795.00/4–551
Memorandum of Conversation, by the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Rusk)
Subject: Korea
| Participants: | Sir Oliver Franks—British Ambassador |
| Dean Rusk—Assistant Secretary of State |
After the meeting between the British Ambassador and Ambassador Dulles on the Japanese peace treaty and Pacific security arrangements, Sir Oliver came to my office for a few minutes to talk about Korea.
The Ambassador showed me a telegram from London which he said reflected the “MacArthuritis” in London. The telegram stated that it was important that we not only not extend the hostilities in Korea to other areas but that we show no desire or intention to do so. The U. K. considers that since it has a substantial troop contribution in Korea it is entirely appropriate for the U. K. to make suggestions as to General MacArthur’s directives. The telegram thereupon asked Sir Oliver to bring to our attention London’s views about a directive which it [Page 297] would be useful to send to MacArthur at this juncture. The text of this portion of the telegram is attached.1
The telegram then referred to London’s understanding that the 7th Fleet was intending to conduct an operation along the China coast in the general vicinity of Formosa about April 7. The U. K. referred to this operation as “dragging coat tails” (which was a World War II expression applied to operations which challenged the enemy to come out and fight—DR). The telegram stated that such an operation had, of course, nothing to do with UN purposes in Korea nor with UN operations there. It stated that the U. K. took the gravest view of this operation and must insist that the United States will take sole responsibility for any consequences which might come from it.
I reviewed for Sir Oliver very briefly our longstanding policy regarding Korea. I told him that we had been prepared to see a conclusion of the fighting in the general vicinity of the 38th parallel and that we were determined not to do anything on our side which would in fact extend the hostilities. I pointed out that, whatever General MacArthur said, his actions had been in response to directives from Washington and that UN forces had acted with great restraint. I told him that I thought there was one difference of emphasis between London and Washington which it might be useful to recognize. It was my impression that London considered that after reaching a suitable line in Korea, a position would be held on a more or less static basis in the hope that negotiations would open up. I told him that we were prepared to move toward a period of negotiation but that we saw no evidence of it whatever on the part of the other side. On the contrary, there was every indication that Communist forces were being built up in great mass for a new major offensive in the immediate future. The imminence of this offensive was a more impelling factor in our present thinking than was the prospect of any negotiation. Our estimate is the other side will not negotiate until it has tried on such an offensive. General Ridgway’s problem, therefore, was related to the overhanging threat of a major offensive by a hostile force and we felt that he could not alter his tactical plan in any fundamental sense in order to create a superficial lull within which negotiations might occur. If there was interest in negotiation on the other side that might make a difference. As a preliminary comment on the content of the directive suggested by the British telegram, I said that much of its substance was already in existing directives but that in certain details a difference of emphasis could be recognized. I told him that, for example, the intention to “localize” hostilities would need the usual qualification with respect to [Page 298] action to be taken by UN forces in the event of, say, a massive air attack upon Manchurian bases.
I told Sir Oliver that we had only heard in the last day or so about the projected operation of elements of the 7th Fleet along the China coast but that it was our understanding that the purpose of such an operation being conducted was for reconnaissance purposes in relation to the mission of the 7th Fleet with respect to Formosa.2
- Not printed.↩
- The operation in the Formosa Strait area was carried out by the Seventh Fleet without incident, except that some antiaircraft fire from coastal batteries on the mainland was encountered (Record of the Actions Taken by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, p. 103). For further information, see the memorandum of discussion, April 4, p. 1616.↩