493.46E9/9–2051
Memorandum of Conversation, by the Counselor of Embassy in Ceylon (Gufler)1
| Participants: | M. E. Metcalf, Acting U.K.H.C. |
| Bernard Gufler, Counselor of Embassy |
Subject: U.S.–U.K. Efforts to Prevent Rubber Shipment to Communist China.
In accordance with the Ambassador’s instructions I called this morning on Mr. Metcalf to inform him of the results of the Ambassador’s conversation today with the Prime Minister regarding the rubber shipment to Bed China that is going forward on the Polish vessel Mickiewicz. I gave him the substance of the Ambassador’s representations to the Prime Minister together with an outline of the Prime Minister’s arguments in reply.
Mr. Metcalf asked whether we had made a particular point with regard to the possibility that the Prime Minister might be disposed to prevent future shipments of rubber to Communist China. I replied that there had been reference to the possibility of future shipments in the Ambassador’s remarks, and that the Prime Minister in refusing to take any steps had not specifically referred to the question of future shipments. He had, however, given a negative reply to the representative in such a way as to imply that he would take no steps to prevent any future shipments.
Mr. Metcalf remarked that, although he naturally had done everything within his power to persuade the Ceylon Government to embargo rubber shipments to Red China, he had a certain understanding for the Prime Minister’s position. He stated that both British and American representation regarding rubber shipments had hit the Ceylonese on two points with regard to which they are extremely sensitive. They are anything which concerns rubber and anything which gives them any intimation that Western powers are attempting to form their policy for them or in any sense to limit their freedom of action. He went on to say that we should never forget that many prominent Ceylonese had been in British jails.
Mr. Metcalf is inclined to believe that the Prime Minister is on very firm ground, indeed, when he states that it would be politically dangerous for him and his Government to intervene to prevent the [Page 2057] rubber shipment from going forward on the Mickiewicz. I remarked that we naturally accepted the point that Mr. Senanayake must be the final authority on his own domestic political position and the necessities of that position. It was, however, difficult for us to make clear to our own Government what lies behind the bald statements that “it would be political suicide for the Government to stop rubber shipments” and that “it would drive Ceylon to Communism if the Government stops the shipment.” While we naturally could not expect the Prime Minister to disclose his political strategy to us, it was hard for us, on the basis of anything we could discover, to convince ourselves that shipment of rubber to Communist China represented such a vital factor in Ceylonese domestic problems, especially since the rubber would have been sold some place else if it had not been sold to China. Mr. Metcalf replied that the domestic political difficulty presenting itself to the Prime Minister in this connection was not so much what the Communist Party or other opposition party might do but what could eventuate among the Prime Minister’s own supporters in his own party from an intervention by the Prime Minister in the extremely sensitive field of rubber politics.
Mr. Metcalf then expressed the opinion that it was now up to us to consider what we might do in the future to better the situation. He said that he had no instructions from London but that he intends to place the following proposal before London in the hope of obtaining approval for it. He will propose that he be authorized within the near future to approach the Prime Minister, saying to him that we know very well that he does not really like the rubber business with Bed China any better than we do, and that we would like to know what he might have to propose from his side with a view to putting a stop to further Ceylonese rubber exports to China. Mr. Metcalf believes that, if the matter can so be handled as to lead the Ceylonese to make some proposals from their side, we may be able to accomplish something concrete and satisfactory. He thinks that they will merely stiffen their backs if they continue to feel that we are trying in any way to dictate to them or to force their position. He suggests that, if we are willing at an appropriate time in the near future to indicate to them that we would welcome suggestions from their side and at the same time to tell them that we will let bygones be bygones insofar as the Mickiewicz is concerned, we may be able to arrest what could otherwise be a drift in the wrong direction on the part of Ceylon. He emphasized in this connection that the Prime Minister is basically our friend and definitely the best friend we are likely to have in Ceylon.
- Sent to the Department of State as enclosure 1 to despatch 272 from Colombo September 20, not printed.↩