796.5–MAP/10–2551: Telegram
The Ambassador in the Philippines (Cowen) to the Secretary of State
1516. Ref Dept circular airgram October 2, 1951, 4:35 p. m.2 The following factual summary for inclusion fourth semiannual report on MDAP in Philippines during period April 1 to September 30, 1951.3 Number paragraphs correspond to those listed paragraph 5 referenced airgram.
1. On April 1, 1951 ten additional battalion combat teams were organized and were placed in the field against the Communist Huks as rapidly as they could be manned and trained. With these additional combat units the Philippine armed forces began making increasingly telling blows, particularly during the last three months, against the Huks. This increased all-out aggressiveness, resulting from a steadier and more effective influx of MSP material, made it possible to rout the Huks from their strongholds and break them up into small, widely scattered elements, thus reducing their capability of making a strong show of arms against the government. The fire fights during this period almost equal the number of engagements during the entire [Page 1574] previous 12 months. The fact that the number of Huks killed during this period did not show an appreciable increase in ratio to the increased number of encounters, is indicative of a continuing breaking up of the larger elements. Several large scale campaigns have been conducted against the Huks few remaining strongpoints. While these campaigns have not been entirely satisfactory, the fact that the necessary equipment and material for such campaigns were partially available, greatly bolstered the esprit de corps of the government troops. The efficacy of the armed forces has increased in direct relation to the receipt of MSP material. Their continuing effectiveness is dependent on the material expected from the fiscal year 1952 and 1953 programs. During the past 6 months government forces have killed 1,277 Huks, captured 773 and by their growing show of strength have caused the surrender of 3,999. Since April 1, 1950, there have been 3,589 Huks killed including many top field leaders, 1,792 captured and 4,673 surrendered.
Although MSP must be credited to a considerable degree with the success of the current campaign, nevertheless there is a shortage of vital equipment such as motor vehicles, signal equipment, medical equipment, ammunition and many minor items. The lack of these supplies has been felt. The failure to receive them as rapidly as they had hoped has been a disappointment to the leaders of the armed forces who, although cognizant of the overall demand on the MSP, feel that they should be given preferential consideration over those engaged in an actual fighting campaign against Communists.
In spite of their defeats the Huks still have the capability to (1) sabotage vital installations (2) continue propaganda work and conscript recruits (3) harass government forces by propaganda and by raids on small towns and ambuscades of patrols and individuals (4) increase espionage activities (5) retard economic development by sabotage and by attacks on mines, trucks, freight transports and other similar enterprises and by kidnapping officials of such enterprises.
The material program for fiscal year 1952 was designed to provide essential equipment required to carry on the all-out guerrilla type warfare that was indicated by the initial breaking up of the Huk forces. Until the flow of this 1952 equipment is stepped up the Huks will retain the majority of the capabilities described.
The fiscal year 1953 mutual security program for the Philippines was completed in September. With the exception of some jet aircraft and equipment, this program is designed primarily to furnish the armed forces with the major equipment necessary for them to carry on after June 1953 with only the financial support of their own government. This is necessarily predicated on the eventual receipt of all material programmed for fiscal years 1951 and 1952.
[Page 1575]2. Events of the past few months have deprived the Communist party in the Philippines of two valuable aids in its fight to overthrow the government and have therefore caused the party to rely more and more on the HMB, its fighting arm. The verdict of the trial of some Communist leaders in May condemned them as traitorous agents of a foreign power seeking to enslave the Philippines, as thieves and murderers of innocent Filipinos and wanton destroyers of public and private property. The verdict also declared the Communist party to be an illegal association and membership in it a crime. Although the Communist party has not functioned openly as a political party for some time in the Philippines, this verdict serves to emphasize further its illegal character and its criminal activities, as a deterrent to those who might otherwise be persuaded to join it. Following this trial the legal registration of the congress of labor organizations, a Communist controlled group of trade unions, was cancelled, thereby depriving it of all legal status and severing from its control several thousands of members. As a result, the unions which formed the congress have turned elsewhere for affiliation or have reorganized.
As a consequence, the Communists cannot function as a legal party in the Philippines (unless the verdict of the trial is reversed by the Supreme Court) and have lost control over a considerable group of trade unions, which leaves them now only the choice of continuing with their armed fight against the government and increasing their efforts to gain followers among the farming population.
No analysis of Soviet intentions is possible from this point, but it appears obvious that the Communists of the Philippines are following the orders of the Soviets in their attempt to overthrow the government by force of arms, and that they enjoy the blessings of the Kremlin, as is indicated by reports on the HMB which have appeared in the Soviet press. The Philippine Communist plans to increase party membership greatly, expand its armed forces into a regular army, to establish liberated areas where they would set up provisional governments after the Chinese Communist pattern, have until now proved impossible to implement and the entire timetable of the Communists has been disrupted perhaps indefinitely, because of the increasing effectiveness of the forces opposing them.
3. While it is far from stable, the economy of the Philippines has increased to a point where the final goal of stability can be reached. This economic improvement is closely related to the results obtained by the country’s armed forces in the field, because actual stability depends greatly upon complete destruction of the Communistic Huks. There is a possibility that the Philippine Government might incur a budgetary surplus during fiscal year 1952. Although it is difficult [Page 1576] to arrive at reliable estimates of the cash position of the government, it is significant to note that the October 9, 1951 statement of daily balances prepared by the Department of Finance reported 63,800,000 pesos available in cash in the general fund, with additional cash in a combination of the bond fund, trust funds, ECA counterpart fund etc, plus special deposits, amounting to 150,400,000 pesos. While the foregoing is purely academic, the facts that (1) in March 1951 the Philippine Government requested a loan4 from the United States to insure payment of its armed forces and (2) that in the following June the loan was converted to a construction program for storing and maintaining MSP material and (3) that the following September the Philippine Government volunteered to seek congressional support for a 6000 man augmentation of its armed forces are concrete indications of the bettering economic position of the country.
4 and 5. The Philippine Government and the Filipinos as a whole are well aware that the material and services which they are obtaining under MDAP are indispensable for the fight against the HMB and for the maintenance of internal security. Because of the old ties of friendship between their country and the United States and because of the frequent reiteration of the principle that the Philippines occupies a unique position within the framework of American foreign policy, the Filipinos naturally look to the United States for material aid and advice. Although the routine delivery over a period of months of basic but unexciting items does not obtain much publicity, spokesmen for the government, and particularly for the armed forces, have emphasized to the public on certain occasions that this aid is arriving and that it is vital.
The knowledge that the United States is supplying most of the material needed by the armed forces and that it shows every indication of continuing to do so during the crisis arising from the efforts of the HMB, is undoubtedly a strong factor in upholding the morale of the Filipinos. This optimism arising from the assurance of American aid in the fighting against internal enemies was, of course, heightened still more by the signing of the mutual defense pact which guarantees aid against external aggressors.
The single negative side to the attitude of the public is the fear expressed occasionally, particularly if supplies do not arrive when scheduled, that the United States is giving first priority to the military needs of Europe. As a consequence, the opinion has sometimes been expressed that the Philippines might be abandoned if Europe should place overwhelming demands on the resources of the United States. [Page 1577] However, the mutual defense pact now has removed the principle grounds for this fear.
- Sent plain text and classified in the Department.↩
- Not printed.↩
- A partial précis of this report appears in Fourth Semiannual Report to Congress on the Mutual Defense Assistance Program: Message from the President of the United States, House Document No. 352, 82d Cong., 2d sess., pp. 62–64.↩
- All other sources refer to this request as one for a grant. See Mr. Rusk’s memorandum of March 29 to Secretary Acheson, p. 1526.↩