Lot 55D128: Black Book, Tab 78: Telegram

The Commander in Chief, United Nations Command (Ridgway) to the Joint Chiefs of Staff

secret
flash

HNC–108. This msg in five parts. Subj: Armistice conference at Kaesong 17 July 1951.

Part 1. Summary: Morning session of 50 minutes taken up by Communist attempt to get United Nations Comd delegation to divulge specific info on substance of items and to determine whether we might concede add points. United Nations Comd delegation held firm on a [Page 692] rqst that Communists provide us with their formal views on United Nations Comd proposed revised agenda. (HNC 104 part 2.) Communists asked for two hour recess to study United Nations Comd revised agenda. Afternoon session opened by Communists and consisted of 35 minutes of reiteration of their views on each item of their agenda. At the conclusion of their speech they proposed a revised agenda for the adoption (part 2). Next meeting scheduled for 1000, 18 Jul 1951.

Part 2. Progress made:

Based on revised agenda submitted by United Nations Comd delegation (ref HNC 104, 16 Jul 51). Communist delegation submitted a proposed agenda. This agenda approaches United Nations Comd views more closely than past Communist agenda on all items except their item on withdrawal of foreign troops from Korea. Communists proposed this agenda.

Item 1. Adoption of agenda.

Item 2. Fixing a demarcation line between both sides so as to establish a demilitarized zone as a basic condition for the cessation of hostilities in Korea.

Item 3. Withdrawal of all armed forces of foreign countries from Korea to insure against the resumption of hostilities and acts of armed force in Korea.

Item 4. Concrete arrangements for the realization of cease fire and armistice in Korea, including the composition, authority and functions of a supervising organization for carrying out the terms of cease fire and armistice.

Item 5. Arrangements relating to prisoners of war.”

The Communist delegation spent much time building a case for the withdrawal of foreign troops from Korea and indicated that forceful and persistent efforts would be continued to insure this item’s inclusion on the agenda.

Part 3. Communist attitudes.

Nam Il’s opening remarks at the morning session was in question form designed to insure that the United Nations Comd delegation would take the floor. He attempted to keep the United Nations Comd delegation on the floor and thus obtain a more concise statement of our views on his preliminary opinions. This might well have been a play for time while awaiting direction which would permit him to firm up his formerly expressed preliminary opinions.

The afternoon session opened in a changed atmosphere. Nam Il took the initiative and in a positive manner led up to the presentation of his agenda. His approach however, was to present firm statements rather than to argue or discuss the problem in detail. It appeared that definite official instruction had been received since the noon recess.

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The regular English translator read faster and used better English than normally, indicating either a more studied approach or the possibility that the translation had been furnished him and prepared by an individual having better comd of the English language.

Part 4. Sequence of events.

a. Communist delegation opened morning session at 1100K stating they were ready to listen to further remarks of United Nations Comd delegation. United Nations Comd delegation rqstd the formal opinion of Communists concerning the proposed revised United Nations Comd agenda which had been submitted the day before. It was obvious the Communists were not prepared to present their views on this matter during the morning session and stalled for time by asking questions about the armistice commission and observer teams. United Nations Comd delegation held firm to its rqst that they state their views on United Nations Comd revised agenda. After 50 minutes, Communists rqstd two hour recess for further study of United Nations Comd agenda. Just prior to recess Nam Il stated that United Nations soldiers fired towards town of Pan Mun Jom during period 1850–1905K, 16 Jul. He stated this was in violation of the agreement on neutral zone. We responded that this matter would be investigated. Morning session recessed at 1150K.

b. Communist delegation opened afternoon session at 1400K by a discussion of their agenda items and explaining more fully why they should be adopted. The main point stressed was the withdrawal of foreign troops from Korea. Communists maintained this is the basic point in guaranteeing against the resumption of hostilities in Korea once the cease fire has been ordered. They insist that this matter is a military matter and must be discussed by the delegates present. They stated it was the responsibility and duty of the delegates at this cease fire conference to make arrangements for this matter. After this long explanation the Communists presented a revised agenda which they recommended be adopted. (See part 2). United Nations Comd delegation rqstd the meeting adjourn until tomorrow in order that new Communist agenda could be studied. Meeting adjourned at 1437K with agreement that next meeting would be held at 1000K, 18 Jul.

Part 5. Conclusions: We conclude that:

a. Communists still desire to reach early agreement on agenda in spite of delays today. They were either uninstructed or unprepared for the morning session.

b. They intend to stand firm for the present at least, on the point that withdrawal of foreign troops from Korea is a military matter and must be on the agenda for discussion. However, it is too early to predict whether this will be a breaking point.