Foreign Relations of the United States, 1951, Asia and the Pacific, Volume VI, Part 2

611.89/2–2151

Department of State Policy Statement ²

secret

[ Washington ,] February 21, 1951.

Afghanistan

a. objectives

Our objectives with respect to Afghanistan are its continued existence as an independent state, with further integration of its diverse peoples; the maintenance of stable government; improved Afghan relations with Pakistan and Iran; and the encouragement of social, political and economic progress which will further strengthen present Afghan orientation toward the western democracies and away from the USSR.

b. policies

The ruling oligarchy in Afghanistan has maintained a stable government for twenty years, and, although it governs with almost autocratic authority, is permitting increasing diversity in expressions of political opinion. Our policy is to contribute to the Government’s stability by assisting in its plans for the economic and social development of the country, by encouraging governmental moves to meet the incipient democratic aspirations of literate elements in the population, and by encouraging the development of realistic foreign policies which adequately reflect Afghan needs and capabilities.

While US prestige in Afghanistan declined in late 1949 and early 1950, when the Afghans surmised that US interest in their country was not substantial, this trend appears to have been halted, and Afghanistan has renewed its cultivation of US friendship in accordance with its traditional reliance upon a remote and friendly power. This reliance is tempered with careful attention to the advantages that may be offered by other Muslim and European countries, as well as by the United Nations itself.

Although the approval of PL 621³ makes it possible to assist Afghanistan in its efforts to prepare for defense against aggression and to preserve internal order, it has been dilatory in making informal approaches looking to the supply of military equipment by this country. The US Government is in a position to consider extending Afghanistan reimbursable aid (by procurement assistance, technical advice or by sales from US military stocks) within the framework of established higher priority and supply limitations when it appears that Afghanistan is in a position to translate its requirements into definite terms.

Owing to the restrictive policies of the Afghan Government and widespread illiteracy, US information activities are limited, but the USIE in Kabul can and does distribute a sizeable amount of pro-US material, chiefly in the form of illustrated booklets, magazines and photographs. Film showings to small groups of officials and students have been successful and the exchange of persons program will bring a significant number of Afghan leaders and students to the United States. Further expansion of the USIE program along these lines will be recommended whenever it is clear that it can be done within the framework of Afghan Government restrictions and sensibilities.

The Afghan Government’s program for recruiting American teachers, potentially effective in disseminating information about the United States, has been suspended for over a year. Should it be renewed, a careful review would be essential in order to insure selection of personnel most likely to succeed under the difficult conditions obtaining in Afghanistan and to eliminate, insofar as possible, the administrative difficulties which have curtailed the effectiveness of the program in the past.

So far as known, there is no overt or clandestine indigenous Communist organization in Afghanistan. To date foreign Communist activity appears to be of little significance due in part to the vigilance of the existing government, and, to a considerable extent, to the predisposition of the inhabitants against Russia as a nation and communism as an ideology.

The major Afghan economic problem is that of maintaining necessary imports of consumer goods while proceeding with development plans. Afghanistan’s principal hard currency resources consist of dollar earnings from karakul fur exports to the United States, which constitute nearly 95 per cent of US imports from that country. A substantial amount of consumer goods imported from neighboring countries has had to be financed by sales of dollars, as Afghanistan has not been able to obtain sufficient rupees from its exports to balance its trade with Pakistan and India. Accordingly, we should encourage the Afghan Government to make arrangements with Pakistan and India for better marketing and transit facilities for Afghan products in active demand in those areas and to exercise more effective control over its foreign exchange resources, in order to promote the most effective application of Afghan dollar resources to purchases of capital goods and technical aid required for development projects.

The Afghan Government has been granted an Export-Import Bank loan of $21 million for irrigation, agricultural expansion, and related development in the Helmand River Valley. One of our objectives in assisting Afghanistan in developing its natural resources and otherwise increasing its agricultural and industrial production is to increase its total exports, reduce its dependence on the karakul trade, which has been subject to wide fluctuations, and to improve it as a market for foreign products. Such improvements, however, will be materially limited until the elimination of present transit difficulties in Pakistan, through which the bulk of Afghan foreign trade must pass. The Department should not support further loans to Afghanistan until there is a marked improvement in Afghan-Pakistan relations.

Subject to this proviso and the successful utilization of the present loan, the Department should continue to support serious consideration by the Export-Import Bank of loan applications for individual projects designed to increase Afghanistan’s agricultural output, especially wheat, the main item in the diet of the people, and to develop suitable industries where private capital is not available. We have indicated to the Afghans our willingness to support an Afghan application for membership in the International Monetary Fund and Bank.

In addition, we should help Afghanistan to obtain technical assistance with emphasis upon the training of Afghan personnel in the United States. The major fields in which other Point IV⁴ or UN technical assistance is needed are agriculture, public health, education, transportation, and exploitation of mineral resources. A US firm is now engaged in irrigation projects and other construction under contract with the Afghan Government. We should continue to support US private enterprise in appropriate ways in its efforts to maintain cordial and efficient working relations with the Afghan Government.

The lack of adequate supplies of both solid and petroleum fuels is one of Afghanistan’s most serious handicaps. Through PL 402⁵ and Point IV a small but reasonably promising start has been made by a US engineer from the Bureau of Mines in increasing coal output. Afghanistan hopes for UN technical assistance in the development of good petroleum prospects and the United States has encouraged Afghanistan to seek assistance from this source. No foreign private capital is likely to be forthcoming for development, however, and at present internal economic rivalries appear to obstruct the use of available Afghan financial resources for this purpose. In the absence of other external financing, Ave would favor carefully planned Afghan investment in the development of this natural resource. Until its petroleum is developed, Afghanistan will remain totally dependent upon Pakistan and the USSR for petroleum supplies and hence for internal transportation and distribution. On the other hand, the development of certain of the country’s mineral resources, particularly deposits of chrome, talc, and lead-zinc ores, may prove attractive to US private enterprise.

In accordance with our general policy, we submitted to Afghanistan early in 1948 a draft Treaty of Friendship, Commerce, and Navigation which, however, they have indicated is not acceptable, as it is too comprehensive and might pave the way for the USSR to demand privileges it does not now enjoy. We are considering the advisability of drawing up a special form of treaty which would take into account the conditions, problems, and circumstances of countries such as Afghanistan. In accordance with our policy in favor of broad participation in the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, we shall encourage Afghan accession to the Agreement at the earliest possible time.

The Afghan Government has a continuing interest in the establishment of an air service connecting Kabul with South Asian and Near East gateways. Despite our interest in adequate air connection for this land-locked country, the lack of communications, navigational aids, and weather service facilities, as well as the low traffic potential, would make the operation of a scheduled service prohibitive in cost. We believe that a more practical method lies in the establishment of a small Afghan airline, which could operate with minimum facilities, to develop the air traffic potential of the area at relatively low cost. We would be disposed to lend appropriate diplomatic and/or technical assistance in its establishment along these lines.

c. relations with other states

As a small, land-locked, and undeveloped country, Afghanistan is dependent upon neighboring countries for access to the rest of the world and is without defense adequate to meet aggression by a strong foreign power. It might, therefore, be expected to cultivate close and friendly relations with its neighbors. It tends, however, to concentrate its fears on these neighbors. As a small country, its diplomatic efforts traditionally aim at playing off states with rival interests in Afghanistan against each other, at the same time enlisting the support of remote powers. Afghanistan has long feared the USSR, and although it mistrusted the British, it regarded the latter as an offset to Soviet encroachment. Since Pakistan lacks a comparable international status it has not succeeded to the British position as a counterpoise to the USSR. It has, however, inherited all of the Afghan suspicion to which the British were subject. This situation, aggravated by a dispute involving the status of tribal groups along the Afghan-Pakistan border, strongly affects relations between the two countries and influences Afghanistan to fortify its position by cultivating the United States and India, and by looking toward the United Nations as a possible means of drawing public attention to its claims. Since the partition of India, Afghanistan has strenuously objected to the integration into Pakistan territory of Pushtu-speaking tribal elements west and south of the Durand Line.⁶ Afghanistan has agitated continuously in an effort to validate its interest in the area, to substantiate assertions that the area (“Pushtunistan”) is a political entity not subject to Pakistan’s authority, and to raise questions as to the validity of the Durand Line as Pakistan’s western and northern boundary. This problem, which so far has not yielded to numerous efforts at bilateral negotiations, involves the issue generally referred to as “Pushtunistan”.

Our interests would be seriously prejudiced by the failure of Afghanistan and Pakistan to reach an accord on matters of tribal status and treatment. We are continuing to urge the fullest utilization of the machinery of bilateral negotiation, including conversations without pre-conditions.

Access to foreign markets and sources of supply through Pakistan is essential to the Afghan economy and to continued Afghan orientation toward the West, especially as there is no such access through Iran at present. We should continue to encourage Afghanistan to settle its differences with Pakistan and to promote the regional cooperation which will preclude its excessive commercial dependence upon the USSR which has obvious implications for Afghan independence.

As a result of conflicts with Pakistan on the part of both India and Afghanistan, there are indications that the former functions as a partner with Afghanistan in its sustained agitation over the status of the tribal areas along the Afghan-Pakistan border with an intensity that appears to parallel the course of the India–Pakistan dispute over Kashmir. While the Indian Government officially deprecates the Afghanistan–Pakistan controversy and denies furnishing support therefor, it has been receptive to Afghan views on the subject of “Pushtunistan” and has freely allowed anti-Pakistan propaganda by Afghans within India. A Treaty of Friendship⁷ has been concluded between India and Afghanistan and ratification of a trade treaty is pending.

The disappearance of the integrated defense system for the Indian subcontinent which existed under British rule underlines the need for an entente among Afghanistan, Pakistan and India which would enable them to concert their defensive arrangements as a matter of common concern in the face of international Communist gains.

Afghanistan continues to maintain toward the USSR an attitude of cautious correctness combined with firm resistance to Soviet efforts at penetration. The best obtainable evidence indicates that ethnic minorities north of the Hindu Kush lack both the initiative and the means effectively to revolt against the government. It is possible, however, that the USSR might be tempted to detach from Afghanistan these groups which are contiguous to corresponding ethnic groups in the USSR. Present proselytism by Afghanistan in the Pathan tribal area appears to provide an opportunity for similar Soviet activity in northern Afghanistan. Afghan leaders are aware of the need for vigilance in their dealings with other states to create no situation or precedent of which the USSR might take advantage, but have failed to apply this principle in their approach to the problem of the tribal areas south and east of Afghanistan. So far, Soviet pressure has not been severe nor has Soviet influence in Afghan territory contiguous to the Soviet Central Asian Republic been extensive. The United States should encourage, however, any moves which the Afghan Government might make toward improving the administration and economic conditions in these areas so as to offset any latent dissidence which may exist and to lessen the chances of Soviet penetration. It should also take occasion to remind the Afghans of the opportunities for Soviet exploitation of any agitation the Pakistan border area affords. Our assistance in economic and other fields, by strengthening Afghan confidence in western support and reducing Afghan economic dependence on Soviet Russia, will tend to encourage Afghan resistance to the USSR.

In the event of actual USSR encroachment upon Afghanistan or indications of aggressive intentions, the United States should: 1) initiate conversations with Afghanistan, Pakistan and India to ascertain their reactions to prompt UN consideration and action; 2) consider what military assistance might be practicable with a view to prolonging guerrilla resistance within the country; and 3) consult with India and Pakistan concerning measures to be taken jointly or with the assistance of third countries for the defense of the approaches to the subcontinent. One of the UN facilities that might be utilized in connection with any aggressive USSR activities is the Peace Observation Commission which might ascertain and report the facts.

Relations between Iran and Afghanistan have improved as evidenced by the willingness of the Shah⁸ to extend his good offices in the Afghan-Pakistan dispute, and the recent friendly discussions in Washington which resulted in the establishment of the Helmand River Delta Commission.⁹ Settlement of the Helmand problem could become a further significant step toward more cordial relations between the two countries. Construction of adequate water storage along the upper Helmand, which has first priority in Afghan plans for economic development, is of vital interest to the Iranian province of Seistan. Although geographic factors are not favorable, an alternative route to the sea through Iran would go far toward relieving Afghanistan of the great economic and political difficulties arising from its landlocked position.

Afghanistan’s mistrust of the United Kingdom is accentuated by the belief that its interests were disregarded by the British in the arrangements for the transfer of power to the Dominions of India and Pakistan, and by the belief among Afghan officials that Pakistani intransigence toward Afghanistan is being encouraged by British interests. While continuing discussions and exchange of information with the British concerning common interests in Afghanistan, we should recognize their special interest in Afghanistan’s southern neighbor and should avoid the appearance of close association with British policy and interests in Afghanistan.

French cultural activities in Afghanistan, which lapsed during the war, have revived strongly. Among foreign influences Afghanistan welcomes that of the French predominantly in the fields of medicine, education, and archaeology. There has been evident a local French tendency to disparage US cultural and technical achievement as well as efforts of French interests to enter the petroleum and mineral development fields.

The lower cost of employing German, Austrian and Italian technicians and their readiness to accept Afghan conditions has tended to create a preference for them over US personnel among some prominent Afghans who have had European training. While American interest in Afghanistan does not aim at the exclusion of technical assistance by nationals of other democratic countries friendly to the United States, we should strive to maintain the US reputation for excellence in this field. This would be strengthened by ensuring the most careful selection of US scientific, technical, and educational workers in Afghanistan, and by using all appropriate means to promote the efficiency of their operations.

During the last year Afghanistan has, in general, supported the United States and the Western democracies in the United Nations when it would not seriously jeopardize her relations with the USSR. In such latter instances, Afghanistan has usually abstained from voting on the proposals for UN action.

d. policy evaluation

Afghanistan may be expected to move toward neutrality in the event of further deterioration in the world situation and to proclaim its neutrality formally should the United States become involved in war with Communist China or the Soviet Union. The urgency of the situation with respect to Afghanistan’s national security would determine the speed with which its Government would gravitate toward neutrality. Once established, this position would probably be followed by a period of watchfulness for a suitable opportunity to align itself with the winning side.

If such a war appears imminent, the United States might consider proposing to the Afghan Government that it hold in abeyance its differences with Pakistan and Iran “for the duration”. This would greatly assist in creating conditions for the regional cooperation which would be essential in the face of possible Communist expansion southward.

The policy of economic assistance which the United States has pursued toward Afghanistan is emerging from a formative stage with generally positive results. With only a few years of active interest in Afghanistan, US activities have inevitably encountered some difficulties. Nevertheless Afghan confidence and interest in US cooperation has persisted and, as advantage is taken of past experience, a continuation of generally good US-Afghan relations and in increasing attachment to Western concepts may be expected. The effectiveness of our assistance appears to be conditioned largely by our ability to maintain an impartiality and independence of opinion regarding Afghan problems, together with a sympathetic awareness of the numerous difficulties peculiar to their geographic and ethnographic position.

The development of Afghan confidence in the United States along these lines, especially if reinforced by a program of economic and technical assistance leading to concrete results, should lend permanence to the influence we currently enjoy. Thus it should be possible to give effect to US views with increasing frankness even when they may be at variance with those of the ruling oligarchy.

Economic and political progress in Afghanistan is hampered by a conservative, often reactionary, ruling group, and by the lack of educated manpower. We should, therefore, encourage the growing influence of educated, liberal Afghans, while carefully avoiding any impression that we wish to perpetuate a particular regime in power.

US ability to supply military equipment might furnish an inducement toward a further rapprochement between Afghanistan and Pakistan, once some progress has been made in settling their differences. If such progress becomes evident, the United States should be prepared to consider a formal request for assistance in obtaining this materiel. Any US response to such a request should likewise be related to contributions Afghanistan might make to South Asian defense in the form of guerrilla activities. An accurate appraisal of such possible contributions might have to await Afghan acceptance of our suggestions that they send military personnel to US service schools and station a Military Attaché here.

While our effort to avoid the appearance of arbitrary pressure and to refrain from use of material inducements as leverage to accomplish political aims has so far been helpful, it may be that a situation such as that between Afghanistan and Pakistan will indicate the desirability of using, in the future, offers or denials of both economic and military assistance as inducements to an attitude of greater international cooperation.

It seems likely that the Afghan Government will renew its program of recruitment for American teachers on a limited scale. The benefits and disadvantages of this program should be carefully reviewed before we encourage the Afghans to believe that we might make it more effective through the allocation of Smith–Mundt funds¹⁰ for limited grants-in-aid designed to parallel those of the British and French programs.

2. Department of State Policy Statements comprised a category of documents summarizing the current United States policy toward the relations of principal powers with, and the issues and trends in a particular country or region. The Statements were intended to provide information and guidance for officers in missions abroad. They were generally prepared by ad hoc working groups in the responsible geographic offices of the Department of State, were referred to the appropriate diplomatic missions abroad for comment and criticism, and were periodically revised.
3. Public Law 621, An Act to amend the Mutual Defense Assistance Act of 1949, approved July 26, 1950; text in 64 Stat. 373.
4. A Point Four General Agreement for Technical Cooperation with the Afghan Government was signed at Kabul on February 7. For text, see United States Treaties and Other International Agreements (UST), vol. 2, p. 592; for description, see Department of State Bulletin, February 19, 1951, p. 299.
5. Public Law 402, the United States Information and Educational Exchange Act of 1948, approved January 27, 1948; 62 Stat. 6.
6. The boundary line between British India and Afghanistan drawn up by a British mission under Sir Henry Mortimer Durand and agreed to by Amir Abdur Rahman Khan of Afghanistan in 1893.
7. Treaty of Friendship between the Government of India and the Royal Government of Afghanistan, signed at New Delhi on January 4, 1950; text in United Nations Treaty Series, vol. 81, p. 75.
8. Mohammed Reza Shah Pahlevi.
9. For information, see the editorial note, vol. v, p. 1459.
10. Funds provided under Public Law 402, which was popularly known as the Smith–Mundt Act after its original cosponsors, Senator H. Alexander Smith of New Jersey and Representative Karl E. Mundt of South Dakota.