689.90D/10–1751: Telegram
The Ambassador in Afghanistan (Merrell) to the Secretary of State
194. We wish to offer fol comments seriatim on points raised Deptel 138, Oct 15:
(1) We have all along considered it self-evident that GOA interpreted our Nov 6 proposal as offering basis for discussion Pashtun issue. Further, it seems obvious from GOP delay in acceptance, and its reframing of point 4 thereof, that GOP also realized that proposal as originally worded offered opportunity for GOA to bring up Pashtun question. Further, as we have reported, GOA consistently has made it clear that Pashtun issue only matter it is interested in discussing with GOP and that it wld not be prepared to go into what it considered secondary subjects in dispute (Embtel 178, Oct 8) unless this first and primary matter was settled to its satisfaction. In this sense we feel employment term “mental reservations” as misconception facts of case.
(2) It has been our belief that main intent of Nov 6 approach was to bring about end to newspaper and radio war over Pashtun issue, and to substitute calm and reasoned talks between two parties on mutually acceptable basis. It was just as inevitable that GOA wld interpret term “without a previously agreed agenda or stated preconditions” in point 4 Nov 6 approach as permitting discussion Pashtunistan as that GOP wld see to substitute other wording ostensibly covering same ground but in fact circumscribing right GOA to introduce matters deemed by GOP of purely internal import. It was in terms basic need to bring two parties together that expression “GOP will also be prepared to discuss with GOA all matters of common concern” was (Embtel 178, Oct 8) mentioned to Min Fon Affairs as possibly affording means of discussing “question of Pashtuns” (which obviously is not the same thing as Pashtunistan state as such). Further, far from encouraging GOA to believe US supports Pashtunistan concept, we have consistently made plain our belief that such state wld be non-viable, and that support for it on part Pashtuns on other side of Durand Line (or for that matter in Afghan itself) is highly questionable. [Page 1994] We have no doubt that GOA harbors no misapprehensions on this score, and in fact we have been given many indications that GOA regards attitude this mission on Pashtun question as distinctly frigid.
(3) Our views on entire Pashtunistan question are set forth in considerable detail in Embdes 131, Oct 12, which shld reach Dept shortly.1 In summary, we feel prospects new and successful effort to end Pak-Afghan imbroglio must await propitious conditions.
(4) We consider it strong probability that Afghans are receiving financial (in addition to obvious moral) support from India. Clearly Pashtun question intimately linked with Kashmir problem, which provides main Indian motivation. We cannot adduce any concrete proof of Indian financial aid, which undoubtedly is indirect. However, Afghan exparliamentarian Habib, now operating under auspices in Peshawar, has told reliable source that Indian import duties on Afghan goods are collected and retained by Afghan customs authorities at Chamen, and earmarked for Pashtunistan propaganda. There is probable substance in this charge. Other means support takes such form as punitive subsidization Pashtun-propaganda organs published in India.
- This 16-page despatch, not printed, contained a summary of the question which recapitulated most of the points documented in the present compilation and that for the year 1950 (689.90D/10–1251).↩