Foreign Relations of the United States, 1951, Korea and China, Volume VII, Part 1

S/S Files: Lot 59D95, Box 98

Memorandum Prepared in the Department of State¹

top secret
WFM T–10

[Washington,] August 18, 1951.

UN Action in Korea in Case of an Armistice

problem

To obtain British and French support for the U.S. position with respect to UN courses of action in Korea in case an armistice is successfully negotiated.

u.s. objective

To achieve a unified independent and democratic Korea with maximum assurance against Communist domination.

probable positions of the british and french

The British and French will probably support the U.S. position in general; they will likely prefer replacement of ROK and North Korean governments by newly constituted regime for all of Korea to assumption of jurisdiction over North Korea by ROK.

position to be presented

1. Political discussions on Korea must follow an armistice.

2. Political discussions of other Far Eastern problems cannot take place prior to a Korean political settlement.

3. The purpose of political discussions on Korea would be to obtain agreement on the following:

a. Establishment under UN supervision of a unified, independent and democratic Korea, assured, insofar as possible, against Communist domination.

b. Activation of a rehabilitation problem for all of Korea under UNKRA, no funds to be spent in North Korea until political settlement in force.

c. Plan for phased withdrawal of foreign forces with reasonable assurances against internal disorder and external aggression.

4. Unification of Korea without Communist domination might be achieved either by a) integration of North Korea into the existing ROK, or b) replacement of the North Korean regime and the ROK government by a successor government for all of Korea. The United States should reserve its position on which of these methods to support pending further study of the situation and analysis of the attitudes of UN members and the ROK.

5. Procedure leading to a political conference should take the following form:

a. The General Assembly should appoint a United Nations Delegation to represent the UN in working out a Korean settlement.

b. The UN Delegation would set up a conference in Kaesong in which the participants might be: the UN Delegation, the ROK, the North Koreans, Chinese Communists, and the USSR.

c. Agreements achieved by the conference would be referred to the General Assembly for approval.

discussion

courses of action in korea in event armistice negotiations are successful

1. General Policy

a. There is general agreement that the United States and the United Nations should seize the initiative in the post-armistice phase. We are publicly committed to enter political discussions leading to the peaceful settlement of the Korean problem after the conclusion of an armistice. There seems to be no good reason to drag our feet and excellent reason for making a proposal looking toward the prompt convocation of a conference for this purpose. Moreover, if we do not make a proposal we can be certain that the enemy will, in which case we will be forced into the defensive position of rejecting or seeking to modify a proposal which can be expected to be objectionable.

b. The United States should adopt the position that it will not participate in a conference on other Far Eastern problems until after there is a cessation of hostilities under a satisfactory armistice agreement and a political settlement of the Korean problem. It should likewise be the United States position that it is preferable to have Korea divided under an armistice agreement than to permit a unification of the country under conditions which would not give maximum assurance against Communist domination.

c. The main questions which must be answered are: what would we wish to derive from a conference on Korea; what would be our position therein; when and where do we propose it be held; and who should participate.

2. Purpose of Political Conference

a. In a political conference we should seek agreement:

1) On the establishment, under UN supervision, of a unified, independent and democratic government of Korea, assured, insofar as possible, against Communist subversion or aggression and with a program for the rehabilitation of all of Korea under UNKRA (no UNKRA funds would be spent in North Korea until a full political settlement had been reached and entered into force).

2) Following agreement on the steps leading to unification, on a plan for a phased withdrawal of all foreign forces under conditions which would assure internal security throughout Korea and provide reasonable assurance against external aggression.

3. United States Position in any Political Conference

a. There are two principal methods to achieve a non-Communist unified government in Korea.

b. The first method would involve, in effect, the integration of North Korea into the presently existing Republic of Korea. This would be done by the holding of free elections in North Korea for seats reserved for North Koreans in the Republic of Korea National Assembly under the auspices of a UN body. The terms of the present ROK assembly elected in 1950 under UN observed elections expire in 1954. This augmented assembly would, in accordance with the ROK constitution, elect a president for the new term beginning in 1952, who could then form a government of his own choice. While involving the least disturbance to the already functioning ROK government and being the course which would be supported by that government, this method would be strongly opposed by a substantial number of important non-Communist foreign governments and would unquestionably be entirely unacceptable to the Communists as a basis for a negotiated settlement.

c. The second method would, in effect, involve the disappearance of both the Republic of Korea and the North Korean regime in favor of a single successor government to be formed by a constituent assembly selected by elections held throughout Korea under the auspices of a United Nations body. This method would be supported by most non-Communist foreign governments, and while it would probably initially be opposed by the Republic of Korea, that government would not necessarily remain entirely adamant in its opposition as the preponderance of population in South Korea together with the control of the governmental machinery in that area during the period of the election should enable officials of the present Republic of Korea government to achieve a dominant voice in the formation of the new government.

d. Either of the above methods would result in the disappearance of the Communist regime in North Korea, and are, therefore, most unlikely of acceptance by the Communists.

e. It is not now feasible to reach a firm decision on which method of unification the United States should support. It would probably not be practicable or desirable to adopt the first method as an initial bargaining position with the view of changing to the second method during negotiations. Both methods present serious difficulties, the first with our Allies and the second with the Republic of Korea. However, it would be to the interest of both the United States and the Republic of Korea to adopt a negotiating position from which the maximum advantage of world opinion can be gained. The greatest advantage would be gained if the Republic of Korea could be persuaded itself to propose the second method. Therefore, efforts should be undertaken at the earliest suitable opportunity to gain the concurrence of the Republic of Korea to this course of action.

f. Failing agreement on unification, the United States should, without prejudicing the principle that only by a unification of Korea under conditions acceptable to the United Nations can the Korean problem satisfactorily be solved, seek ad hoc agreement on such other matters as may be possible, including a mutual reduction of forces.

g. In discussing any reduction of foreign forces in Korea the United States should make it clear that the Chinese forces, having engaged in an act of aggression, are illegally in Korea, while the United Nations forces are in Korea pursuant to United Nations resolutions in order to repel aggression and to restore peace and security. Nevertheless, recognizing the realities of the situation and the desirability of some Chinese Communist forces remaining in Korea so as to enable us to utilize the threat of action against China in event of violation of the armistice, the United States should be prepared to accept the retention of some Chinese Communist forces in North Korea.

4. Procedure Leading to a Political Conference

a. After the armistice is signed, the General Assembly should adopt a resolution noting the armistice with approval and appointing a United Nations Delegation (the United States and possibly Australia and Thailand) to represent the United Nations in efforts to achieve a permanent settlement of the Korean problem. This Delegation would, by any appropriate means, make contact with the North Korean and Chinese Communists and set up a conference in which the North Koreans, the Chinese Communists, the USSR, the Republic of Korea, and the United Nations delegation would participate.

b. It is suggested that the conference be held at Kaesong or in the demilitarized zone as soon as possible after it appears that the armistice terms are being faithfully carried out.

5. United Nations Approval of Political Settlement

a. Any agreement reached in discussions among the interested parties would be ad referendum and would be referred to the General Assembly for approval.

[Annex]

WFM T–10 (Supplement)

Views of the Embassy in London on Probable British Attitudes on Subjects To Be Discussed in the Washington Foreign Ministers’ Meetings

korea (if armistice)

The British fear that Korea may fall to the Communists by political means, and they may suggest general talks outside UN in order to facilitate Chinese Communist participation, preferably limited to Korea but in any event with Korea as first agenda item and agreement on other subjects dependent upon reaching an agreement on Korea.

1. A cover sheet, not printed, indicated that this document was prepared in the Department of State in anticipation of the forthcoming Tripartite Foreign Ministers Conference in Washington, involving the Foreign Ministers of France, the United Kingdom, and the United States, which was held from September 10 to 14, and which is documented fully in vol. iii, Part 1, pp. 1163 ff. At this time, the document was being transmitted to the Department of Defense for clearance; see p. 877.