396.1–PA/4–551: Telegram
The Chargé in France (Bohlen) to the Secretary of State
priority
5960. Eyes only for Secretary from Jessup and Bohlen. Deptels 52071 and 5220.2 After lunch today, since party split up into two groups, Bohlen found opportunity to make the informal inquiry suggested by Dept.
In reply to an opening given by Semenov concerning realistic approach to the world situation, Bohlen said while discussion here on agenda was interesting and important a meeting of the four Mins wld only make sense if it had an opportunity to produce some genuine relaxation in the world sitn; that while by common agreement Far Eastern questions were excluded both from this discussion and the mtg of the four Mins, nevertheless, realistically speaking, it must be apparent to Sov Govt that as long as people were being killed in Korea, that fact by itself quite, apart from governmental attitudes was a major factor in world sitn and cld not but affect the general atmosphere surrounding internatl relations. Bohlen added that although he had not been directly involved in this Korean matter, nevertheless, from authoritative statements and other info, it wld appear apparent that a purely military decision for one side or the other was difficult to foresee and that one thing was certain—that it wld not be possible for the North Koreans, even with Chinese help, to win a complete mil victory.
Semenov referring to mil sitn said that this wld undoubtedly be a [Page 305] long drawn-out affair since “the Chinese believed that they cld win a mil victory and push the Americans off the peninsula”.
Bohlen replied that this was an illusion and that the state of all equipment in all branches of the service now compared to what it had been in the opening months of the campaign when we had come to the aid of the South Koreans shld make it plain to any serious mil observer that the Chinese cld not achieve this aim.
Semenov indicated in oblique terms that as a professional diplomat he understood the purely informal and personal references of Bohlen so we may hear more from him on this subject.
The impression Bohlen drew from the remark quoted above, which of course shld not be taken too literally, was that Semenov felt a future Chinese offensive might well succeed where others had failed. It is interesting that Semenov made no ref to North Korean prowess, nor attempt to disguise Chinese intervention through any ref to so-called volunteers nor to argue the point as to who was the aggressor in Korea.
It is probably unnecessary to point out that these off-hand and inconclusive observations of Semenov’s in the context of a deliberately casual conversation shld of course not be taken as any definite or accurate reflection of Sov Govt position and we must await any follow-up, if any, from Semenov before any conclusion on this score can be drawn. [Jessup and Bohlen.]