796.5–MAP/1–1651

The Deputy Director of the Office of Philippine and Southeast Asian Affairs ( Melby ) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs ( Rusk )

top secret

Proposed New Approach to the Philippine Problem.

I am attaching comments from S/ISA on the proposal for increased military aid to the Philippines and the integration and coordination of that aid with the economic program. In brief, S/ISA likes nothing about it. My comments on the S/ISA memorandum are the following:

1. S/ISA questions the premise that greater American direction of the Philippine military establishment is necessary to retain the Philippines within the democratic orbit.

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Comment: Every military man I know, and practically every civilian with any Philippine background, believes the United States should go even farther in this direction than we in PSA are yet prepared to do. The record of the Philippine army the last few years should speak for itself. Responsible Philippine military leaders also agree on the necessity for added American supervision.

2. S/ISA doubts there would be Philippine-American support for this proposal.

Comment: The Philippines have already accepted the suggestion and the only American opposition I know comes from S/ISA. Even our own local economists who have raised objections do so on economic grounds, not military.

3. S/ISA cannot “imagine a sensitive and proud people” agreeing to the controls we suggest.

Comment: Responsible Filipinos have already agreed.

4. S/ISA raises the question of the political implications of the kind of control we suggest.

Comment: The point is well taken and there will be political repercussions but they will be inconsequential as compared to the repercussions if we should lose the Philippines to the Communists.

5. S/ISA questions whether the Philippines would accept the economic controls which are envisaged as a corollary to the military program.

Comment: The Philippines is already resisting the controls implicit in the Bell Report, hence nothing new will have been added under this proposal and the Philippines will have no alternative. Considering the present level of the Philippine tax structure, that Government will have to go a long, long way before it approaches a tax level even comparable with our own. I am not impressed with the hardships additional taxes in the Philippines would impose.

6. S/ISA suggests that FE and the NAC should explore conditions to be placed on the utilization of American aid dollars as well as the administrative mechanisms for securing performance.

Comment: I am under the impression that the Bell Report, PSA, FE, ECA and the NAC have already done this and are agreed.

7. S/ISA believes that labelling American aid as military would not overcome objections to compliance with the conditions laid down in the Bell Report, and furthermore, that Philippine relations should be handled in a straightforward manner.

Comment: I would not expect this proposal to overcome the objections, nor would I expect anything else to do so. I do not quite understand what is meant by “straightforward manner”, and I question whether the Filipinos will understand it any more or appreciate it.

8. S/ISA “recognizes the seriousness of the Philippine problem and believes that any proposal which offers some prospect of providing a solution thereto should have prompt and careful consideration.”

Comment: I concur.

Recommendation: That the proposal for increased military aid in the Philippines be discussed with S/ISA at the necessary level as soon as possible to the end that this proposal can be implemented now.1

  1. Further documentation on discussion of Mr. Melby’s proposal in its original form has not been found in Department of State files.