Foreign Relations of the United States, 1951, Asia and the Pacific, Volume VI, Part 2

689.90D/6–851

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Acting Officer in Charge of Pakistan–Afghanistan Affairs (Gatewood)

confidential

[Washington,] June 8, 1951.

Subject: Pushtoonistan

Participants:	H.R.H. Shah Mahmud, Prime Minister of Afghanistan
	Abdul Hamid Aziz, Minister Counselor, Chargé d’Affaires ad interim, Afghan Embassy
	Mr. McGhee—NEA
	Mr. Mathews—SOA
	Mr. Gatewood—SOA

Problem:

Explore means of improving Afghan–Pakistan relations.

Action Required:

To convince the Afghan Prime Minister that it is not in Afghanistan’s best interest to press the Pushtoonistan issue at this time.

Action Assigned to:

NEA.

On the occasion of the Prime Minister’s visit to Mr. McGhee’s Virginia farm, the Prime Minister was requested to review the Pushtoonistan question. There ensued a 3-hour discussion, throughout which Mr. Aziz acted as interpreter for the Prime Minister, who made the following initial points:

(1) After describing in some detail the location and nomenclature of the tribes on both sides of the Durand Line and their relationship to each other, the Prime Minister pointed out that tribes to the east of the line had never been directly administered by the British who had done nothing to improve their condition except to build a few military roads and some forts.

(2) Afghanistan wishes no additional territory but is seriously concerned with obtaining self-government and improved living standards for the Pushtoon people. (He admitted that more than half of the Pushtoon-speaking people live outside Afghanistan.)

(3) The Durand Line is an artificial boundary, largely drawn across the crests of mountains, and the 1921 treaty¹ establishing this boundary was only agreed to initially by Afghanistan with great reluctance, and is not worthy of much consideration (implying that Pakistan did not inherit any rights or obligations from the British under this treaty, which the Afghans have, nevertheless, failed to denounce, as they might).

Mr. McGhee reiterated two points he had made during his visit to Kabul: (a) that the principle of self-determination, though popular after World War I, had proved most difficult of application in the last 20 years; and (b) that the area called “Pushtoonistan” was not economically viable. He also pointed out that the tribes in this area had been associated for many years with British India, perhaps more closely than with Afghanistan.

The Prime Minister replied that: (a) these tribes had, in fact, very close associations with various Afghan Governments during the War of Independence (against the British), the reign of King Amanullah,² and the establishment of the present (Mohammedzai) dynasty in 1929; (b) furthermore, they were most intelligent and ingenious, as shown by their remarkable ability in reproducing European types of rifles, and could make rapid progress if they received outside assistance, particularly if such aid were to develop their untouched mineral resources; and (c) though it might be true that the principle of self-determination had led to difficult political situations, nevertheless, it formed the basis for the establishment of small states such as Trans-Jordan and Israel.

Mr. McGhee said that the Prime Minister had unhappily picked poor examples to illustrate his last argument, as Trans-Jordan had been established because of British strategic interests in the Middle East, and Israel was being upheld by large amounts of American aid. He went on to say that, as for Pushtoonistan, Afghanistan could not support it, Pakistan would not countenance it, and the United States had too many commitments to be able to give it any assistance; it seemed to him, therefore, that, without any possibility of outside aid, without a seaport, and with only sparse resources, the inhabitants of “Pushtoonistan” would have a dim future, unless they chose to join their efforts with those of West Pakistan, which is a progressive and democratic state. On this last point Mr. McGhee alluded to the fact that the Pakistan constitution, though not yet completed, contemplated representation for the inhabitants of the tribal areas and that Pakistan had begun to execute certain important development projects that should provide opportunities for improving the condition of the tribes.

The Prime Minister summed up the principal reasons for Afghan support of the Pushtoon-speaking tribes as follows:

(1) The close bonds of blood relationships and mutual political influence between these people and the Afghans;

(2) The demands of the whole Afghan people (not of the Afghan Government only) for Pushtoon independence;

(3) The verdict of history, with which future generations would praise or condemn present Afghan leaders in proportion to the effort put forth to protect and aid the Pushtoons; and

(4) The consciousness that there should be justice done to the Pushtoons for their long-standing efforts to preserve their independence.

The Prime Minister emphasized that Afghanistan would pursue these aims only by peaceful means and that, if the Pushtoons were abandoned by the GOA, the present Afghan rulers might be overthrown by a popular revolution.

Mr. McGhee said that, without further disputing the cogency of the Prime Minister’s arguments, it seemed to him that the persistence of Afghan–Pakistan differences over Pushtoonistan might provide a spark to a world conflagration; that all the countries of the free world, including Afghanistan, were struggling to preserve the peace and build up their strength as quickly as possible; and that the free nations would, in one or two years, acquire such combined power as to deter the USSR from further aggression. Under these circumstances, he urged the Prime Minister to believe that these were not times in which to persist in pressing the Pushtoonistan issue.

The Prime Minister replied that he agreed entirely with Mr. McGhee’s opinion but felt he must point out that, by the will of God, the Afghans had been able to retain their freedom by fighting for it (implying that the Pushtoons might feel impelled to follow this example), and that he hoped Mr. McGhee would carry his point with the Pakistanis also (indicating that Pakistan’s stubbornness was a great stumbling block to the GOA).

Mr. McGhee replied that we had indeed pressed Pakistan to consider the consequences of its actions and we would continue to do so. He said he wished to make it quite clear that it was only “Pushtoonistan” that we felt we could not assist and that we had every hope of continuing to help Afghanistan. The Prime Minister inquired whether, as Pakistan was buying arms in the United States, some aid might not be extended to allow Afghanistan to do this also. Mr. McGhee said that Pakistan arms purchases here had been of little significance, to which the Prime Minister replied good-naturedly that something was better than nothing.

1. Treaty between Great Britain and Afghanistan establishing Friendly and Commercial Relations, signed at Kabul, November 22, 1921; text in British and Foreign State Papers, vol. 114, p. 174.
2. King of Afghanistan, 1919–1929.