Foreign Relations of the United States, 1951, Asia and the Pacific, Volume VI, Part 2

Bangkok Embassy file, Lot 57 F 139, Box 5

The Chargé in Thailand (Turner) to Mr. W. Park Armstrong, Jr., Special Assistant for Intelligence to the Secretary of State

top secret

Bangkok, August 21, 1951.

Dear Mr. Armstrong: Upon receipt of your Top Secret letter No. 1, enclosing a copy of SE–5, “Vulnerabilities of Communist China”,¹ a census of views was taken among the Political Section, Controlled American Source, and the Service Attachés of this Embassy. I am glad to report that there is virtual unanimity of views regarding the four courses of action mentioned in your letter.² I am enclosing a rather detailed memorandum, prepared in the Political Section, which represents the consolidated views of the interested persons at this post.³ For ready reference, a summary of these views follows:

1. The Thai Government would be favorable to any of the four courses mentioned in your letter because of its belief that such actions would deflect China’s aggressive intentions from Southeast Asia. If there is a truce in Korea, the Government’s concern over possible Chinese aggression in this region will increase still further. The Government’s public expression of its support of the U.S. would depend largely on three corollary factors: (1) the moral case that could be made for U.S. action, (2) the position of the UN toward such action, and (3) the Government’s estimate of the chances of U.S. success.

2. The Thai people’s reaction to any one of the four courses mentioned would be generally similar to that of the Government although less well-defined. Intense Communist propaganda against such American action would influence a few people and create some confusion but would fail to turn the people generally against the U.S. More dangerous would be the subtle exploitation of the large body of “neutralist” sentiment which tends to oppose Thai commitments in major conflicts until forced to make them or until it is possible to discern the winning side. This sentiment could best be counteracted by rapid and striking initial successes in any campaign undertaken in Asia, thereby creating the impression that the U.S. had the situation and all possible consequences firmly under control.

3. The bulk of the Chinese here would be greatly concerned over a Nationalist invasion, but except for small groups of rabid pro-Communist and pro-Nationalists would generally adopt a wait-and-see attitude. The ultimate Chinese attitude would depend on the success or failure of the invasion. A Naval blockade would evoke little favorable or unfavorable reaction among the Chinese. American bombings in China, especially south China, would evoke animosity against the “foreign devils” attacking the motherland, whereas a Nationalist invasion would be regarded as a struggle of Chinese against Chinese. The reaction would be particularly unfavorable in case of the bombing of central and south China whence come most of the Chinese resident in Thailand. Although the reaction to Manchurian bombings in connection with the Korean action would be unfavorable, it would not be as vigorous or bitter as in the case of central and south China bombings.

4. The extent of U.S. logistic support of a Nationalist invasion would be relatively unimportant as the U.S. would be assumed to be behind the operation in any case. However, the greater the known U.S. involvement in the invasion the more important it would be to produce (1) a good moral justification for the invasion and (2) backing from the U.N. Also, the heavier the U.S. commitment to the invasion the more disastrous for American prestige would be a failure. This point is especially valid for the Thai Government, Thai people, and Chinese people in Thailand.

Although it is obvious from the attached memorandum that in Thailand, as elsewhere in Asia, forward estimates are as much a matter of gambling as of sound planning, nevertheless we believe that the climate of opinion in Thailand is generally more favorable to the U.S. and its objectives than is the case in any other country in south Asia. After making due allowance for all of the qualifications made in the memorandum, we believe, as indicated above, that the United States could count on at least a not unfavorable overall response to the four steps suggested in your letter, and in some cases the response would be highly favorable and quite open.

Very truly yours,

William T. Turner

1. Dated May 22. Scheduled for publication in volume vii.

2. Not printed. Mr. Armstrong, on July 3, wrote Mr. Turner a letter in connection with SE–5. The letter read in part as follows:

   “In the case of the enclosed SE–5 your comments on the estimates contained therein are particularly desired; specifically and urgently needed is a statement of the Embassy’s views as to how the government and peoples of Thailand would react to each of the following courses of action:

   1. A Nationalist invasion of Communist China undertaken with US logistic support made available to the Nationalists on Taiwan and with no further US assistance;

   2. A Nationalist invasion of China that would be accomplished through US logistic support, including US waterlift and logistic support of Nationalist troops on the mainland;

   3. US naval blockade of Communist China;

   4. US bombing of selected industrial and transportation targets in China.” (Bangkok Embassy file, Lot 58 F 56, Box 6)

3. Not printed.