689.90D3/6–151: Telegram

The Ambassador in Pakistan (Warren) to the Secretary of State

confidential

1151. 1. It is evident now, in view of revealed Pak decision taken on May 9 to adopt defensive positions (Embtel 1107, May 22),1 that Defense Secy gave me different interpretation of the then developing sitn of which border raids were only a factor, than that which GOP actually entertained. Similarly MilAtt reed incomplete picture from Pak mil authorities while defense deployment was being carried out. Significantly it was only after deployment was completed that FonMin called UK HICOM and myself to present estimate of sitn, and likewise MilAtt was freely given order and timing Pak troop movements after they were completed.

2. It is further evident that despite Pak allegations and ambiguities actual recent additions to strength in areas in question are squadron of eight planes from Peshawar, one infantry battalion from Rawalpindi and about 12 armored cars. Pak motives for lack of forthrightness in describing troop movements and reason therefore are not clear. Motive for secretiveness is made less clear since additional strength moved into affected area is not substantial, units are deployed defensively and Paks have nothing to fear from Afghan mil machine. Dept perhaps correct in conjecture that GOP has lost faith in usefulness bilateral negotiations with Afghans and decided instead to “rattle the sabre” for effect it may have on stopping border raids as well as on making Daud think twice before taking precipitant action.

It may be giving Paks too much credit for global thinking in connection this particular sitn to project considerations probable attitude US and UK. But if such considerations were undertaken it is likely that GOP cld conclude along lines suggested in Dept’s second conjecture.

Third conjecture seems unlikely. Defense Secy informed MilAtt today that no troop movements have taken place in Lahore, Rawalpindi or Peshawar.

Emb has recd no clue in conversations with PriMin, FonMin, and others of a relationship between troop movements and GOP attitude toward Nov 6 approach. Fact is, however, that Pak’s reluctance to [Page 1979] accept unconditionally our Nov offer is now matched by parallel refusal to accept GOP offer simultaneous withdrawal troops without imposing unilateral conditions.

3. Discrepancy between FonMin’s statement to me that GOP wld offer simultaneous withdrawal (Embtel 1096, May 20)2 and actual offer probably based on my midunderstanding Zafrullah’s precise meaning. Paks did not then nor do they now consider their recent troop dispersal in Chaman area to be abnormal in strength, whereas they regard Afghan concentration around Kandahar as “dangerous”. Hence Pak request for unilateral withdrawal.

It is opinion of Emb, supported by MilAtt, that pattern troop deployment in Baluchistan at present date is one of defense only and that Paks have no offensive designs.

Dept pass London Kabul. Rtpd info London 86, Kabul 67.

Warren
  1. Telegram 1107, from Karachi, May 22, not printed, contained information on Pakistani troop movements (689.90D3/5–2251).
  2. Telegram 1096, from Karachi, May 20, not printed, but see footnote 3, p. 1974.