689.90D/11–2951: Telegram
The Ambassador in Afghanistan (Merrell) to the Secretary of State
260. Dept pass DeptAr G–2. Pak Chargé wishing discuss “Hussain-Majid agreement” (Embtel to Dept 254, Nov 26)1 called on Horner yesterday. Horner attempted impress upon Abdur Rahman advantages of positive GOP response to GOA’s evident desire to achieve face-saving compromise to Pash question. Abdur Rahman said he wld call on AF Amb to London Shah Wali (who has been visiting Kabul, and is brother PriMin and uncle of King) with object inciting him to travel back via Karachi (Emb had understood previously that Shah Wali wished to go thru Pak, but was uncertain of his reception). He also said, if response was favorable, he wld ask GOP to extend formal invitation and to urge warm reception calculated to improve polit atmosphere.
Abdur Rahman agreed that essential feature of any agreement is face-saving formula. In that regard, Horner indicated Emb’s strong belief that gradual cessation propaganda on both sides was crux of situation without which no agreement was possible. Horner also suggested that during period in which propaganda being diminished it wld be most helpful if GOP cld make some unsolicited offer to improve transit Afghan goods, even to point of suggesting possibility of free port arrangement and extension of rail line from Chaman into [Page 2002] Kandahar. Chargé promised bring these views to attention GOP with positive recommendation.
As previously indicated, Emb considers that atmosphere conducive to satisfactory settlement Pak–Af dispute, if on no more than temporary basis, is being rapidly generated Emb feels this result, in large measure, PriMin’s own earnest wish for opportunity for peaceful development Afghan industry and economy. Emb therefore believes it wld be important if face-saving formula (largely intended to strengthen PriMin’s hand against more nationalistic elements) could be accompanied by economic advantages to GOA. These wld not be essentially bribe, but rather wld be intended rationalize Afghan’s land locked position, and to replace archaic Brit system of refundable customs duties, which has led to great delays in Afghan imports and exports, and very considerable increase in costs thereof. Emb hopes that ultimately GOA can be offered free port arrangement in Karachi, and that rail line shld be extended into Kandahar, thereby making possible exemption Afghan goods from customs examination and duty within Pak. At same time, Emb wld like to envisage substantial improvement Kabul–Kandahar road (partially paid for by US grant aid).
These improvements in communications not only wld bolster Afghan econ, but wld be of ultimate military value in event Sov aggression in this area. For that reason, if for no other, Emb wld recommend strong support by Dept and Emb Karachi along those lines. Army Attaché concurs.
Dept pass Karachi. Sent Dept 260, rptd info Karachi 45, pouched London unn, Delhi unn, Moscow unn.
- Telegram 254, from Kabul, November 26, not printed, reported that the Hussain–Majid “agreement” outlined in Karachi’s telegram 44 to Kabul, November 15 (same as telegram 525 to Washington, p. 1999) had been reposing in the Prime Minister’s desk and that the Minister of Foreign Affairs had been summoned from vacation to Kabul to consider it. The acting Minister of Foreign Affairs had stated that while the agreement might not lead to a solution it was “encouraging.” (689.90D/11–2651)↩