320/2–851: Telegram
The United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin) to the Secretary of State
priority
1136. From Ross—Conversation with Entezam re Korea and Chinese Communists. I called on Entezam this noon at his request. He initiated conversation by a very gloomy reference to fact he had been on leave at Lake Placid when David Owen, Acting Secretary General, telephoned him on Saturday and read to him resolution we had introduced that day condemning Chinese Communist aggression in Korea.1 His first reaction to 9th paragraph of resolution, he said, had been strong opposition to participating in his capacity as President of Assembly as provided in that paragraph of our resolution. He said he had finally yielded, however, to political necessity of accepting indicated role, although he realized it would mean very great loss of prestige in view of virtual certainty that no peaceful settlement could be worked out with Chinese Communists.
At later stage in conversation I took occasion to point out that inclusion of 9th paragraph in our resolution was not merely political gesture but that we were very sincerely devoted to objective of achieving peaceful settlement of Korean issue. I said we did not accept defeatist view which had been expressed, for example, by Indian delegate, that passage our resolution would destroy prospect of peaceful settlement. I said we wanted to cooperate fully with efforts of GOC, although we fully realized difficulties they would be up against vis-à-vis Chinese Communists. I said in our conception work of ad hoc CMC and GOC should be closely coordinated and proceed along parallel lines.
[Page 161]After his initial gloomy statement Entezam went on to say that his first hope had been that both Pearson and Rau would be able to continue to serve with him in order to be able to maintain continuity of cease-fire group. He regretted decision of Indian Government against permitting Rau to serve but said that Rau had assured him of continuing support of Indian Government in peaceful settlement effort. He said that as substitute for Rau he felt Swedes, because of their contact at Peiping, would be desirable.2 Now that Pearson was also definitely out he had asked Cordier to telephone me last night to inquire whether Padilla Nervo3 would be acceptable to us.
I told Entezam as I told Cordier last night that I did not feel it was appropriate for us to comment on his choice of colleagues for GOC. I said that out of consideration for his position in matter it hardly seemed fair to him to expose him to charge that his appointments had resulted in any way from our influence. Similarly I thought it was much better from our own point of view not to be open in any way to charge that we have sought to influence his appointments. Entezam said he understood these points entirely and thought they were correct. While I was in his office Entezam indicated on the telephone to one of Padilla Nervo’s associates his hope that Padilla Nervo would be able to serve on GOC.
Entezam outlined as follows his thinking concerning alternative approaches to work of GOC.
In general way he said first mission of GOC was to study work of cease-fire group and to consider approaches that might be made to Chinese Communists on basis of principles approved by First Committee. He said his concept of work of GOC was that it should not attempt to solve problems (such as question of Chinese representation) but rather facilitate the procedures necessary to achieve solution of outstanding issues.
With this general thought in mind first alternative mentioned by Entezam was sending of inquiry as to views of Peiping Government. Entezam discounted this alternative since it was apparent Peiping Government is illegal, etc. group. Such communication Entezam indicated might be sent by him on authority of group either officially through secretariat or through intermediary of Swedes or Indians.
In reference to this approach, Entezam said Pearson had urged him to approach Peiping authorities individually in his capacity as President [Page 162] of Assembly before appointing other members of GOC. Entezam said he had disapproved of this procedure since he was not authorized to follow it by Assembly.
The second alternative mentioned by Entezam was that Peiping might be asked to appoint a representative to come to New York to discuss peaceful settlement. He doubted whether Peiping would accept this.
Third, Entezam conceived that Peiping might be asked if they would accept an emissary who would go to Peiping. Such emissary might be one of other two members of group or third person. It should not be Entezam himself, he felt, since this would too deeply involve prestige of UN. He did not altogether rule out his going personally to Peiping, however, as last resort.
Fourth, if it were thought that Peiping regime would not give its formal acceptance of emissary they might be asked if they would be willing, without formality of acceptance, receive an emissary. Entezam thought this alternative was one most likely be accepted by Peiping, but he did not feel it was very dignified procedure from UN viewpoint.
Fifth, Entezam raised question of direct contact between USG and Peiping Government. He said that this approach he firmly expected would not be well received by either USSR or UK. He said USSR would obviously not wish to see US in position of driving wedge between them and Chinese Communists and he said that he did not imagine UK would be very happy about our discussing matters with Chinese Communists without their participation in some way.
It seemed fairly clear to me that Entezam had primarily on his mind question of developing contact between US and Chinese Communists. He developed his thinking on this point a little further along following lines. He said, of course, he realized that we might tell him we thought this approach was very bad or, on other hand, we might at this time not wish to make any comment. He recalled that we had repeatedly said we were willing to seek to achieve peaceful settlement through UN. One possible approach, he said, was that if Chinese Communists were not willing to send representative to New York they might be willing send representative to meet with GOC perhaps in Europe. In this case it should not be too difficult for us to arrange to have whomever we might wish to designate for the purpose available in Europe if a possibility of direct contact might be developed.
Entezam said that he did not expect any comment from me at this time on foregoing alternatives and I did not offer any.
As reported by telephone to Sandifer, Entezam indicated as Cordier had on telephone last night at Entezam’s request, that he would like to be in Washington on Monday4 and that it would be very helpful [Page 163] to him if he could see the principal people in Department involved in these matters, including the Secretary. I said we would, of course, be very glad to facilitate his contacts in any way we could. I reminded him that while I was sure the Secretary would always want to see him his schedule was very full and the notice was rather short. Entezam indicated that if Secretary’s schedule were full on Monday it might be possible to work something out for Tuesday morning. I told him I would let him know soon as possible what arrangements could be worked out.
Entezam said he had been discussing with Lie question of adjournment or recessing of Fifth Session GA. He said Lie had taken view Assembly should be subject to recall by Secretary General rather than by President. Entezam said he had demurred. It was his view that since there remained work to be done by first committee, with particular reference to reports from ad hoc CMC and GOC, that Assembly should be recessed on understanding that Committee 1 would be called into session whenever in judgment of chairman of that committee it appeared appropriate to do so. I made clear to Entezam that in our view Assembly session should be recessed and definitely not adjourned. [Ross.]
- Reference is to the introduction into the First Committee of the U.S. draft resolution (A/C.1/654) on Saturday, January 20, by Mr. Austin.↩
- Mr. Austin had informed the Department of State on February 6 that, in view of India’s unwillingness to let Rau serve on the Good Offices Committee, Entezam had asked Sven Grafström of Sweden to accept the post, and the Swedish Government was willing to have him do so. (Telegram 1113, February 6, from New York; 310.5/2–651)↩
- Luís Padilla Nervo, Mexican Representative at the United Nations.↩
- February 12.↩