Lot 55D128: Black Book, Tab 74: Telegram

The Commander in Chief, United Nations Command (Ridgway) to the Joint Chiefs of Staff

secret   priority

HNC–105. Much evidence revealed in contacts to date with en delegation of existence of their belief that an armistice is the short way to the attainment of their unchanged objective at minimum cost. Our delegates believe opposing delegates think that an armistice, if concluded, will result in same sequence of events as those terminating hostilities in last war, namely that the United States and consequently the United Nations will promptly withdraw their forces, removing the only effective barrier to prompt Communist conquest of whole of Korea.

I concur in this estimate.

I therefore suggest repetition on several occasions of positive statements by authoritative United States Government officials, preferably supported by corresponding statements by United Nations authorities, that armistice or no armistice, the United States and United Nations military forces propose to remain in Korea until political settlement acceptable to them shall have been effected.

Am aware that our President has recently made some such statement.1 However I feel very strongly that only through frequent repetition can we hope to carry conviction to our enemies, and I therefore respectfully recommend consideration of reiteration of this position at a very early date.

  1. No such statement had recently been made by President Truman, although the question was under consideration in Washington at this time. Secretary of Defense Marshall on July 13 had forwarded to Mr. Acheson a draft statement on this subject (795.00/7–1351), but no high level statement was actually issued until July 19 (see telegram JCS 96802, July 19, p. 704).