792.5–MAP/10–2251: Telegram
The Chargé in Thailand (Turner) to the Secretary of State
929. Re Depcirgram Oct 2, 4:35 p. m. and Depcirtel 338, Oct 12,1 semi-annual MDAP report.
[Page 1630]For photographs illustrating scope MAAG program and unclassified summary effects pertaining to MAAG refer Embdes 274 and 277, Oct 182 marked urgent and sent unaccompanied pouch No. 4–1510 invoice No. A–68. As instructions were only received Oct 15 Emb unable meet Oct 25 deadline except by telegram. Following represents joint views Emb and MAAG on evaluation MAAG program covering April–October 1951 period. Certain parts necessarily classified due security reasons here.
Begin unclassified. With arrival considerable MDAP arms and equipment, intensive training in Thai Army and Air Force moved ahead readily during this period. Army now well grounded in maintenance procedures, warehousing, stock records, and use of all MDAP infantry weapons already arrived under FY 1951 program. After successful completion two MAAG supervised infantry training courses Thai officers now in position give instruction to nine US-equipped battalions stationed in provinces. These battalions may be termed effective front line troops by March 1952 following extensive field exercises under MAAG guidance. End unclassified.
Begin confidential. First two RTAF squadrons which have completed T–6 training and are now conducting transition flying in MDAP F8F aircraft will be effective fighting units by Feb 1952; third squadron by Oct 1952. Three additional squadrons will be activated as pilots become available from primary flying school which has been completely reorganized along USAF lines. One dive bomber squadron utilizing six MDAP S–B–2–C’s and dive bombers already purchased from Britain will be activated January 1952; one fighter squadron in March 1952 and another in March 1953. Estimate squadrons will be combat ready one year from date activation. End confidential.
Begin unclassified. MAAG chief highly pleased with eagerness, cooperation and ability Thai Army and Air Force officers absorb rapidly modern military methods. Should be noted flying time increased 300 percent for first three squadrons, 400 percent in primary flying school since advent of MAAG. Thai cooperation demonstrated by ready acceptance of infantry, artillery, communications and air force doctrines introduced by MAAG. End unclassified.
Begin confidential. Main criticisms of army are initial failure Thai authorities fulfill commitment build up to two-thirds US strength fifteen battalions to receive US equipment and their inability realize thus far that army would become more effective fighting force if present battalions now scattered thruout provinces could be formed into well integrated regimental combat teams. In this connection should be noted Thai have already brought nine US equipped battalions to required strength and promise strengthen remaining six after April [Page 1631] 1952 conscription. Thai also favorably considering essential MAAG recommendations to form regimental combat teams and to revise current draft law to permit (a) more frequent inductions, and (b) basic training system which would prevent raw recruits from joining field units already trained.
As both projects require parliamentary action and increase in budget, doubt if they will be consummated in near future. Rather anticipate changes will be gradual spreading over two–three year period.
During next fiscal year (calendar 1952) Thai Govt should be able absorb anticipated MDAP equipment physically and financially. Ability expand beyond December 1952 depends largely on Thai Govt willingness spend funds necessary to make effective use of equipment being furnished. Altho nation can afford this, political opposition to increased military budget over prolonged period and lack of necessary financial reforms may prove stumbling blocks. US, therefore, must constantly examine problem as additional equipment arrives. End confidential.
Begin unclassified. Thai economy currently sound but basically dependent on agriculture and mining, i.e., rice, timber, rubber, tin. Current income from these items now at high point but any reversal price situation world market would have serious effect govt income. While major price declines not immediately probable, Thais aware future economic vulnerability due lack of diversification. Funds additional to normal income difficult secure in view extremely tight local commercial credit situation which discourages flotation internal loans.
Prior to June 29 coup attempt Royal Navy made satisfactory progress in regunning 50 percent of its vessels, in communications techniques, and in testing and firing MAAG equipment. Since then, however, navy has been inoperative with only officers and petty officers reporting for duty. Navy section of MAAG program temporarily suspended pending long awaited navy reorganization; and chances of navy becoming effective force in near future look slim.
Both MAAG program and extensive Thai Korean participation have tended improve morale of armed services who appear eager to get on with job; officers are gradually becoming conscious of their part in defending free world. US support including military aid has probably been responsible in large measure for strong anti-Commie stand by govt (e.g., all out support in UN, economic embargo against Commie China, et cetera). Thinking provincial people in areas where MAAG operating with Thai battalions generally look with favor on US assistance and appear to be turning more and more to Thai Govt for security—something they never had before. As training of additional battalions increases, news of MAAG should spread, thereby awakening hitherto indifferent provincial minds to fact that Thai [Page 1632] Govt thru US assistance intends to protect them from Commie aggression. End unclassified.
Begin confidential. Main criticism of MAAG comes from two sources: (1) local Thai and Chinese Commie and fellow-traveler elements as well as Peking, Viet Minh and Moscow, (2) certain politically conscious factions opposed to present govt. Altho details re first fully explained in Embdes 277, Oct 18 should be noted Commie efforts in Thailand largely directed at intellectuals, students, white collar workers primarily in Bangkok area. No effort thus far to conduct large scale labor or grass roots movements propaganda or otherwise. Second group have been more noticeable since vigorous suppression of coup attempt as it feels US assisting present unpopular ruling clique within govt (controlled by 1947 coup party headed by Police Dir Gen Phao and Army C-in-C Phin) rather than Thailand as a nation. MAAG has made efforts point out MAAG here to build up nation against external aggression, but doubt if those opposed to govt will be impressed as long as 1947 coup group continues tighten its hold on govt thru increasing exploitation its military power.
With above points in mind Thai forces now in position to suppress any purely internal Commie-inspired uprising. However, due to weaknesses in high command, logistical and medical support we expect Thai forces will not in foreseeable future be reliable for a successful independent campaign against well conducted external invasion. While Thailand could make Chinese Commie-led invasion initially most uncomfortable any prolonged resistance could not be expected without active assistance from abroad, in which case Thailand’s contribution would become highly valuable, as has been their battalion in Korea. End confidential.