Subject: Policy on Repatriation of Chinese and North
Korean Prisoners.
Attached is a copy of a memorandum on the above subject which we have
just forwarded to the Secretary of Defense. I am sending this
[Page 792]
copy to you because the
subject is, I know, one of extreme interest to you, and, in addition, I
believe that it should be handled by NSC
as soon as practicable. A copy of the enclosure has been forwarded to
General Smith.
[Enclosure]
Memorandum by the Joint Chiefs
of Staff to the Secretary of Defense (Marshall)
top secret
Washington, 8 August
1951.
Subject: Policy on Repatriation of Chinese and North
Korean Prisoners.
1. The following proposed policy has been recommended to and
considered by the Joint Chiefs of Staff in connection with the
repatriation of Chinese and North Korean prisoners remaining under
United Nations control after all exchanges agreed to during current
armistice negotiations have been completed, that:
-
a.
- Subject to adequate safeguards for United Nations
prisoners in Communist hands, the United Nations Commander
in Korea be authorized, in his discretion, not to repatriate
Chinese or North Korean prisoners of war to
Communist-controlled territory without their full
consent;
-
b.
- Subject to adequate safeguards for United Nations
prisoners in Communist hands, the United Nations Commander
in Korea be authorized to repatriate to Formosa all Chinese
prisoners of war who are found to be acceptable to the
Chinese Nationalist Government and who claim to be
ex-Nationalists or Nationalists at heart and elect such
repatriation; and
-
c.
- Provision should be included in the safeguards mentioned
above for United Nations authorities to interview
immediately all prisoners remaining in Communist custody
after initial agreed exchanges are made. A like provision
should be made applicable to Communist prisoners in United
Nations custody.
2. The following may be stated in justification of this policy:
-
a.
- There is grave likelihood that those Chinese and North
Korean prisoners who are forcibly repatriated to the
Communists will be executed or condemned to slave labor.
Humanitarian considerations prompt that these prisoners not
be forced to return;
-
b.
- In the conduct of psychological warfare in Korea, the
United Nations Commander promised safety and asylum to those
Chinese and North Korean military personnel who would
voluntarily surrender
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to his forces. Forceful repatriation
to the Communists of such individuals will be in violation
of his promise;
-
c.
- In light of the ideological struggle throughout the world
for the minds of men and the despotic totalitarian methods
employed by the Communists to force men to join with them,
it would be of great value to establish in the free world
not only the reliability of the promises of the United
Nations Commander but also the principle of United Nations
asylum from terrorism; and
-
d.
- The effectiveness of future United States psychological
warfare programs would be enhanced by the adoption of this
policy.
3. The disadvantages inherent in the policy are as follows:
-
a.
- It would establish a precedent for future wars which might
prevent complete repatriation after the cessation of
hostilities. Specifically, the Communists could claim
justification for not returning United Nations armed forces
personnel whom they now or may in the future hold as
prisoners of war, and there would be no assurance that the
retention of such personnel was in accordance with the
freely expressed choice of the individual.
-
b.
- It would also establish a precedent contrary to Article
118 of the 1949 Geneva Convention (to which, however, the
United States is not a signatory).1 This article includes a provision that
“prisoners of war shall be released and repatriated without
delay after the cessation of active hostilities.” The policy
proposed in paragraph 1 above would, in effect, redefine
“repatriation” by limiting it to those who voluntarily elect
such repatriation;
-
c.
- It would provide the Communists with propaganda material
inasmuch as the USSR undoubtedly would claim that the United
States was forcibly holding prisoners who wished to return;
and
-
d.
- Subsequent to agreement on an armistice in Korea, it might
be used by the Communists as a reason for breaking off peace
negotiations and for Communist renewal of hostilities in
that country.
4. The Joint Chiefs of Staff, from the military point of view, have
no objection to the adoption of the proposed policy expressed in
paragraph 1 above. On balance, they are inclined to favor it because
of its extreme importance to the effectiveness of psychological
warfare. They recognize, however, that the matter transcends the
military.
5. Accordingly, the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommend that the proposed
policy be submitted to the National Security Council for
consideration.
6. In view of the fact that CINCUNC may need guidance on this matter before the
armistice negotiations in Korea reach the exchange of prisoners
agenda item, copies of this memorandum are being handed
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informally to the State
Department and the CIA in order that
consideration by the National Security Council may be expedited.
For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:
Omar N. Bradley
Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff