795.00/8–751
Memorandum for the Files by the Assistant Secretary of State for United Nations Affairs (Hickerson)
Subject: UN Action on Korea
Ambassador Gross telephoned Mr. Hickerson shortly after noon on August 7 to seek clarification regarding some questions raised in the Department’s telegram no. 75 dated August 4.
Ambassador Gross, who was preparing to consult with Jebb and Lacoste, wanted to know how much importance we attached to having the Security Council resolution refer specifically in its preamble to the June 25 and June 27 Security Council resolutions. I told him that we attached considerable importance to this point, and that we felt that a failure to mention these resolutions would be regarded as in essence a gesture of appeasement toward the USSR. Ambassador Gross wondered what our reaction would be to a reference only to the Security Council resolution of July 7, noting that pursuant to this resolution a report had been received from the Unified Command on the conclusion of an armistice. I told Ambassador Gross that I could see little logic in referring to the July 7 resolution alone and doubted it would be much more acceptable to the Soviets than our original position. I told the Ambassador that some other areas of the Department were inclined to agree with the British and French in their reluctance to include references to the June 1950 resolutions but that I felt that from a United Nations standpoint this was important.
Ambassador Gross asked whether we were concerned about the possibility of a Soviet veto on the matter. I told him that we were not particularly worried by this prospect.
[Page 791]The Ambassador asked us whether we would insist on having the Security Council resolution include provision for transmission of the Unified Command report to the General Assembly for action by the Assembly. I indicated that there was a little more flexibility here; the main point was that we must be certain that Assembly action would follow after Security Council proceedings had been concluded.
The Ambassador then turned to the question of sponsorship. He assumed that our references to “widest possible sponsorship” of the Security Council resolution did not include the USSR. I agreed. I suggested that it would be appropriate for all Security Council members contributing forces to the Unified Command to co-sponsor such a resolution.
The Ambassador then referred to our telegram no. 30 to New York dated July 14 and asked whether we wanted to spell out in an Assembly resolution Point 1b (“note with approval armistice agreement of ______ which confirms that armed attack against ROK has been repelled, that fighting has come to an end, that international peace and security in area are being restored”). I said that we wished these concepts to be included in the resolution but that the wording might perhaps be changed. It was important not to leave any doubt that the mere conclusion of an armistice did not of itself restore international peace and security in the area.
In answer to further questions by Ambassador Gross, I told him that we had no objection to inclusion in a General Assembly resolution of a paragraph reaffirming the desirability of support for Korean rehabilitation, without specific reference to the UC–UNKRA agreement; that we had not yet made any decision on time — i. e., how quickly we would move in the General Assembly after conclusion of an armistice; that we preferred a single General Assembly resolution to a number of resolutions; and that we had doubts about the wisdom of Five-Power consultations and expected that USUN would so indicate if other delegations again referred to this possibility.