Subject: British Views Regarding Post-Armistice
Procedure for Korea.
Mr. Greenhill called this morning to leave the attached extracts of a
message from the Foreign Minister to the Ambassador concerning the UK
desire to exchange views with the Secretary of State on post-armistice
developments in Korea.
Mr. Greenhill stated that the Embassy hoped that it would be possible for
the Department to discuss Mr. Morrison’s message early next week. I
assured him that it would be immediately brought to the attention of Mr.
Rusk and the Secretary and that we would get in touch with the Embassy
when we were prepared to discuss it.1
[Attachment]
secret
Following Are the Relevant Portions of a
Message From the Secretary of State [for Foreign Affairs] to His Majesty’s
Ambassador [in Washington]
“I would like to exchange ideas with Mr. Acheson about the possible
developments over Korea. The immediate aim is, of course, an
armistice
[Page 676]
and cease-fire,
but we might profitably consider now the situation that may arise
later.
2. The present basis for armistice negotiations as reported by you is
acceptable to us. I have full confidence in General Ridgway but I
expect the negotiations to be long and difficult. I assume we shall
continue to be fully consulted in the course of the negotiations in
view of their great importance.
3. I am cautiously optimistic that we can bring the fighting in Korea
to an end. I am fairly well satisfied that the Russians genuinely
desire this, and probably the North Koreans also. I am less sure
about the Chinese, though they probably desire at least a breathing
space. There is nothing in our reports from Peking to suggest that
they are abandoning the build-up of their military striking power.
In particular, the Chinese may wish to insist on widening the scope
of the negotiations beyond purely military matters. It is thus
possible that there may be some difference of attitude between the
Chinese and Russians and it is of course in the Russian power to
deny supplies to the Chinese. But we cannot expect to see any public
rift between them; both must be fully aware that neither can afford
this.
4. I am apprehensive less the attitude of the South Koreans may
prejudice the success of the negotiations. I am sure the United
States Government will take the responsibility of ensuring that this
does not happen. There would be an unfortunate reaction in the
United Kingdom if the British public believed that the South Koreans
were responsible for a break-down in the negotiations.
5. Let us however assume that an armistice has been agreed upon. I am
less optimistic about the next stage. We would like to see a general
settlement in Korea under the auspices of the United
Nations—elections throughout the country under United Nations
supervisions; the dissolution of the South Korean Government; a
vigorous rehabilitation programme; withdrawal of all non-Korean
forces, but leaving United Nations personnel and advisers (including
police advisers) for a period. (In this connexion I am attracted by
Mr. Lie’s proposals for a single mediator.)2
6. A settlement on these lines would open the way to discussions of
other Far Eastern problems and would offer the best hope of a
gradual relaxation in tension and of general improvement in the
international situation.
[Page 677]
7. This is the type of solution which would be acceptable to us, but
I confess that the prospects of bringing it about are not good. From
the Chinese point of view, if some such solution were to be
achieved, they would have to agree to confine talks to Korea, and to
accept a settlement in Korea without having had an opportunity to
discuss Formosa and Japan, or having obtained satisfaction in regard
to the representation of the Peking Government in the United
Nations. Moreover, the terms of the settlement in Korea (unification
under United Nations auspices) would constitute a political reverse
for both China and Russia, both of whom, I am convinced, will not
easily abandon their goal of a communist-controlled Korea.
8. I am therefore not hopeful that a general settlement can be
brought about in Korea, and I think that after the armistice we must
expect a prolonged stalemate lasting perhaps for several years, with
a divided Korea. In default of a settlement a stalemate would be
preferable, from our point of view, to either of the
alternatives—efforts to break the stalemate by military force, or
complete withdrawal from Korea. Our instinct would be to stay put in
Korea, avoid provocative action there or elsewhere, maintain such
contacts as are possible with China, wait in the hope that tempers
would cool and that as western rearmament began to show results our
bargaining position would gradually become stronger, and perhaps in
the end reach an understanding with the communist bloc either by a
general settlement or by a series of local settlements. By that time
Japan should also be less of a liability from the defence point of
view, and, assuming that Japanese policy was friendly to the west,
she would be an additional factor making for stability in Asia.
9. In the event of a stalemate such as I am contemplating I would
expect Chinese energies to be directed primarily at internal
reconstruction and at building up her military power. I doubt
whether China would engage in direct military adventures elsewhere,
e.g. against Indo-China or Burma, though the Chinese would lose no
opportunity to stir up trouble throughout South East Asia by means
of propaganda, aid and encouragement to communist and Chinese groups
there, and perhaps by “volunteers”, though not on the Korean scale.
There would however always be a danger of China intervening again in
Korea, and meanwhile both she and Russia could be expected to give
assistance to the North Koreans to re-arm and consolidate. The
Korean situation, despite the stalemate, would remain potentially
explosive.
10. All this assumes an armistice. We must also consider the position
that would arise in the event of the armistice negotiations breaking
down. General Ridgway will of course be taking the necessary
military precautions to guard against a resumption of the offensive.
In the political field it is essential that the responsibility for
any resumption
[Page 678]
of the
fighting must not only lie with the Chinese and North Koreans, but
must be publicly recognised as lying there beyond any doubt. Whilst
I would not suggest fettering General Ridgway’s freedom of action I
earnestly trust that the utmost care will be taken to guard against
what might be considered provocative action on the part of United
Nations forces.
11. These are no more than general speculations about the possible
course of events in connexion with Korea. There are many unknown
factors, and in any case I cannot commit His Majesty’s Government in
advance of discussion with my colleagues on the basis of a known
situation. Nevertheless, I would be glad to know how far they accord
with Mr. Acheson’s own thinking.”3
