restrictions against attacks in North Korea, the Yalu River dams, and the power installations on the Korean bank of the Yalu River; the question of attacks on Rashin should be reviewed in the light of the then existing circumstances;

h. Direct CINCUNC fully and currently to report upon any increase in the scale and scope of enemy air operations in Korea, as well as, to the extent possible under present restrictions, upon enemy air buildup in Manchuria, so that Washington can re-examine, if necessary, the question of authorizing UN counter-action in Manchuria or China against enemy aircraft and, if such counter-action appears necessary, take action to obtain support from other participating countries for such counter-action;

i. Take necessary UN and diplomatic measures as outlined below looking toward a complete blockade of Communist China.

In the United Nations

a. Ridgway report on breakdown of armistice;

b. Provided it is concluded at the time that the results thereof would be effective in obtaining increased support for the UN action in Korea, adoption of a GA resolution re-affirming UN determination to carry on the fight, and requesting further assistance;

c. Additional economic measures against China, looking toward complete economic blockade, including possible alternatives to naval blockade, e.g., calling on nations to control their shipping, or to agree to have UN help them control shipping.

Diplomatic

a. Additional vigorous efforts to obtain increased military forces from those countries already participating as well as to obtain contributions from countries which have not yet contributed military forces.

Psychological Warfare

a. Program to place blame for armistice breakdown on Communists, including wide publication Ridgway report;

b. Efforts to maintain and increase world support for continued UN action;

c. Efforts to spread dissatisfaction among Chinese people;

d. Efforts to drive wedge between Peiping and Moscow.

Domestic

a. Presidential address to nation;

b. Preparation of domestic opinion for greater sacrifices;

c. Public campaign to stress patience and resist pressures for preventive war or measures likely to extend hostilities in Far East.

III. Alternative Three: Assumptions:

(1) Negotiations fade out or adjourn without a clear break and with possibility open for renewal at any time;

(2) Communists do not launch offensive or massive air attacks;

(3) Enemy appears to be attempting to bring about a situation of de facto cease-fire without agreement.

Course of Action:

Military

a. Maintain Kansas line defensive positions;

b. Make only tactical advances to keep enemy off balance and prevent possible buildup;

c. Continue air and naval activity on same basis as prior to armistice talks;

d. Develop and equip additional dependable ROK military units, as rapidly as possible and in sufficient strength, with a view to their assuming the major responsibility for the defense of Korea;

e. Direct CINCUNC fully and currently to report upon any increase in the scale or scope of enemy ground or air buildup in Korea or Manchuria to the extent possible under then existing conditions, so that Washington may, if necessary, consider the question of authorizing UN counter-action necessary to the continued security of UN forces;

f. Expedite the organization, training and equipping of Japanese defense forces;

g. Take necessary UN and diplomatic measures as outlined below looking toward a complete blockade of Communist China;

h. Support a vigorous campaign of covert operations designed;

(1) To aid effectively anti-Communist guerrilla forces in Communist China and Korea; and

(2) To interfere with and disrupt enemy lines of communication.

Diplomatic

a. Efforts, perhaps through the USSR, to ascertain to the extent possible enemy intentions;

b. Efforts to obtain additional troops better to distribute defense burden and to increase number of countries contributing troops.

In the United Nations

a. Ridgway report on negotiations after sufficient time has lapsed to clarify situation;

b. In Sixth GA, another GA resolution calling on Communists to give up their aggression and resume peace talks on UN basis;

c. Additional economic measures against China, looking toward complete economic blockade, including possible alternative to naval blockade, e.g., calling on nations to control their own shipping, or to agree to have UN help them control shipping.

[Annex]

WFM T–10/1

(Supplement)

Views of the Embassy in London on Probable British Attitudes on Subjects To Be Discussed in the Washington Foreign Ministers’ Meetings

korea (if no armistice)

The chief concern of the British is that the US may renew full-scale military effort. They hope for an effective stalemate in absence of major air intervention, in which case they would probably be prepared to accept full-scale war with China, perhaps leading to general war.

1. See footnote 1, supra. For the comments of the Department of Defense, see p. 877.
2. Dated May 17; for extracts from NSC 48/5 dealing with Korea, see the memorandum, p. 439.