Foreign Relations of the United States, 1951, Korea and China, Volume VII, Part 1

795.00/2–2251

Memorandum by Robert W. Tufts of the Policy Planning Staff¹

secret

[Washington,] February 22, 1951.

Draft Statement on Korea by the President

1. The occasion for the statement might be the military stabilization which now appears to have been achieved in Korea.

2. The form of the statement might be a letter by the President in reply to a letter from Senator Connally inquiring whether military stabilization of the situation in Korea might serve as the basis for a political arrangement conforming to the U.N. objectives in Korea and relating this problem to other urgent questions under consideration by the Committee on Foreign Relations.

3. The points which the President might make in his letter are:

a. The U.S. hopes that military stabilization of the situation in Korea might serve as the basis for a satisfactory settlement of the Korean problem. The U.N. action in Korea was undertaken to repel the aggression against the Republic of Korea and the U.N. has consistently sought and still seeks to conclude the fighting in Korea on terms which would restore peace to the area, in order to lay a basis for the continuation of its efforts since 1947 to secure the peaceful unification of an independent Korea.

b. The intervention of the Chinese Communists created a wholly new situation and made it impossible to conclude the fighting and restore peace by the military operations which were undertaken in October to destroy the North Korean aggressor forces. The U.N. has sought and still seeks to prevent the widening of hostilities in this new and inflammable situation and to conclude an arrangement with the Chinese Communists which would assure a cessation of hostilities in Korea, the independence of the Republic of Korea, the phased withdrawal of foreign forces from Korea, and the prevention of the use of North Korea as a base for aggression against the Republic of Korea while the U.N. is working out arrangements for the unification of Korea.

c. Clearly, the question whether military stabilization of the situation in Korea can serve as the basis for such a political arrangement depends in large measure on whether the Chinese Communists are free to seek peaceful settlement. The U.S. will continue to support the efforts of the U.N. to conclude such an arrangement. The U.S. believes that the Chinese people will recognize that failure to conclude such an arrangement can only further the schemes of Russian imperialism which seeks to create a new colonialism in Asia and to involve the Chinese people in war as a means of furthering its aim of dominating China and of furthering its expansionist designs in other areas.

d. This Government therefore advocates that the primary objective of the U.N. forces in Korea should be the restoration of the situation existing prior to the North Korean attack on June 25 under conditions which will protect the Republic of Korea against renewed attacks south of the 38th parallel and will lay the foundations for a peaceful unification of Korea by political means.

e. Obviously, so long as North Korea continues to be used as a base for aggression against the Republic of Korea military action against North Korea required by this situation must be continued.

1. A notation on the source text indicated that this memorandum was discussed at a meeting with Mr. Acheson on February 22, with Paul Nitze, Director of the Policy Planning Staff, also being present. The notation was presumably made by Mr. Tufts. No record of the meeting has been found.