795.00/2–2351

The Secretary of State to the Secretary of Defense ( Marshall )

top secret

My Dear Mr. Secretary: There are attached five copies of a draft memorandum for the President on the subject of the 38th parallel. I [Page 190] should appreciate the views of the Department of Defense before the memorandum is forwarded to the White House. You will notice that the first recommendation is that the memorandum itself be furnished by the President to the Joint Chiefs of Staff as a policy basis for a military directive to General MacArthur.

The Department of Defense may wish to suggest changes in those sections of the memorandum relating to military matters or it may wish to suggest that a military annex be appended to the memorandum itself.

Assistant Secretary Rusk will be available at any time to discuss the memorandum with representatives of the Department of Defense. I believe that the matter is of some urgency and would greatly appreciate your views as soon as practicable.

Sincerely yours,

Dean Acheson
[Enclosure]

Draft Memorandum for the President

subject: the 38th parallel

1. There is urgent need for a preliminary determination of the action to be taken by United Nations forces with respect to the 38th parallel. General MacArthur needs more precise instructions on the matter than he now has. Other governments with troops in Korea are insisting upon full consultation before any decision is made to move substantial forces across the parallel.

United Nations and United States Objectives

2. It is the political objective of the United Nations and of the United States to bring about the establishment of a unified, independent and democratic Korea. This has been a United States objective since the Cairo Declaration and has been accepted repeatedly by an overwhelming majority of the United Nations. The October 7, 1950 resolution of the General Assembly (Tab A)1 is the latest statement of this objective.

3. The essential objective of United Nations military action in Korea is to repel the aggression against the Republic of Korea and to restore international peace and security in the area. This is set forth in the June 27, 1950 resolution of the Security Council (Tab B).2 The United Nations could not accept a result which leaves the aggressor in possession of his loot; hence, it could not accept anything less than a restoration of the status quo ante June 25, 1950, except as a matter of [Page 191] military necessity. On the other hand, success in repelling the aggression across the 38th parallel would constitute a major victory for United Nations forces since it would involve the denial to the massed hordes of the enemy their main objective.

4. Neither the United Nations nor the United States has undertaken an obligation to use whatever force is necessary to achieve the unity of all Korea by military means. The October 7, 1950 resolution of the General Assembly is permissive but not mandatory on this point. Our principal allies and the great majority of governments having troops in Korea would not support the unification of Korea as a war aim, although they continue to support it as a political objective. A decision to press for the unification of Korea by military action would constitute a vast increase in our present military commitments, would almost certainly require the extension of hostilities against China, would greatly increase the risk of direct Soviet participation, and would require a major political effort to obtain the agreement of other directly interested governments.

Enemy Intentions

5. There is no evidence that the Moscow–Peiping axis has changed its publicly announced intention to drive United Nations forces from all of Korea. There continues to be substantial evidence of a reinforcement and supply effort on the part of the enemy to support major military operations in Korea. In his recent Pravda interview, Stalin said, “If Britain and the United States reject finally the proposals made by the People’s Government of China, the war in Korea can only end in a defeat of the interventionists.”

6. If the enemy persists in his effort to drive United Nations forces from Korea, no early end of the fighting is in sight. The enemy must now decide, however, between a major reinforcement of his effort in Korea or a suspension or abandonment of his purpose to seize all of Korea. If enemy losses and the prospect of even heavier costs in personnel and matériel cause a reconsideration of the situation in Moscow and Peiping, they may reach the conclusion that a restoration of the status quo ante June 25, 1950 should be accepted. This would not mean that their purpose of producing an all-Communist Korea would be abandoned, but it might be pursued by other means. Further, it can be expected that the Moscow–Peiping axis would attempt to extort a price for the restoration of the status quo, such as concessions on Formosa and admission to the United Nations. These we could not accept, since to do so would reward aggression and vitiate the sacrifice already made to repel it.

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The Military Situation

7. United Nations forces would require heavy reinforcement to undertake large-scale operations into North Korea. These reinforcements are not readily available from the United States or elsewhere and, even if they were available, there would be grave problems involved in committing them to Korea in face of the present worldwide threat posed by the Soviet Union. If this additional United Nations effort were attempted, the Moscow–Peiping axis has comparatively unlimited reserves which could be committed to Korea to prevent a complete United Nations success. The enemy’s ability to maintain larger forces and to oppose United Nations advances would sharply increase as the battle moved northward. If the United Nations problem is to force a change in the enemy’s policy by inflicting maximum punishment upon him with minimum cost to United Nations forces, a battle of maneuver in the general vicinity of the present positions would seem to be more advantageous to the United Nations than would operations substantially to the north.

International Opinion

8. Virtually all members of the United Nations, including the great majority of those actively participating in the military operations in Korea, are strongly opposed to any general advance across the 38th parallel. This opinion is largely based upon (a) the view that by driving the enemy back across the 38th parallel the primary objective of repelling the aggression would have been accomplished, and (b) the view that an advance into North Korea would (1) make an early settlement of the Korean issue impossible because the enemy would not accept anything less than the 38th parallel, (2) greatly increase the pressure to extend the hostilities to China, (3) involve United States military resources on an increasing scale to an indecisive operation in Asia, and (4) greatly increase the risk of direct Soviet involvement in Korea and the consequent risk of general war. A major advance across the 38th parallel would require full consultation with our principal allies, and their agreement would under present circumstances, be extremely difficult to obtain. Unilateral action by the United States as the Unified Command would create a severe crisis within the free world and could lead to the withdrawal of certain allied forces from the Korean campaign.

Summary of Factors Operating Against a General Advance Across the 38th Parallel

9. The principal factors militating against a general advance across the 38th parallel are: (a) the capability of the Moscow–Peiping axis to inflict a decisive defeat upon United Nations forces if they [Page 193] make the decision to do so, (b) the risk of extending the Korean conflict to other areas and even into general war at a time when we are not ready to risk general war, (c) the heavy additional drain on American manpower and resources without a clearly seen outcome of the effort, (d) loss of unity among our allies and in the United Nations in support of the Korean effort, and (e) the diversion of additional United States effort from other vital requirements.

The 38th Parallel as a Safe Haven

10. It would be disastrous for United Nations forces if Korea north of the 38th parallel should become a safe haven for enemy forces. The Unified Command must be free to continue maximum air and naval action against North Korea and to take such action on the ground as is required to keep the enemy off balance, interrupt or prevent enemy offensives against United Nations forces and, if opportunity offers, to inflict punishment on the enemy without serious loss to our own forces. The 38th parallel should not become a barrier to the conduct of aggressive defensive operations which have characterized United Nations action in recent weeks.

Factors Favoring a General Advance Across the 38th Parallel

11. If a general advance across the 38th parallel were within our military capabilities and could be accomplished without heavy loss to United Nations forces, such an advance would (a) greatly increase the cost of aggression to the Moscow–Peiping axis, (b) explode the myth of Chinese military power, (c) render less likely Chinese adventures in other areas, and (d) produce strains within the Peiping regime and between Peiping and Moscow.

An Agreed Settlement

12. This memorandum is based upon the absence of an agreed settlement of the Korean affair as a result of negotiation or the work of the United Nations Good Offices Committee. It is considered important that our military action be consistent with the steps we should take in the absence of agreement but, to the extent possible, be such as to (a) produce a desire for settlement on the part of the enemy and (b) create a situation in which a settlement could in fact be reached. The Department of State is preparing a separate memorandum on the question of a possible agreed settlement of the Korean situation and related problems.3

Conclusion

13. On balance, it would be undesirable for United Nations forces to attempt a general advance north of the general vicinity of the 38th parallel.

[Page 194]

Recommendation

14. It is recommended:

a.
that this memorandum be furnished to the Joint Chiefs of Staff as a policy basis for the preparation of a draft directive to General MacArthur for the consideration of the President;
b.
that the Department of State, upon the approval by the President of a directive to General MacArthur, discuss the matter with other governments having troops in Korea;
c.
that the Departments of State and Defense keep the situation under constant review and advise the President in the event of any significant change in the political or military considerations affecting this position.

  1. For text, see Foreign Relations, 1950, vol. vii, p. 904.
  2. For text, see ibid., p. 211.
  3. See the memorandum by Robert W. Tufts, supra.