357.AK/4–551: Telegram
The United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin) to the Secretary of State
priority
1367. Re proposed statement on Korea. In response to initiative by Padilla Nervo, Gross and Ross called on him this noon and had long conversation concerning possibility of issuance of statement on Korea by UC. Padilla said that Entezam had informed him of our recent conversation with Entezam and Grafstrom on this subject (Usun 1342, Mar 29). He said GOC as such had not yet discussed matter, but would probably be doing so soon; Grafstrom was coming in to see him this afternoon. Padilla said it would be helpful to him if we could review with him points we made in discussion with Entezam and Grafstrom.
Gross summarized situation along lines summary he gave to Entezam and Grafstrom, adding that we had received general comment from UKG and indicating very briefly nature UK idea.1
Padilla Nervo said he had discussed matter with French (probably Lacoste), Jebb, Rau and Bebler. French had said matter was, of course, one under discussion in Washington. They apparently raised questions whether if statement were issued by UC it would deal only with military matters or, if it dealt also with political matters, whether it would reaffirm or modify established UN policy. French also apparently raised question concerning relationship between group of 14 govts with combat forces and UN as whole.
Jebb had apparently been rather vague and in general seemed to have questioned desirability of issuance of statement.
[Page 302]Rau indicated that Indian contacts with ChiComs indicated to Indians that Mao was convinced that US did not want peaceful settlement in Korea. Padilla said he had indicated his feeling that US desire for peaceful settlement had been made very clear both privately and publicly. He asked Rau how ChiComs could be convinced if they were not already convinced. Question of desirability of issuance of public statement might be very good thing or very bad thing, depending upon interpretation put upon it by ChiComs. If statement indicated strict adherence to established UN policy by way of reaffirmation, statement might be good idea. If, on other hand, statement indicated deviation from established UN policy it might be very bad thing. Rau apparently gave some indication to Padilla that on procedural point statement might be given to GOC for proper use at proper time.
Bebler thought that Soviets were not pushing ChiComs to carry on war in Korea. Commenting that within Soviet orbit there were substantial differences in degree of pressure exerted on satellites, Bebler said that Soviet-ChiCom pressure relationships were “more difficult and more loose”. Bebler also commented that if Soviets were not pressing ChiComs at moment it was because they did not want Chinese either victorious or direct agents of settlement in Korea and would prefer to have USSR in one or other role.
Going on to explain his personal views, Padilla Nervo then said he felt we should avoid issuance of statement by 14 govts with combat forces or even by US as UC if statement carried any indication it was being issued after consultation with the 14. To do so, Padilla thought, in effect would divide UN into sheep and goats and play directly into Soviet hands, giving them most useful field for propaganda and having adverse effect on attitude of ChiComs. He stressed that Commie line leaned heavily on theme that action in Korea was not really UN action, but rather an aggressive action by group of imperialist powers led by US.
Continuing his expression of personal views Padilla said that special responsibility having been given to UC in military matters, question arose whether, if proposed statement dealt with political matters it would in any way be subject to misinterpretation by ChiComs. Padilla then went on to say that if it were considered desirable for some statement to be issued as a US statement, if, in other words, some reiteration or reaffirmation of UN policy in political field were really necessary, there were number of ways in which this could be done. US statement might be handed to and issued by Entezam as Pres of GA, or statement might be issued by GOC, or statement might be presented in First Comite, perhaps proposed by US as declaration by First Comite. Later in conversation Padilla modified his suggestion as indicated below.
Leaving aside for moment question of procedure, Padilla expressed [Page 303] personal view that statement might have good results if it were in fact reaffirmation of existing UN policy, particularly of principles approved by UN. On other hand, he thought it would be undesirable if nature of statement were such as to provoke public debate involving, for example, US Congress, etc. He felt proposed statement would undoubtedly be related to MacArthur statement, variously interpreted in this relationship, and perhaps cast doubt on MacArthur’s situation.
Summarizing Padilla’s comments in order make sure we understood them, Gross said that Padilla seemed to have two points in particular in mind as follows: (1) That if statement were to be issued we should avoid giving any impression that there was political enclave in UN (the 14 govts with combat forces in Korea); (2) That we should avoid indicating any change or modification of existing policy.
Padilla agreed that these two points accurately reflected his own thinking. He went on to say, in effect stating a third point, that if first two points were covered statement might have salutary effect if issuance handled in right way, which he thought might be along following lines: US, acting in its capacity as govt designated by UN as UC, might address statement to GOC with indication it was doing so in order to clarify any misunderstanding that might have resulted from recent events. (Padilla specifically mentioned in this connection any misunderstanding that may have resulted from MacArthur statement.) Statement would be sent to GOC as body charged by the GA with responsibility for seeking pacific settlement in Korea. GOC in turn might give publicity to statement after consultation with us as to timing and method of publication. Publicity might be direct or by means of GOC report to First Comite.
During course our discussion Rau, following conclusion Arab-Asian group mtg this morning, telephoned Padilla and asked him in his personal capacity and not as member GOC to meet with Arab-Asian group this afternoon, which Padilla agreed to do. Padilla said he had no indication from Rau as to what they wanted to see him about but speculated group might wish to ask his personal views concerning statement we have under consideration. He wanted to ask us very frankly whether we thought it would be helpful or not if he were to express his views to Arab-Asian group as he had done to us. We replied with equal frankness that mtg with group as large as Arab-Asian group, any speculation which might arise from his meeting with them would not be likely to make distinctions between Padilla Nervo in his personal capacity and as member GOC. In order to protect himself and GOC it seemed to us frankly that it might be desirable for him to hold his cards very closely. Padilla said this was his own instinct and said if question of statement we have under consideration should come up he would suggest that group should consult USDel. Gross thought it might be helpful [Page 304] to Padilla to know about Rau’s visit the other day (Usun 1330, Mar 26), when Rau indicated that one member of Arab-Asian group had suggested possibility of Arab-Asian appeal to UN forces not to cross 38th parallel. Gross pointed out disadvantages of any such appeal. Padilla agreed. Variation of idea also mentioned by Gross was possibility that someone might support appeal not to cross 38th parallel addressed equally to ChiComs and UN forces. Padilla agreed such appeal would be equally disadvantageous. Gross then mentioned the personal thought that if Arab-Asian group felt they had to do something they might as group, either privately or publicly, inquire of ChiComs why they had not replied to communication from Pres of GA.
Padilla agreed he would let us know whatever he appropriately could concerning his meeting with Arab-Asian group this afternoon.