357.AK/4–2151: Telegram
The United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin) to the Secretary of State
1433. For Hickerson from Gross. GOC—possible approach to NK authorities. As per Telecon April 21: the GOC is seriously considering requesting the Soviet Govt to deliver to NK authorities at Pyongyang a message from Entezam as GA President similar to his message of 14 Feb to Peking. Padilla and Grafstrom in two lengthy conversations with me have emphasized anxiety lest they be accused of letting go by default any possible significance in timing of NK message of 15 April, or in its implied omission of reference to non-Korean FE issues. Although Padilla and Grafstrom agree thoroughly with us that the NK April message is a scurrilous document, they are under pressure from many UN members “to do something.” Furthermore, at Austin reception April 20 Padilla, Sunde, Palar and Zinchenko had conversation at which I was also present for part of the time. [Page 374] Zinchenko, in response to direct questions by Padilla and by Sunde, expressed the view that the NK message “was worth following up.” When Sunde and Palar both complained of the nature of the document, Zinchenko replied that one must understand that it was necessary under the circumstances for the NK Govt to use strong language “just as the other side has used strong language.” I did not participate in conversation except to tell Zinchenko at this point that I could not possibly agree with him and that we regarded the document with complete contempt. However, Padilla told Grafstrom and myself later that he was impressed by Zinchenko’s repeated suggestions that the NK message should be followed up, particularly since Padilla feels that Zinchenko “does not have views of his own.” I gave no reaction to Padilla and Grafstrom regarding their ideas of communicating with NK through the Soviet Govt, except to agree to discuss it again early next week. I did, however, point out the extreme importance of keeping the US Govt entirely free of the matter. I said that if the GOC should decide to take this or any other step of the same nature, it would have to do so entirely upon its own responsibility and that the US Govt would feel itself in a position to deny any knowledge of such an approach or any approval thereof. Grafstrom agreed that this was a sound position.
Comments of Dept are requested urgently in view of seriousness with which GOC apparently contemplates steps. [Gross.]