Subject: Report on Conversation with the Prime
Minister of India, Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru, at noon on February 20,
1951 regarding the international situation.
I found the Prime Minister in an excellent humor. In none of my
previous conversations had he ever been so friendly or talked with
such apparent frankness. He made use of his great personal charm and
was evidently anxious to persuade. It is easy to understand how,
when the Prime Minister is in such a mood, he is so frequently able
to win over so many persons, particularly those without profound
convictions based on their own experiences. In fact, as I listened
to him I found myself rather regretful that I could not agree with
him and say with all honesty that he was quite right and was, in my
opinion, pursuing the policy most likely to preserve the peace of
the world.
I did not undertake to argue with the Prime Minister, since his
remarks were in response to my request that he give me his views
with regard to the present international situation and also his
ideas as to what would be the best way for coping with this
situation. It was impossible for me to guide the conversation, and
his brilliant mind wandered at will from one subject to another
somewhat regardless of relevance and sequence. Nevertheless he made
quite clear the broad outlines of his thinking and of the policies
based on his thinking.
I regret that I found no opportunity to ask some of the questions
which I hoped to be able to put to the Prime Minister, and was
unable to focus our conversation on some of the more concrete
problems of South Asia. No mention was made, for instance, of Nepal
or any of the differences, including Kashmir, existing between India
and Pakistan. Little was said also about the present state of
relations between India and the United States.
Enclosure
Memorandum of Conversation, by the Ambassador
in India (Henderson)
secret
New Delhi, February 20,
1951.
Mr. Nehru, the Prime Minister, received me at my request at noon
today in his office in the Parliament Building. Our talk lasted
for approximately an hour. His manner throughout was friendly
and even cordial. There is set forth below a summary of certain
portions of our conversation.
I thanked the Prime Minister for putting aside his other pressing
duties in order to let me talk with him. I said that I was
planning to leave day after tomorrow for Ceylon in order to
attend an American Foreign Service conference at which would be
present the Chiefs of our various diplomatic missions and
consular offices in South Asia, as well as a distinguished group
of American officials from Washington. At this conference we
would probably discuss the international situation with
particular emphasis on South Asia. The various Ambassadors would
be expected to talk about the external and internal policies of
the countries in which they were stationed and would exchange
views among themselves and with the officials from Washington
with regard to various phases of their work. It had seemed to me
that it might be useful for me before proceeding to such a
conference to have a chat with the Prime Minister of India since
any views which he might care to give to me personally and
confidentially regarding the international situation might
assist me during my talks in Ceylon. I had therefore asked him
for the present interview. After I had requested an appointment
I had informed the Department of State that I hoped to see the
Prime Minister and inquired if there was anything in particular
which it would like for me to tell him. Just a few minutes
before leaving the Chancery of the Embassy I had received a
telegram from the Department suggesting that I bring several
matters to the Prime Minister’s attention. I thought it might be
well to follow the various suggestions made by the Department
before embarking on a more general conversation.
I told the Prime Minister that I had been asked by the Department
to inform him that Mr. Acheson particularly appreciated his
thoughtfulness in sending his recent personal message3 through
Madame Pandit in January. The Secretary would like for him to
know that he was always grateful for any suggestions or comments
regarding the international situation which the Prime Minister
might care to transmit to him either through Madame Pandit or
through myself.
[Page 2121]
Turning to the international situation I said that the United
States deeply regretted the recent attack of Mr. Stalin4 on the United
Nations. Many of the statements contained in Stalin’s recent
declaration were not new. Nevertheless, it was unfortunate that
he should choose this moment, when all countries outside of the
Soviet orbit were endeavoring to find some road towards peace,
to issue pronouncements of so provocative a character. Although
Soviet leaders for many years had been emphasizing their belief
that the world was divided into two camps it did not seem to
serve any useful purpose for Stalin to give emphasis to this bit
of Communist dogma just now. It seemed to the United States that
if the Soviet Government had any genuine desire for peace, it
would abandon its aggressive and disruptive tactics in the
United Nations; it would order the Communist parties throughout
the world, which looked to it for guidance, to desist from their
efforts to overthrow non-Communist governments; it would with a
single gesture bring a halt to the present military aggression
in which Communist armed forces were engaging in Korea and in
Southeast and Central Asia. In fact, the attack by Stalin on the
United Nations might well pose the question as to whether or not
the Soviet Union was planning to embark on some new aggressive
enterprise. It would be recalled that the Nazi Government of
Germany had launched a similar attack on the League of Nations
as a prelude to its campaign for world conquest. If Stalin were
not planning an eventual aggression against the non-Soviet
world, why should he have said that war was not inevitable at
present. He should have said simply that war was not inevitable.
Stalin has it in his power to prevent or to provoke a global
war. In his protests that the intentions of the Soviet Union
were peaceful, Stalin ignored a number of facts. For instance,
he did not mention that it was Soviet opposition to the
inspection of atomic energy plants throughout the world which
prevented the reaching of an agreement several years ago for the
international control of atomic weapons. Although Stalin
maintained that the Soviet Union had engaged in demobilization
since 1945, he did not attempt, during his recent declaration,
to present figures to prove that the number of men under arms in
the Soviet Union at the present time was less than the men under
arms in 1945. It was difficult to know precisely what was going
on behind the Iron Curtain. Nevertheless the full extent of
demobilization in the United States, the United Kingdom, and in
the non-Soviet countries after World War II was known to anyone
who might wish to investigate.
[Page 2122]
Turning to Korea, I said that no nation more than the United
States deplored the destruction which had been taking place in
that country. The United States realized, however, that if the
United Nations should allow aggressors to profit by attacks in
Korea the Soviet Union would be encouraged to proceed with
aggressive designs throughout Asia, and the death and
destruction now affecting thousands in Korea could easily
involve millions. The United States was earnestly hoping that
some kind of a negotiated settlement could be achieved which
would not violate the principle of collective action against
aggression on which United States foreign policy was based, nor
endanger the independence of the small country which the United
Nations has been endeavoring to protect against the wanton
attack made upon it. No Government would be happier than that of
the United States if the Good Offices Committee now meeting in
Lake Success could find a just solution of the Korean problem.
If the Good Offices Committee should fail, the United States
would be prepared to support such steps as the United Nations
might take to prevent the Chinese Communists from obtaining
strategic materials. It was difficult to believe that any nation
which valued its independence and was opposed to aggression
could justify selling commodities which would increase the
ability of Communists to kill and maim troops of the United
Nations.
I then referred to the problem of Germany. I said that my
Government thought that it and other democratic nations were
practically being forced to re-arm Western Germany because of
the Soviet rearming of Eastern Germany and of the aggressive
tactics which the Soviet Government was pursuing in Europe. It
seemed to it that the surest way to encourage war was to leave
Germany defenseless in the presence of an aggressive power which
had already utilized force to obtain control over a number of
weak, formerly independent European countries. To leave Western
Germany unarmed would be to invite further aggression.
The Prime Minister said that before discussing some of the
broader aspects of the international situation he would like to
clarify a small matter which one of the statements which I had
just made to him brought to his mind. It was his understanding
that on a personal basis I had recently approached Sir Girja
Bajpai with regard to reports that Indian automobile tires were
being sold to Communist China. He did not know whether there was
any truth in these reports, but he was having the matter
investigated. Tires, particularly truck tires, were in short
supply in India; and if he should learn that Indian speculators
were buying them up and sending them to China, he would try to
put an end to this kind of trade.
[Page 2123]
The Prime Minister said that he had listened carefully to what I
had had to say about the Soviet Union, the situation in Europe,
and the situation in the Far East. There was truth in much that
I had said. Nevertheless, it seemed to him that the situation
was so grave that we must not permit ourselves to rest content
with the mere presentation of facts or the submission of
evidence regarding the aggressiveness of the Soviet Union or
other Communist countries. It seemed to him necessary to analyze
the situation in its entirety and to find ways and means of
preventing the outbreak of a new world war.
It was his understanding that the United States was of the
opinion that the Soviet Union had aggressive intentions both in
Europe and Asia; that it also thought that Communism had taken
advantage of the internal situations in some countries and the
exposed internation position of others in order steadily to
expand by infiltration, by threats, or by open force; that the
United States conceived that in its own interest as well as in
that of world peace it must take every appropriate measure to
put a stop to Soviet aggressiveness and to the spread of
Communism; that the United States considered Soviet
aggressiveness and Communist expansionism were intimately
connected and to an extent interwoven; that the United States
was looking to the system of collective security, as represented
by the United Nations, for assistance in the carrying out of its
present policies.
I said that his analysis seemed to me to be in general correct. I
would like to point out, however, that the United States was not
undertaking to prevent any nation which desired to be Communist
from becoming Communist. It thought that every nation was
entitled to have the form of government which its people wanted.
What it objected to was the practice of International Communism
of forcing, by terror, threat and violence, free nations to
submit to its yoke. The United States believed, I thought, that
unless the free nations made it clear that they would
collectively and resolutely oppose aggression, Communist or
otherwise, committed by either a great or small state, the
Soviet Union as the directing center of International Communism
would continue to carry on its aggressive policies with a world
war as the inevitable result.
The Prime Minister entered into a lengthy discourse regarding the
meaning and probable outcome of a new world war. He did not
believe that the United States and the other Western powers
would be defeated. On the other hand he did not believe that the
United States and the Western powers could completely conquer
the Soviet Union and China. They might defeat the Soviet and
Chinese armies and raze Soviet and Chinese cities and industrial
centers but they could not saturate Russia and China with
troops. There could, in his opinion,
[Page 2124]
be no complete victory over the Soviet
Union and China unless both countries were occupied throughout
by troops of the victors. Obviously there were no armies among
the Western powers sufficiently large to make a complete
conquest of Russia and China. Chinese and Russian forces could
exist for many years in the vast spaces which could not be
occupied or policed by their enemies. A new world war,
therefore, was likely to continue indefinitely and there would
be no absolute victor except hunger, pain and human suffering
which would lead to some kind of indigenous Communism in case
International Communism should collapse. This situation must be
apparent to intelligent leaders both in the Western world and in
the Communist world. Since the Western leaders would not like to
become involved in a venture which would mean the end of their
civilization and the Communist leaders would not like to see
their countries ravaged and their own organization wrecked, it
seemed logical that the responsible leaders in neither world
really wanted a war. The immediate task was to convince each
world that the other did not really desire a war and, while
endeavoring to find some basis for establishing a modus vivendi between the two worlds, to
take care that some development or other should not ignite the
war which neither side desired.
The Prime Minister said that mutual suspicions might in
themselves lead to a world war. If, for instance, the Western
world was convinced that the Communist world was preparing
aggression and should proceed to arm itself to the teeth to
oppose this aggression, the Communist world on its part might
decide that it would be better to fight now than to wait until
it should be attacked by the fully armed West. Furthermore,
limited frictions and disputes which might appear at first to be
of an isolated character might develop into a full world war
conflagration.
The Government of India, realizing these dangers had been doing
its best to convince each of the two worlds that the other was
not preparing to attack it. The policy of India in this respect
was illustrated by the position it had taken with regard to
China. The Government of India did not believe that the People’s
Government of China had aggressive intentions against any
country in Asia. It thought, however, that Peiping was
determined to assume full control by force, if necessary, of all
the territories which it considered to be a part of China,
including Formosa and Tibet. He himself did not for a moment
believe that Communist China had invaded Korea because it had
aggressive designs against that country. It had intervened in
Korea, in his opinion, because it was convinced that the United
States was intending to use Korea as a base for the subsequent
invasion of China itself. It was his belief that there could be
no final solution of the Korean question which did not have the
approval of Communist China. He also thought that it would be
possible to obtain the
[Page 2125]
consent of Communist China to “relatively fair” solution for
Korea if that solution would be in the framework of an overall
Far Eastern settlement.
I asked the Prime Minister what he meant by an overall Far
Eastern settlement. What, in his opinion, should a Far Eastern
settlement be and what kind of a settlement did he think would
satisfy Communist China? The Prime Minister said that, in his
opinion, Communist China wanted and should have Formosa; it
should be admitted into the United Nations; and it should be
treated as an equal by the other great Powers and its view taken
into consideration whenever important international questions
involving the Far East would arise. He assumed that Communist
China would want Hong Kong eventually, but he did not believe
that this problem would arise in the foreseeable future.
The Prime Minister emphasized the importance of Formosa. That
island was of no value to the United States except as a military
base for possible operations against China. I said that there
was also a negative aspect of the Formosan problem. If Formosa
should fall under the domination of International Communism, it
could serve as a base against Japan or the Philippines. The
Prime Minister said that it might be possible to work out an
arrangement whereby Communist China would undertake that if it
was permitted to take Formosa it would establish no bases on the
island. Of course, Communist China might not live up to such an
agreement after it had once obtained possession of Formosa;
nevertheless, risks were involved in every international
agreement.
I said:
“Let us assume that the United States would recognize
Communist China and support its entry into the United
Nations; that it would agree to the occupation of Formosa by
Communist China. Would such concessions in themselves
represent a Far Eastern settlement? Would not Communist
China take the position that until a solution satisfactory
to it of the Japanese problem had been achieved there could
be no Far Eastern settlement? Furthermore, would not
Communist China insist that the only solution to the
Japanese problem would be for the United States to withdraw
completely from Japan and to leave an unarmed Japan to face
an armed Russia and China? If the United States would not
consent to this kind of arrangement, is there any
possibility of a settlement just now of the Far Eastern
problem? Would India like to see Japan placed in such an
exposed position?”
The Prime Minister said that he had given some thought to this
matter. He must admit that there could be no general Far Eastern
settlement without the solution of the Japanese problem. In his
opinion, it would be a mistake to re-arm Japan. If the United
States should undertake to restore Japan’s military power, both
the Soviet Union and Communist China would be convinced that
Japan was
[Page 2126]
being
prepared as a base for operations against them. The re-arming of
Japan would be likely to provoke war rather than to contribute
to a peaceful atmosphere. He himself thought that the best
solution would be for the United Nations to guarantee Japan
against aggression.
In response to several questions which I put to him, the Prime
Minister admitted that it might be advisable to permit Japan to
have sufficient arms to defend itself until the United Nations
would have time to come to its assistance in case it should be
the victim of aggression. Since neither Russia nor Communist
China desired war, they would not, in his opinion, attack Japan
if the latter was protected by a United Nations guarantee.
I pointed out that the Charter of the United Nations was in
itself a guarantee against aggression. This guarantee, however,
had not proved effective in preventing Korea from being invaded.
Unfortunately too many nations took rather lightly the
obligations which they had assumed when they signed the Charter.
International Communism must have been aware of this fact when
it invaded Korea. Unless the members of the United Nations
should be prepared to make more sacrifices than they had been
willing to make in the past to maintain the system of collective
security, the guarantee of the United Nations would not be
sufficient protection for an unarmed Japan.
The Prime Minister repeated that he was convinced that Russia and
China would not risk a world war by deliberately upsetting a Far
Eastern settlement calling for an unarmed, neutralized
Japan.
With respect to Germany, the Prime Minister said his feelings
about the rearmament of Western Germany were similar to those
which he had just expressed regarding the rearming of Japan. He
thought it was an extremely dangerous thing for the Western
Powers to furnish Western Germany with arms. Such action might
well frighten Germany’s neighbors to the East and kindle a world
war. It seemed to him much wiser for the Western Powers not to
arm Western Germany but to use the threat of arming Western
Germany as an argument for prevailing upon the Russians to
disarm Eastern Germany. Germany could be an unarmed area lying
between the Communist and Western worlds. Each world would know
that if it attacked Germany there would be a world war. That
knowledge would serve as a deterrent.
I did not consider it advisable to turn my talk with the Prime
Minister into an argument. As the hour set aside for our
interview was drawing to a close I merely thanked him for his
frankness in setting forth his views and said that it seemed to
me that the basic divergencies between the foreign policies of
India and those of the United States stemmed from differences in
analyses of the motives of International Communism. India
apparently was sincerely convinced
[Page 2127]
that International Communism had no
aggressive intentions and that its motives were primarily
defensive. The United States, however, after a considerable
amount of experience with the Soviet Union and its associates,
was convinced that International Communism was inherently
aggressive and that the only reason it was not engaging in
undisguised aggression in various part of the world was because
it feared that if it did so it would find itself embroiled in a
world war with most of the free nations lined up against it. In
our opinion, the present policies of the Soviet Union and its
associates were directed to disrupting the unity of the free
world and to weakening the determination of the free world to
resist aggression. If these policies should be successful,
International Communism might feel that it would not be too
dangerous for it to endeavor to realize some of its aggressive
designs.
At this point in our conversation, Sir Girja Bajpai,
Secretary-General, Ministry of External Affairs, entered the
room with some documents for the Prime Minister to sign. My
interview with the Prime Minister, therefore, terminated. The
three of us, however discussed for a time the progress of the
bill in the United States Congress providing for foodgrain for
India. I explained some of the procedures involved. For the
first time the Prime Minister talked with me about the Indian
need for foodgrain. His questions indicated that he had an
active interest in the matter and would like to see the proposed
legislation enacted. He did not, however, express any hopes on
the subject or any appreciation of the efforts on India’s behalf
of the United States Government.
