320/12–1651: Telegram
The Acting Chairman of the United States Delegation to the General Assembly (Roosevelt) to the Secretary of State
priority
Delga 697. Re Kashmir: In light of Gadel 432 of Dec 12, Gross had conversation with Graham and Devers, Hyde present. In course of two hours fol conclusions were reached:
1. Graham will not now commit himself to return to subcontinent and reiterated that this shld be “matter of depending on future developments”. He wld not at this time commit himself to continue in case but on Gross insistence agreed to keep open mind. Graham feels his future usefulness depends on attitude of parties toward him after filing of report.
Devers stated his personal commitments make return to subcontinent impossible; he feels he has done his part and if military man is needed wld suggest Gen Malony1 whom he wld be willing to accompany to subcontinent, introducing him to Ayub and Cariappa. While Graham stated he felt his duty ends with filing report, Gross pointed out that Nov 10 resolution can properly be construed as continuing his services and Graham agreed to take no final decision.
2. On suggestion of token withdrawal of forces, Graham and Devers will put their heads together and consider this possibility. Devers was doubtful Indians wld agree, since Pak troops cld be returned in matter of hours but Indians in matter of days. However, Graham will consider raising this with Zafrullah entirely apart from his report.
3. Graham agreed that no res or other action by SC shld be taken at this time.
4. Graham and Devers stated that idea of large number of observers was put forward partly as a tactical move and it is not now under active consideration.
5. Idea of neutral troops has been rejected by India in a communication received by Graham on Dec 14. He and Devers feel that Pak wld probably reject idea of troops there without increasing neutral contingents in India. Therefore, this idea no longer is current.
6. As things stand now, Graham intends to insert in report two opinions stated in para five of Delga 601 and in addition as third point he plans to suggest July 15 as date of appointment PlebAd. As for the point and developing idea of small number of troops, he will suggest that part two of Aug 13, 1948, UNCIP res and para 4(a) and (b) of Jan 5, 1949 res are inter-related. He will also state that at every stage in demilitarization which is to be completed by July 15 there shld be a fair proportion of Indian and Pak troops in relation to each other and that proportion might well be arrived at by using figures at time of cease-fire.
Devers has worked out demilitarization plan in stages with precise number of troops at each stage and an over-all figure at end of demilitarization and upon appointment of PlebAd who, as Devers [Page 1918] understands his powers, can decrease or increase number of troops remaining throughout the state.
Indian statement which was recd on Dec 14 was consistent with Bajpai statement to Steere (New Delhi’s 1940 to Dept of Dec 1) and referred to informal paper on numbers of troops which Devers had prepared for Indian military men. In the light of this fact, Devers plan on demilitarization, which is complete in every detail, leading to appointment of PlebAd on July 15 will be annexed to Graham report. Gross commented that this wld be most important document and Graham stated that this paper contains solution of case on theory of a plebiscite if it is at all possible to solve it.
7. Re SC tactics, Graham and Devers agreed with Gross that Graham might orally present his report in substance at SC mtg on or about Dec 19 without submitting it first for UN documentation. This might prevent leaks and report cld later be documented and circulated. This wld meet problem of Paks for some SC consideration before Xmas recess, but it was recognized this shld be discussed with UK in light of London’s 2730 to Dept of Dec 13.
In discussing above points Graham felt he had completed his best efforts and that Devers’ demilitarization plan is the key to any solution on our present theory.
Devers was very frank in urging that Nehru is key to problem; that Indian milit men wld agree with him on settlement if they were permitted to do so. He doubted that Graham cld do anything further with Nehru and while he personally cld not return to subcontinent, was skeptical of usefulness of Graham doing so. While Indians have reduced their figures on troops, they still deny the Paks the right to have any on their side. He feels appointment of PlebAd wld be creation of agent who might deal effectively with Nehru. However, he thinks Nehru does not desire plebiscite, because on analysis the powers of the PlebAd are so great that it wld infringe on sovereignty of state and be bitterly opposd by Abdullah. He has found Indian milit men most sympathetic and feels he cld have settled case with them if they were permitted to do so.
Graham’s analysis is that Indian statements about desiring a plebiscite are conditioned on what he and Devers consider unreasonable fear that the withdrawal of troops if agreed in advance, not just for one stage but as part of an entire plan, might lead to communal rioting and slaughter. Therefore, the Indians have insisted on agreeing upon not more than one stage of demilitarization at a time. It is understandable with four years experience with Indian vagueness, feel this means nothing. Graham feels Rau is sincere in arguing this point of view but agrees with Devers that milit forces under Devers plan wld be sufficient to prevent serious communal disorders at every state. Devers added that Paks wld have same problem of refugees and security and yet Indians wld allow them no troops other than police force to cope with them.
[Page 1919]We left discussion with understanding that, subj to views of Dept, we wld aim at SC mtg next week and we feel it likely UK will agree in light of Pak desire for some SC consideration before holidays.
In discussing recent statements of Zafrullah in GA with personal and official hostility to US position, Devers feels this reflects uncertainties in positions of Pak Govt and understands Zafrullah is most anxious to return to Karachi for consultations on Dec 21. Altho Indians have now agreed to eight of Graham’s twelve points, Graham concluded that essence of disagreement remains.
- Gen. Harry James Malony, U.S.A. Ret.↩