The Department of Defense may wish to suggest changes in those sections
of the memorandum relating to military matters or it may wish to suggest
that a military annex be appended to the memorandum itself.
Assistant Secretary Rusk will be available at any time to discuss the
memorandum with representatives of the Department of Defense. I believe
that the matter is of some urgency and would greatly appreciate your
views as soon as practicable.
[Enclosure]
Draft Memorandum for the President
subject: the 38th parallel
1. There is urgent need for a preliminary determination of the action
to be taken by United Nations forces with respect to the 38th
parallel. General MacArthur needs more precise instructions on the
matter than he now has. Other governments with troops in Korea are
insisting upon full consultation before any decision is made to move
substantial forces across the parallel.
United Nations and United States Objectives
2. It is the political objective of the United Nations and of the
United States to bring about the establishment of a unified,
independent and democratic Korea. This has been a United States
objective since the Cairo Declaration and has been accepted
repeatedly by an overwhelming majority of the United Nations. The
October 7, 1950 resolution of the General Assembly (Tab A)1 is the
latest statement of this objective.
3. The essential objective of United Nations military action in Korea
is to repel the aggression against the Republic of Korea and to
restore international peace and security in the area. This is set
forth in the June 27, 1950 resolution of the Security Council (Tab
B).2 The
United Nations could not accept a result which leaves the aggressor
in possession of his loot; hence, it could not accept anything less
than a restoration of the status quo ante
June 25, 1950, except as a matter of
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military necessity. On the other hand, success
in repelling the aggression across the 38th parallel would
constitute a major victory for United Nations forces since it would
involve the denial to the massed hordes of the enemy their main
objective.
4. Neither the United Nations nor the United States has undertaken an
obligation to use whatever force is necessary to achieve the unity
of all Korea by military means. The October 7, 1950 resolution of
the General Assembly is permissive but not mandatory on this point.
Our principal allies and the great majority of governments having
troops in Korea would not support the unification of Korea as a war aim, although they continue to support it
as a political objective. A decision to press
for the unification of Korea by military action would constitute a
vast increase in our present military commitments, would almost
certainly require the extension of hostilities against China, would
greatly increase the risk of direct Soviet participation, and would
require a major political effort to obtain the agreement of other
directly interested governments.
Enemy Intentions
5. There is no evidence that the Moscow–Peiping axis has changed its
publicly announced intention to drive United Nations forces from all
of Korea. There continues to be substantial evidence of a
reinforcement and supply effort on the part of the enemy to support
major military operations in Korea. In his recent Pravda interview, Stalin said, “If Britain and the United
States reject finally the proposals made by the People’s Government
of China, the war in Korea can only end in a defeat of the
interventionists.”
6. If the enemy persists in his effort to drive United Nations forces
from Korea, no early end of the fighting is in sight. The enemy must
now decide, however, between a major reinforcement of his effort in
Korea or a suspension or abandonment of his purpose to seize all of
Korea. If enemy losses and the prospect of even heavier costs in
personnel and matériel cause a reconsideration of the situation in
Moscow and Peiping, they may reach the conclusion that a restoration
of the status quo ante June 25, 1950 should
be accepted. This would not mean that their purpose of producing an
all-Communist Korea would be abandoned, but it might be pursued by
other means. Further, it can be expected that the Moscow–Peiping
axis would attempt to extort a price for the restoration of the status quo, such as concessions on Formosa
and admission to the United Nations. These we could not accept,
since to do so would reward aggression and vitiate the sacrifice
already made to repel it.
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The Military Situation
7. United Nations forces would require heavy reinforcement to
undertake large-scale operations into North Korea. These
reinforcements are not readily available from the United States or
elsewhere and, even if they were available, there would be grave
problems involved in committing them to Korea in face of the present
worldwide threat posed by the Soviet Union. If this additional
United Nations effort were attempted, the Moscow–Peiping axis has
comparatively unlimited reserves which could be committed to Korea
to prevent a complete United Nations success. The enemy’s ability to
maintain larger forces and to oppose United Nations advances would
sharply increase as the battle moved northward. If the United
Nations problem is to force a change in the enemy’s policy by
inflicting maximum punishment upon him with minimum cost to United
Nations forces, a battle of maneuver in the general vicinity of the
present positions would seem to be more advantageous to the United
Nations than would operations substantially to the north.
International Opinion
8. Virtually all members of the United Nations, including the great
majority of those actively participating in the military operations
in Korea, are strongly opposed to any general advance across the
38th parallel. This opinion is largely based upon (a) the view that by driving the enemy back across the 38th
parallel the primary objective of repelling the aggression would
have been accomplished, and (b) the view that
an advance into North Korea would (1) make an early settlement of
the Korean issue impossible because the enemy would not accept
anything less than the 38th parallel, (2) greatly increase the
pressure to extend the hostilities to China, (3) involve United
States military resources on an increasing scale to an indecisive
operation in Asia, and (4) greatly increase the risk of direct
Soviet involvement in Korea and the consequent risk of general war.
A major advance across the 38th parallel would require full
consultation with our principal allies, and their agreement would
under present circumstances, be extremely difficult to obtain.
Unilateral action by the United States as the Unified Command would
create a severe crisis within the free world and could lead to the
withdrawal of certain allied forces from the Korean campaign.
Summary of Factors Operating Against a General
Advance Across the 38th Parallel
9. The principal factors militating against a general advance across
the 38th parallel are: (a) the capability of
the Moscow–Peiping axis to inflict a decisive defeat upon United
Nations forces if they
[Page 193]
make the decision to do so, (b) the risk of
extending the Korean conflict to other areas and even into general
war at a time when we are not ready to risk general war, (c) the heavy additional drain on American
manpower and resources without a clearly seen outcome of the effort,
(d) loss of unity among our allies and in
the United Nations in support of the Korean effort, and (e) the diversion of additional United States
effort from other vital requirements.
The 38th Parallel as a Safe Haven
10. It would be disastrous for United Nations forces if Korea north
of the 38th parallel should become a safe haven for enemy forces.
The Unified Command must be free to continue maximum air and naval
action against North Korea and to take such action on the ground as
is required to keep the enemy off balance, interrupt or prevent
enemy offensives against United Nations forces and, if opportunity
offers, to inflict punishment on the enemy without serious loss to
our own forces. The 38th parallel should not become a barrier to the
conduct of aggressive defensive operations which have characterized
United Nations action in recent weeks.
Factors Favoring a General Advance Across the 38th
Parallel
11. If a general advance across the 38th parallel were within our
military capabilities and could be accomplished without heavy loss
to United Nations forces, such an advance would (a) greatly increase the cost of aggression to the
Moscow–Peiping axis, (b) explode the myth of
Chinese military power, (c) render less
likely Chinese adventures in other areas, and (d) produce strains within the Peiping regime and between
Peiping and Moscow.
An Agreed Settlement
12. This memorandum is based upon the absence of an agreed settlement
of the Korean affair as a result of negotiation or the work of the
United Nations Good Offices Committee. It is considered important
that our military action be consistent with the steps we should take
in the absence of agreement but, to the extent possible, be such as
to (a) produce a desire for settlement on the
part of the enemy and (b) create a situation
in which a settlement could in fact be reached. The Department of
State is preparing a separate memorandum on the question of a
possible agreed settlement of the Korean situation and related
problems.3
Conclusion
13. On balance, it would be undesirable for United Nations forces to
attempt a general advance north of the general vicinity of the 38th
parallel.
[Page 194]
Recommendation
14. It is recommended:
-
a.
- that this memorandum be furnished to the Joint Chiefs of
Staff as a policy basis for the preparation of a draft
directive to General MacArthur for the consideration of the
President;
-
b.
- that the Department of State, upon the approval by the
President of a directive to General MacArthur, discuss the
matter with other governments having troops in Korea;
-
c.
- that the Departments of State and Defense keep the
situation under constant review and advise the President in
the event of any significant change in the political or
military considerations affecting this position.
