S/S Files: NSC 101 Series
Memorandum by the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Secretary of Defense (Marshall)
Subject: Military Action in Korea
- 1.
- In view of the arrival of United Nations ground forces in the
vicinity of the 38th parallel in Korea and in the light of current
United States policy toward Korea, the Joint Chiefs of Staff
recommend the following as the United States military position
toward Korea under conditions now obtaining:
- a.
- If the USSR precipitates a general war, United Nations forces should be withdrawn from Korea as rapidly as possible and deployed for service elsewhere; and
- b.
- If the USSR commits units of Soviet “volunteers” sufficient to be critical to the safety of the United Nations forces, United Nations forces should be withdrawn. The United States should then mobilize in readiness for general war.
- 2.
- If general war is not precipitated by the USSR prior to the
resolution of the Korean problem:
- a.
- If the immediate objectives of the strategy of the USSR are in Western Europe, it would be to the advantage of that nation for the maximum number of United Nations Forces to remain in Korea. On the other hand, if the immediate objectives of the USSR are in the Far East, it would be to the advantage of that nation for United Nations forces to leave Korea; and
- b.
- It would be greatly to the advantage of the Communists to bring about an armistice which would leave their military forces in Korea. Such an armistice would be greatly to the disadvantage of the United Nations forces inasmuch as it would constitute an unwarranted drain on our military resources, and would keep our forces in Korea.
- 3.
- The Korean problem cannot be resolved in a manner satisfactory to the United States by military action alone. Further, because the Korean problem is a symptom of world tension, a satisfactory resolution of that problem probably cannot be achieved by politico-military action which is confined to Korea; rather, a resolution of that problem in a manner satisfactory to the United States is not to be expected unless and until there is a general relaxation of world tensions.
- 4.
- In the light of all of the foregoing:
- a.
- United States forces in Korea must pursue their current military course of action there until a political objective for that country appears attainable without jeopardizing United States positions with respect to the USSR, to Formosa, and seating the Chinese Communists in the United Nations;
- b.
- Dependable South Korean units should be generated as rapidly as possible and in sufficient strength to take over the major part of the burden from the other United Nations forces;
- c.
- Preparations should be made immediately for action by naval and air forces against the mainland of China; and
- d.
- Action should be taken as a matter of urgency to ascertain the policies and objectives of our allies toward Korea specifically and the Far East in general, and also to discover the degree and nature of the support which we would expect from them if, while continuing our present military course of action in Korea, operations against the mainland of China are initiated.1
Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
-
At the request of the Secretary of Defense, this memorandum was circulated to the National Security Council by the Executive Secretary of the NSC (Lay) on April 10. Mr. Lay’s note of transmittal indicated that the paper would be referred to the NSC Staff for consideration in connection with the priority project on the NSC 48 series dealing with U.S. national objectives and policy in Asia; for documentation, see vol. vi, Part 1, pp. 33 ff.
Secretary of Defense Marshall on April 9 furnished President Truman a copy of the JCS memorandum under cover of a transmittal letter containing this comment:
“I believe you might be interested in these recommendations which deal with the basic military factors in the Korean situation. This memorandum is also being sent to the National Security Council for consideration.” (JCS Files)
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