357.AD/7–1351
Memorandum of Conversation, by the Director of the Office of United Nations Political and Security Affairs (Wainhouse)
Subject: Future of UNCURK.
| Participants: | Mr. Trucco—Chilean Under Secretary of Foreign Affairs |
| Mr. Rodriguez—Minister Counselor, Chilean Embassy | |
| Mr. Hickerson—UNA | |
| Mr. Wainhouse—UNP | |
| Mr. Emmons—NA |
Mr. Trucco, until recently Chilean representative on UNCURK came in to see Mr. Hickerson today. He was accompanied by Mr. Rodriguez, Minister Counselor of the Chilean Embassy. Mr. Trucco’s visit resulted from a visit which Mr. Hickerson had from Ambassador Santa Cruz last week.
Mr. Hickerson stated that he understood Mr. Trucco was going to act as the Chilean Representative at the UN in place of Ambassador Santa Cruz and would be one of the Chilean delegates to the General Assembly in Paris this fall. Mr. Trucco said that that was so and he was returning to Chile to resume his duties as Under Secretary of Foreign Affairs after the General Assembly session.
Mr. Hickerson spoke of the frustration UNCURK is undergoing, and recalled the circumstances under which UNCURK was created, the military situation in October–November 1950, the important task [Page 669] given to the Commission, the high-level personnel necessary for this important task, the intervention in force of the Chinese Communists in Korea in late November, and the effect that this has produced on the functions of UNCURK. Mr. Hickerson expressed sympathy for the members of UNCURK in their frustration. No one, he said, could have foreseen the Chinese Communist aggression in Korea.
Mr. Trucco fully agreed with Mr. Hickerson on the frustration which UNCURK had experienced and recalled the Commission’s meetings with MacArthur on the 21st and 24th of November in Tokyo, and the high hopes entertained for the unification of Korea after the restoration of international peace and security. But with the Chinese Communist intervention in Korea, the military developments that followed, the creation of the GOC and the appointment of the Agent General under UNKRA for the relief and rehabilitation of Korea, UNCURK’s frustration was pretty nearly complete. He spoke of the low morale of the Commission, its desire to disband, and how he and Mr. Plimsoll (the Australian member on UNCURK) kept the Commission together. Mr. Trucco went on to say that the Commission should be “extricated” from Korea. (While Mr. Trucco did not explain what he meant by “extricated”, we understand from the conversations which he has had with officers in USUN and others in New York that he meant bringing the Commission to New York where it might write its report and recommend its dissolution.) UNCURK, he argued, as the name signifies, is a symbol associated with unification. If the present armistice negotiations should be successful along the present military lines, Korea in fact would be divided, at least for the present. Since the Commission is identified with unification it would not be psychologically desirable to have the Commission remain in Korea. The presence of the Commission under these circumstances would tend to emphasize the “partition” of Korea. It should be “extricated”. In the light of this, it seemed to Mr. Trucco that a new United Nations body with new terms of reference is necessary. Mr. Trucco referred to the visit of the Cordier party to Korea and said that Mr. Cordier shared the views which he had expressed about the Commission and its future work.
Mr. Hickerson explained at some length the importance both politically and psychologically, of maintaining a United Nations instrumentality in Korea pending a fresh look at the entire problem when the Sixth General Assembly meets. It is important that the ROK not be given the feeling that the United Nations is abandoning it. Mr. Hickerson feared that such an inference might be drawn by the ROK if the Commission were withdrawn. We have no intention of giving up our aims in Korea.
Mr. Wainhouse felt that the Commission should remain in the area, [Page 670] write its report in Tokyo perhaps leaving a skeleton staff in Pusan to maintain liaison with it. It was Mr. Wainhouse’s view that the Commission might select one of the representatives to be present when the General Assembly discusses the report of the Commission in Paris.
Mr. Emmons agreed that the withdrawal of UNCURK from Korea at this time might have unfortunate psychological repercussions upon the Korean population. He also expressed interest in the question of any report which UNCURK might be preparing on the Korean situation for submission to the UN Secretariat and indicated that the American Embassy at Pusan had been instructed to turn over to UNCURK certain background information and material on North Korea which might be of use in the preparation of such a report.
Mr. Trucco asked whether we had any views as to how the Commission might be reconstituted at the next General Assembly. Mr. Hickerson stated that we are giving the matter consideration but that we have not come to any definite conclusions. If an armistice agreement is concluded along the present military lines, this would obviously be but a first step. Mr. Hickerson said our objective remains that of the United Nations—a unified, democratic and independent Korea and that the GA will have to deal with this problem at its next session. Mr. Hickerson said that while we have not come to any definite conclusions, the GA might wish to reduce the size of the Commission to three, or appoint a single representative, or for that matter a single representative supported by a commission made up of say three members.
Mr. Trucco asked whether the UN would play any role in the implementation of the armistice agreement. Mr. Hickerson replied that we would like very much to see a role of the UN in addition to that played by the Unified Command, in the implementation of the agreement, but we know very well that the other side would not look with favor upon a UN role. The armistice is military in nature and would very likely be implemented by the military representatives of both sides. Mr. Trucco said he saw no role for UNCURK in the implementation of the armistice agreement.
Mr. Trucco inquired how we intended to deal with the armistice agreement from the standpoint of the UN. Mr. Hickerson stated that, of course, the UN should take some official action such as noting with approval the armistice agreement. We think this should be done in the Security Council or the General Assembly. We, at this time, have no fixed views.
Mr. Trucco expressed some concern about democracies being unable to take the propaganda offensive. He, of course, appreciated the enormous difficulties democracies face in the propaganda field. He felt that the Soviet Union at the forthcoming GA session would more than [Page 671] likely take advantage of the Korean armistice agreement and pose as the great exponent of peace in what might be another of their peace offensives. He felt, somehow or other, we should wrest the initiative from them, as difficult as this may be. Mr. Hickerson agreed in toto with Mr. Trucco and said that the problem of propaganda is a constant preoccupation with us and we were giving this matter our most earnest consideration.