891.03/5–251
Memorandum of Conversation, by the Director of the Office of South Asian Affairs (Mathews)
Subject: Congressional Reaction to Prime Minister Nehru’s Speech of May 1
| Participants: | B. K. Nehru, Minister, Embassy of India |
| E. G. Mathews, Director, Office of South Asian Affairs |
Mr. Mathews informed Mr. Nehru that reports in the US press of Prime Minister Nehru’s speech of May 11 and of Indian press comment on the half-grant, half-loan Senate bill for Indian food aid had created the impression in the Congress that India would not accept aid from the United States under the terms of the Senate bill. As a consequence the leadership in both Houses had considered it necessary to postpone floor consideration of both the Senate and House bills which had been scheduled for debate this week. There seemed a strong possibility that even the all-loan House bill would be defeated if it came to a vote in the present atmosphere.
Mr. Mathews went on to say that the Department, on the strength of Mrs. Pandit’s statements to Mr. McGhee on April 14 and 18, had informed the Senate Foreign Relations Committee that the terms of the Senate bill were acceptable to the Government of India. Although the Department was not as disturbed by the Prime Minister’s remarks as many members of Congress, a doubt had been raised as to his Government’s position.
[Page 2154]Mr. Nehru expressed his awareness of the gravity of the situation. He thought it possible that popular reactions in India after the terms of the Senate bill had become known had impelled the Prime Minister to make the remarks about “political strings” and “conditions” attributed to him. He asked what the Department foresaw as the next step.
Mr. Mathews replied that the Congressional leadership felt that it must have a clarification of the Indian position. In the Department’s view, the situation required a public statement by the Prime Minister himself, or by the Government of India with the Prime Minister’s specific approval, which would make clear that the Government of India (1) was aware that the Senate bill did not contain “political strings”, (2) while not necessarily happy about the terms of the Senate bill, was aware that these were standard provisions in US aid legislation, and (3) would accept grant aid under these terms.
Mr. Nehru indicated that he appreciated the need for action along these lines. His Government would, however, have to give careful consideration to the attitude of the Indian people. In this connection, it would be exceedingly helpful if he could assure his Government that the US Government would make a clear statement at an appropriate time that food aid was not intended to influence India’s foreign or domestic policies. This might be done by the insertion of pertinent language in the bilateral aid agreement, in an exchange of letters, or in a public statement by a high US official. Mr. Mathews observed that the aid agreement was hardly a suitable vehicle for such statements, and that an exchange of letters would present difficulties. The Department would, however, be prepared to make an appropriate statement, presumably at the time the aid agreement was signed, in the sense that the provision of food aid was not intended to influence India’s foreign or domestic policies.
Mr. Mathews then commented that, as Mr. Nehru was aware, we had no way of knowing whether the Congress would finally adopt the Senate half-grant, half-loan bill, or the House all-loan bill, or some compromise between them. Mr. Nehru observed that in view of this uncertainty and the apparent reaction of the Indian press against the terms of the Senate bill, he wondered whether his Government might not decide that it would prefer credit terms for all the grain as provided in the House bill.
Mr. Mathews said that if this were the Government of India’s decision, the Department would, of course, have to change its position of strongly supporting grant aid. The Department’s position, as Mr. Nehru knew, was based on the conviction that India’s development program would be adversely affected if the Government of India had [Page 2155] to undertake an obligation to repay the cost of the two million tons of grain specially requested from this country. Mr. Nehru commented that the Department’s conviction was fully justified, but the political atmosphere in India might make it necessary for his Government to choose a grain loan at the expense of development. Mr. Mathews pointed out that in view of the political atmosphere in the Congress here, it might not be possible to obtain legislation authorizing a loan unless some statement indicating at least an awareness that the United States was not attempting to put “political strings” on food assistance came out of New Delhi.
Mr. Mathews concluded by stressing the importance of removing the present uncertainty as soon as possible—preferably within forty-eight hours. Mr. Nehru said that he would consult with the Ambassador and despatch a telegram to New Delhi later in the day. (He subsequently informed Mr. Mathews that it had not been possible to send the telegram until the following morning.2)
- Prime Minister Nehru, in a speech broadcast over All-India Radio on May 1, stated in part as follows: “While we welcome all the help we can get from foreign countries, we have made it clear that such help must not have any political strings attached to it, any conditions which are unbecoming for a self-respecting nation to accept, any pressure to change our domestic or international policy. We would be unworthy of the high responsibilities with which we have been charged if we bartered away in the slightest degree our country’s self-respect or freedom of action, even for something which we need so badly.” A copy of the text is printed in Congressional Record, vol. 97, pt. 4, p. 5739.↩
- Another memorandum of conversation by Mr. Mathews, also dated May 2, not printed, described the conveyance on that date to Mr. B. K. Nehru of a revised draft bilateral agreement on aid to India to replace an earlier version of March 9. The new draft was intended to meet as far as possible the suggestions made by the Indian Ambassador in the course of her interviews with Mr. McGhee on April 14 and 18. It also contained changes necessitated by the language of the Senate bill, S. 872. (891.03/5–251)↩