689.90D/4–1451: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Pakistan 1

secret
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661. Embtel 960 Apr 14.2 Dept notes Pak reply Nov 6 approach formulated prior receipt report conversation Mohd Ali and McGhee Apr 13 which might have influence GOP phrase its reply more consistently with US proposal.

Dept forced, after careful evaluation, regretfully conclude present reply does not constitute acceptance broad terms Nov 6 approach for fol reasons:

1)
Para one restates effect implicit in pts one and two Nov 6 approach in terms unnecessarily offensive Afghan Govt.
2)
Para two Dept believes Afghan Govt would view as unacceptable challenge its sincerity new GOP precondition that exch Ambs be postponed until after lapse arbitrary two months “good behavior” period. Dept considers exch Ambs anytime within two mos as permanent constructive step creating climate conducive further negotiations.
3)
Para three GOP proposal connects exch Ambs with substantive discussions to point where they arrange agenda. This conflicts our proposal which specified discussions without agenda or preconditions, exch Ambs being procedural, psychological factor and preceding substantive talks.

It appears GOP may either:

(a)
Rephrase reply in light Mohd Ali–McGhee talks.
(b)
Accept unconditionally first three pts US approach (as GOP apparently ready to do in March) in which case Pak concept re talks (to be carried on through diplomatic channels after exch Ambs) would constitute counter–proposal to US fourth point which Dept [Page 1963] would be willing submit Afghans though most doubtful their acceptance.
(c)
If present reply GOP last word Dept must withdraw approach and end attempts act as informal go-between.

Afghan PriMin together with Najibullah Khan, Amb to India, will talk with Secy Apr 23 and Dept considers desirable that final Pak reply be available by then so Afghans can be informed.

Acheson
  1. Repeated for information to Kabul as telegram 258, to London as 4760, and to New Delhi by air.
  2. Not printed, but see the editorial note, p. 1959.