795.00/2–751: Telegram
The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Korea
652. Eyes only for Muccio from Rusk. Fol for ur strictly conf background [Page 159] and such discreet use as you may consider desirable with ROK officials.
Neither US nor UN has ever committed itself to unification of Kor by unlimited commitment of whatever force required. UN mil objective has been repel armed attack on ROK and restore peace and security in area. In absence of intervention by Chi or USSR unification by polit means might have followed destruction of NK forces. However, in view of demonstrated Chi Commie willingness and ability commit large forces to prevent UN achieving that objective without unacceptable commitment force in Kor and increasing possibility spread of hostilities into gen war that course of action is no longer feasible. Apart from mil feasibility, attempt to reoccupy NK by force wld undoubtedly arouse determined opposition friendly UN members prejudicing US position and adversely affecting further UN effectiveness collective action.
On other hand Chi Commies may not have or may not exert ability to achieve their announced objective of expelling UN forces from all Kor.
Therefore, we are considering here some solution which will deny success to Commie aggressor without continuing subj Kor to ravages war and UN and ROK forces to indefinite and indecisive combat against numerically superior foe.
It appears certain that Commies will not accept and have ability deny any polit solution which wld permit unification except on terms which wld assure eventual, if not immediate, Commie domination of all Kor.
Therefore, it is our tentative view that solution must be sought along lines which while maintaining US post-war polit attitude toward unified Kor, will restore and maintain authority ROK south of 38th parallel under conditions which will permit eventual withdrawal of UN forces. It appears to us that, if UN forces are able stabilize mil position vicinity 38th parallel, such solution cld best be achieved by seeking cease-fire and, if possible, a demilitarized border zone and such other measures as will give maximum possible assurance against renewal of aggression. This shld be accompanied by thorough program for strengthening of ROK forces to point they cld replace UN ground forces and cld, with assistance of UN naval and air power, offer maximum deterrent to renewal of aggression, and reasonable possibility of success in repelling any but an all-out attack by USSR. Some rep UN force might remain in Kor for considerable time.
To obtain such solution, it will probably be necessary for US agree to principle of negot with Chi Commies on other FE matters with all difficulties inherent therein.
Such solution is obviously not ideal from standpoint of ROK, US [Page 160] or UN, but is probably maximum obtainable within present capabilities. It wld achieve objective of repelling attack against ROK, denying a success to Commie aggression and restore peace to area. There wld, of course, be risk of renewed aggression, but that risk is permanent and we cannot undertake major permanent US mil commitment Kor on that account.
I wld welcome any observations or suggestion you may desire transmit re these preliminary views. Best regards. [Rusk.]