Foreign Relations of the United States, 1951, Korea and China, Volume VII, Part 1

693.0024/4–2151: Telegram

The Ambassador in Korea (Muccio) to the Secretary of State

secret   priority

Pusan, April 21, 1951—5 p. m.

887. Re Deptel 793 Apr 13.¹ Fol comments CCF morale based principally EUSAK interrogations and evaluations effectiveness psychological war efforts. Interpretation must take account fact that majority POW’s are ex-KMT who believed represent 60 percent or possibly more of total CCF forces Korea.

POW’s statements clearly show dissatisfaction conditions in CCF in Korea, based on heavy losses, serious hardships, shortages equipment. There is little evidence that war is understood or that ordinary soldier has any convictions regarding it. Psychological war’s antimorale leaflets, stressing good treatment, etc., receiving some response under these conditions. It appears that at least in this class CCF troops, physical restraint and strict surveillance are major factors preventing greater defections, rather than effect of 2 years or more of CCP indoctrination. Emb officers impressed by absence evidence of such effect except among those with lowest IQ. Judging from information thus obtained, there is basis for belief a major mil defeat, resulting breakdown discipline and surveillance, wld provide opportunity for mass desertions and that a majority of CCF wld take advantage of it. Continuing psychological war activities, coupled with current campaign hardships aggravated by round-the-clock air attack and intense artillery fire, will contribute appreciably to this objective. Difficult assess effect KMT or foil mil attack mainland, but believe same general factors apply, and that physical disruption CCP discipline wld be prerequisite any serious effects.

Emb emphasizes that all foregoing comments are based solely upon POW attitudes, which may well be nonrepresentative sampling, and considers particularly significant fact that until now all UN forces in Korea have taken only 3,100 Chi prisoners out of the masses of Chi employed Korea.

Muccio

1. The substance of this message read as follows:

   “Dept urgently required prepare immediate estimate on current public opinion in China, including morale Chi Commie forces. Dept wld appreciate current info on dissatisfaction among Chi forces and attitudes toward Mao regime ChiNats. Also interested possibilities large-scale desertions, particularly if ChiNats or western forces started mainland operations. Info needed not later than Apr 23.” (793.00/4–2151)

   For documentation on the situation in the People’s Republic of China, see pp. 1474 ff.