611.91/9–651: Telegram
The Ambassador in India (Henderson) to the Secretary of State
priority
868. No distribution outside Dept.
1. In view apparent surprise in wide US circles at rejection by Nehru of Jap treaty and consequent speculation re status Amer-Ind relations, we venture submit herewith some our ideas re likely future [Page 2180] attitude Nehru towards Jap in framework his general fon policies as we presently assess them.
2. Rejection Jap treaty your opinion not mere reflection of current status US relations with Ind. We believe it represents logical step on part Nehru in his efforts attain one his primary fon policy objectives, that is, eventual exclusion from mainland and waters Asia all Western milit power and what he wld consider as Western polit and econ pressures.
3. By rejection treaty for reasons given by him Nehru has laid basis which will enable him carry on subsequent campaign stimulate and gain influence over nationalistic and anti-white elements in Jap. He believes these elements if discreetly encouraged and skillfully guided by such experienced Asian nationalist leaders as himself will eventually take over power in Jap, denounce Jap alliance with US, and insist on evacuation all Amer armed forces from Jap and return to Jap control such islands as US might be occupying.
4. Thus far Nehru has made little progress in persuading Commie Chi abandon its ties with Russia and form partnership with India carrying out campaign to unite Asia under slogan “Asian nationalism.” (content of “Asian nationalism” as this expression used by Nehru is for most part combination of desire for an “Asia for Asians” and of “anti-Westernism.”) If he can succeed in drawing Commie Chi away from Russia and Jap away from US and can work them into common front with Ind he will feel he has made substantial progress in direction attainment united Asia in which he can play important role (in referring to Asia herein we not including Russian Asia) and which he wld like use in pursuing further objectives.
5. Nehru will probably work not only thru Ind dipl and cons offices’ in Jap and on Jap dipl and cons reps in Ind but also in numerous other ways to gain in Jap reputation disinterested and idealistic defender of Jap polit and territorial integrity against US imperialism. It is believed he will use channels press and radio, encourage exchange goodwill visits, instruct Ind dipls take appropriate attitudes in UN and elsewhere, and employ usual tricks modern propaganda.
6. In carrying on his campaign to attain his objectives in Asia Nehru not likely move too openly or rapidly. He will, not wish arouse too much hostility or indignation in US. He realizes for some time to come Ind will sorely need certain capital and consumption goods which only US can furnish. He not likely disclose his real objectives. He will probably continue try appear as democratic idealist primarily interested in welware downtrodden masses of Asia; as David who regretfully faces materialistic and clumsy Goliath of militarism and imperialism. He will continue endeavor gain support in Western [Page 2181] world, particularly in US and UK, of various non-Commie left wing elements and well-intentioned idealists with progressive view as well as professional “liberals.” He will continue make special effort charm and flatter naive Amer and Brit, who he thinks might be useful in helping mold public opinion in his favor or in supporting policies in their countries which wld facilitate gaining of his fon policy objectives. He will continue make minor concessions and friendly gestures from time to time to US in order keep down tide resentment and and make US officials think, “He will come to our side eventually if we are patient and handle him properly.” He not likely, however, change his basic policies unless Commie Chi by acts makes clear once for all that his dreams for partnership with it cannot be realized. It wld be foolish for Commie Chi commit such acts just now because potential value of Nehru in helping stimulate hatred in Asia against peoples of Eur stock, particularly of US, shld not be underestimated.
7. In presenting our ideas above with minimum of reservations and qualifications we have probably made Nehru’s objectives and plans for obtaining them more clear-cut than they really are. Nehru frequently “plays by ear” and permits his emotions of moment influence his actions. Nevertheless we believe what we have said above portrays Nehru’s present approach to problem of Jap future and to related problems.
8. Discussions measures we might take meet Nehru’s probable campaign against us in Jap not in scope this tel. We wish stress, however, that in determining and carrying out such measures we shld be careful differentiate between him and India. Altho Nehru at present conducts Ind fon policies to suit himself many thoughtful Ind polit and econ leaders disagree with these policies and believe friendly coop with US more important than close ties with unreliable Commie Chi. We shld be playing into hands our enemies if in endeavoring meet Nehru’s campaign against US in Asia we shld “write India off” or take measures likely wound sensibilities of Ind people.1
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In telegram 441 from Moscow, September 13, Ambassador Kirk sent the following comment to the Secretary of State:
“Amb Henderson’s tel 868, September 6 of great interest this Emb providing clearest exposition Nehru character and program to date.
“Obviously we shld continue concentrate on steering Nehru away from collaboration with Commie China and Soviet Union which bound end disastrously for India and West. Presumably we in better position counteract his attempts wean away Japan.
“India as future great world power is of utmost importance US and world security. In implementing recommendation last para reftel we must not neglect fact that possibility adroit Soviet exploitation of any situation which might be construed as indication lack US faith and interest in India and its people, is main danger.” (611.91/9–1351)
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