795.00/7–1351

Memorandum by the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Secretary of Defense (Marshall)

top secret

Subject: United States Courses of Action in Korea.

1. In the event that the current armistice negotiations in Korea fail, the Joint Chiefs of Staff consider it necessary to increase military pressure on the enemy. However, they do not recommend action which would involve us in a general war with Communist China. They recommend, therefore, that the following actions be taken:

a.
Continue preparations to place the Nation in the best possible position of readiness for general war on relatively short notice;
b.
Direct the Commander in Chief, United Nations Command (CINCUNC) to increase immediately the scale of military operations in the Korean campaign to the maximum consistent with the capabilities and security of the forces now available;
c.
Remove all restrictions concerning advances into North Korea, at least to the neck of the North Korean peninsula;
d.
Remove all restrictions against attacks in North Korea, including restrictions against attacks on Rashin, the Yalu River dams, and the power installations on the Korean bank of the Yalu River;
e.
Extend the area for pursuit and the air-to-air action in air engagements initiated over Korea by disregarding the border between Korea and Manchuria (loosely termed “hot pursuit”), such pursuit to include destruction of enemy planes after landing, and neutralization of opposing antiaircraft fire;
f.
Support a vigorous campaign of covert operations designed to:
(1)
Aid effectively anti-Communist guerrilla forces in Communist China and Korea; and
(2)
Interfere with and disrupt enemy lines of communications.
g.
Expedite the organization, training, and equipping of Japanese defense forces; and
h.
Develop and equip dependable South Korean military units, as rapidly as possible and in sufficient strength, with a view to their assuming eventually the major responsibility for the defense of Korea.

2. The Joint Chiefs of Staff further recommend that the sixteen nations participating in the Korean campaign be pressed to support the following courses of action:

a.
Bring to bear on the Communist Government of China additional political and economic pressures with a view toward forcing the withdrawal of Chinese Communists from Korea;
b.
Expand immediately the potential for military operations in the Korean campaign through the commitment of additional armed force contingents; and
c.
Impose a naval blockade of Communist China.

3. The Joint Chiefs of Staff recommend that you obtain Presidential approval of the foregoing recommended courses of action in order that there may be no delay in implementing them if the negotiations break down.1

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

Omar N. Bradley

Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
  1. On July 18, these recommendations by the Joint Chiefs of Staff were forwarded to President Truman by Secretary Marshall without comment, Marshall indicating that he was not ready to express an opinion at the time. (Truman Library, Truman Papers, PSF–Subject File) See the memorandum by the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Secretary of Defense, dated August 29, p. 880.