795.00/7–1451: Telegram
The Secretary of State to the United States Mission at the United Nations
30. Fol is Dept’s thinking on questions raised urtels 38, July 6; 59, July 10.
1. As indicated in Deptel 13, July 6, Dept’s present thinking is that if armistice is achieved, there shld be some official UN action shortly thereafter to note approval of armistice. While in our view, as well as that of UN Secretariat (urtel 1750 June 30), US as UC has authority to enter into armistice in Korea, and any such armistice wld take effect without further UN action, it is nevertheless desirable to have some formal expression in an appropriate UN organ noting approval of armistice. Since UN forces went into Korea pursuant to UN resolutions, it is appropriate and desirable that UN note accomplishment of their mission. We wld want UN action which wld put armistice in context of previous resolutions on Korea and leave record clear as to purpose of UN action in Korea. UN shld also reaffirm its political objectives in Korea. Thus, we are thinking of res or resolutions along lines which wld:
- a)
- recall past SC and GA Res;
- b)
- note with approval armistice agreement of _______ which confirms that armed attack against ROK has been repelled, that fighting has come to an end, that internat’l peace and security in area are being restored;
- c)
- reaffirm that it remains firm purpose of UN to seek to bring about by peaceful means a unified, democratic and independent Govt in Korea.
We are also considering desirability of para which wld confirm that UN forces shld remain in Korea, under authority UC, so long as is necessary to assure that internat’l peace and security in area will be maintained.
2. This Dept considers minimum objective of formal UN action. There may be dels who will not agree that res along lines above is kind of action called for in present circumstances. Some may believe it advisable to take no action at all. Others may wish to see armistice noted with approval in SG only, in such form that it will gain Sov support, and will insist that no further UN action be taken which will not have Sov approval and which wld therefore disturb “new harmony”.
This approach raises serious questions. In Dept’s view passage of res which does not reaffirm UN’s case in Korea, might tend to confuse world as to real character and purpose of UN action in Korea. It is impt that achievement of armistice in no way becloud or confuse record on Korea; it must remain clear that there was Commie aggression in Korea; that UN action was designed solely to meet this aggression and that such action has been successful in meeting aggression and achieving mil objectives of UN. Further, it will mean that there wld be no GA action to reaffirm pol objectives in Korea or to take any other measures which do not have full consent of Sov Union, thus giving USSR in effect a new veto in GA.
This approach, in Dept’s view, grossly misconceives USSR’s objectives in agreeing to armistice. If encouraged, attitude wld have serious consequences going beyond question of UN action re Korea. US is always ready to welcome true Sov cooperation in support of UN Charter; we have no concern or desire to maintain cold war tension. We wld have to have much more and stronger evidence of Sov change of heart, however, before we were persuaded that USSR had suddenly decided to give up all ideas of aggression and Commie imperialism and has started on path of peaceful cooperation. Sov approach to armistice in Korea must not be allowed to engender false and dangerous impression that all will be sweetness and light on internat’l scene. Such an impression would lull us into false security, and jeopardize all our efforts to build up strength of free world and to maintain free world unity against aggression in and out of UN. Within UN it might tend to paralyze action on almost any subject which some dels might feel wld antagonize Russians.
3. Assuming that there is agreement on UN action along lines indicated para 1, there remains question of organ or organs in which such action shld be taken. As we see it, there are three possibilities.
a) Bring res of kind we want directly to GA. Arguments for this course are: Since GA must in any event deal with pol and econ [Page 680] aspects, it might as well deal with mil aspects which so intimately intertwined. Further, GA is logical body to go to. It is GA which has been effectively in charge of Korean question since Oct; indeed entire Korean question has been removed from SC agenda and left to GA. It is GA which approved decision to cross 38th parallel. It carried on all cease-fire efforts; it adopted Feb 1 res finding that Chi Commies have engaged in aggression and affirming determination of UN to continue its action in Korea; it recommended strategic embargo against Commies. GA action at this time, therefore is merely a continuation of GA’s exercise of authority and raises no constitutional question.
Arguments against this course are, of course, arguments in favor of SC action, at least in first instance, as set forth below. Moreover, if this course followed and UK and others continue feel strongly that SC shld act first, their attitude in GA debate might prejudice attainment desired objective of prompt passage by large majority of res along above lines.
b) Seek res of the kind we want in SC Arguments in favor: Action in SC is favored by a number of dels. They wld argue that UN action was initiated in SC, that SC resolutions are still on books and in effect, and that SC res wld be obvious way to wind up fighting. As matter of constitutional practice, questions of this kind shld go to SC which has primary responsibility for maintaining peace, at least in first instance; to bypass SC in this case wld further weaken Council and establish a precedent for taking questions to GA without even going to SC, which raises serious constitutional questions and goes beyond ideas of Uniting for Peace Program.
Arguments vs: Question of Korea has been removed from SC and wld have to be put back on agenda, this might raise doubts as to legality of GA action, past and future. Also, convening Council to discuss Korea case wld almost certainly result in Sov Union raising Chi rep question right at beginning; this question wld be particularly troublesome to us in SC. Further, it seems hardly likely that kind of res we want cld pass SC. Sov Union wld not agree to any mention of previous res on Korea which it had declared illegal; they wld not agree to any res which in any way reaffirmed that Commies committed aggression and that UN forces went to Korea to meet this aggression. Bringing our kind of res to SC therefore is only a futile gesture; we wld then have to bring it to GA in any event. More important there wld be efforts, perhaps by countries like India or Egypt, to water down and neutralize our proposal in an effort to get Sov concurrence or acquiescence. This wld only cause confusion and recrimination, and make more difficult our task in GA thereafter.
c) Another alternative is to present in SC short res which USSR cld vote for and by which SC wld simply note with approval conclusion [Page 681] of armistice, and to seek passage in GA immediately thereafter of full res along lines outlined in para one. Arguments for this include arguments favoring principle of some prior SC action cited para 3 (b) above. In addition it is argued that here is opportunity for exploiting measure of agreement or rapprochement which armistice implies; that it wld be very desirable to have Sov del raise his hand in support of res putting an end to Korean fighting; that wld not only constitute Russian commitment to respect armistice, but it might even have propaganda value to have Russians support res ending a war which they had previously argued shld never have been launched by SC.
Arguments vs this course are: that it is unnecessarily complicated and confusing, and that entire results cld better be achieved simply in GA as argued in para 3 (a). More important, those dels who do not agree on the kind of res outlined in para one as minimum objective for formal UN action might later resist approval by GA of res desired on the ground that such a step wld be likely to upset frail, young bloom of harmony which armistice and agreed SC res will be held to represent. Thus, if this third alternative were followed, it wld be highly important obtain widest possible prior commitment UK and other leading dels for wholehearted support for prompt GA action along desired lines as soon as SC res passed.
On balance, Dept leans toward first alternative, i.e., direct action in GA. (Special UC report on armistice wld go to SC, like previous UC reports, without calling for action.) Before adopting a position, however, we wld appreciate your comments and recommendations.