Subject: Foreign Military and Economic Assistance
Programs for Thailand.
[Enclosure]
Analysis and Appreciation of Foreign
Military and Economic Assistance Programs for Thailand
A. The Present Military
Program.
On October 17, 1950, a military assistance agreement was signed
between Thailand and the United States. Within three months from
that date equipment began to be delivered to the Army, Navy and
Air Forces. The program for 1950 and ’51 was carefully
calculated to achieve certain primary objectives which were: (1)
to encourage Thailand to continue on its present political
course of alignment with the free world and to remain a
stabilizing force in Southeast Asia; (2) to assist the Thai
armed forces in improving internal security and, by increased
defensive strength, deterring external aggression; (3) to
bolster internal political stability and help check Communism by
strengthening the Thai Government.
To these ends the actual materiel allocated to the Army, Navy and
Air Forces were so balanced as to avoid disturbing the political
balances which rested upon the various Armed Services. It was
fully realized that the stability of the government depended
upon the preponderant forces of the Army and Police as over
against the Navy. The police are mentioned in this connection
not because they received military aid directly but because the
army released to the police their more obsolete equipment as
they were able to obtain modern arms. During the course of
furnishing equipment, various substantive changes have been made
in the over-all listings of equipment. These modifications as
indicated in the section of this paper provided by the military
establishment have not had an adverse effect upon the success of
the military aid program in Thailand because the Thai [Page 1624] Armed Forces have
been receiving just about the maximum amounts that they have
been able to absorb up to date.
On the week end of June 29, 30 and July 1, the Navy engaged in
military action with political significance against the
regularly constituted government and arrested the Prime
Minister, holding him for a time on board the flag ship of the
Thai Navy. The resulting action in which the Army and Police
subdued the Navy in less than two days illustrated the wisdom of
the U.S. Government’s policy in providing military aid on a
carefully balanced basis. As it seems apparent that considerable
reorganization of the Navy would be brought about, it was
decided that shipments not already on the water for the Navy
should be suspended, subject to further recommendations from the
Embassy and MAAG.
Request was made for the views of the Embassy, Military Attachés
and MAAG as to the future of
MDAP for Thailand. The
report received coincides with the thinking in the Department
that the first objective of MDAP, i.e., the alignment of Thailand with the U.S.
and UN against Communism has been
remarkably successful. In anticipation of MDAP the Thai Government began to
take action in 1950 against Communism. Thus, on February 28,
1950 it officially recognized the Governments of Laos, Cambodia
and Vietnam, thus aligning Thailand against the forces of
Communism in those countries. Thailand also resolved not to
recognize the Chinese Communist Government and prepared to
resist its entry into the United Nations. A final and decisive
move was made on July 21, 1950 when the Thai Government offered
ground, air and sea forces to the United Nations Forces in
Korea. It made a conclusive step when it resolved in conjunction
with the United States Government at the United Nations to
declare Communist China an aggressor in Korea. Thailand
furthermore has consistently supported the United States
policies in the various organs of the United Nations. The
foregoing recital indicates also that the second objective has
also been reasonably attained, i.e., for Thailand to resist
external aggression. By its acts of recognizing the free
governments in Indochina, it opposed itself to the actions of
the Viet Minh who have been operating along the
Thailand–Indochina border. In opposing the Chinese Communist
Government, Thailand has given an unmistakable evidence of its
intentions toward any Chinese aggression.
The third objective of MDAP was
to help in the stabilization of the Thai Government.
Notwithstanding certain changes in the leadership and alignment
of forces within the government, as a result of the attempted
coup d’état of June 29, the attitudes
of the government remain essentially unchanged. The Prime
Minister and the Foreign Minister have given repeated assurances
that their policies remain [Page 1625] unchanged, and government leaders have
uniformly indicated their desire for continued MDAP aid.
The abandonment or even material modification of military aid
contemplated for Thailand in the years 1952–5 at this time, in
the view of the Embassy, the Military Attachés, the MAAG, and the Department, might
very well defeat all of our efforts thus far. It might
conceivably cause the Government to reconsider the very extended
position it has taken against Communism and might lead the
government to consider accommodating itself to the forces of
Communism. It should also be recognized that the cost of the
program to the United States in relation to its position in Asia
in general is minute. The program to which we are committed and
which is anticipated should be continued unchanged except
possibly as regards materiel for the Navy which awaits further
recommendation and consideration by the Embassy and MAAG.
B. The Present ECA Program.
On September 19, 1950 an economic assistance agreement was signed
between Thailand and the United States. The program was
conceived in order to improve the economic position of Thailand
as a nation and of the Thai people as individuals so that they
might be economically strong against any possible temptations of
Communism. After careful study by trained personnel in Thailand,
it was concluded that U.S. aid should be along several principal
lines: (1) port development; (2) improvement of railroad
communications; (3) irrigation; and (4) public health.
The ECA program is just moving
out of the planning stage and is beginning to have a substantive
effect. Until July 1951 almost all ECA personnel in Thailand were administrative and
the only evidence of the proposed program was the use of DDT in
certain restricted areas of the country for the control of
malaria. During the last couple of months a large number of
technicians have been proceeding to Thailand, especially in the
field of public health and agriculture. The personnel chosen
have been of the highest order and the technical results should
be substantial in the coming year. As for the port development,
the ECA has granted a dredge to
participate in the dredging of the harbor. Up to date the
principal effect of the ECA
program has been psychological in impressing the Thai with the
value of American friendship.
The program was cut quantitatively from the original planned
amount of about $12 million to about $7 million. It is expected
that the remainder may be obtained by loan from the IBRD or Export–Import Bank. In
view of the fact that the program has already been cut
substantially, it seems imperative in order to keep good faith
with the Thai people and government that the balance of the
program be continued unimpaired.
