690D.91/10–2651
Memorandum by Mr. Vincent Baker of the Office of United Nations Political and Security Affairs, of a Conversation Held on October 23, 1951
Subject: Kashmir
| Participants: | UN Representative for India and Pakistan: Dr. Frank Graham |
| UNA: Mr. Hickerson | |
| SOA: Mr.Weil, Mr.Collins | |
| UNP: Mr. Stein, Mr. Meyers, Mr. Ludlow,1 Mr. Baker |
Introductory Remarks
Dr. Graham opened the discussion by emphasizing the need for playing up the importance of a Kashmir settlement. He considered it especially necessary to do so for the effect such an emphasis would have in Pakistan. He had considered filing a dramatic report to achieve this effect but decided such a report would end his mediation efforts, and that sometimes more boldness was required to proceed slowly and wisely than to file an apparently bold report. He decided that his report could not please the Pakistanis unless it said they were lily white and it could not please the Indians unless it called the Pakistanis aggressors. He thought his report as submitted would probably displease the Pakistanis by its avoidance of any condemnation of India, but that they would be pleased that he did not recommend partition. He believed that if the agreements under the UNCIP resolutions were thrown aside, India would merely assert its sovereignty and the possibility of peaceful settlement would be ended. The Pakistanis would be quite alarmed if the broader powers granted to Sir Owen Dixon were given to him at this time.
Estimate of Nehru’s Attitude
To Mr. Weil’s inquiry as to the apparent sincerity of Nehru’s arguments against demilitarization proposals, Dr. Graham replied that at one stage it appeared that Mr. Nehru genuinely wanted a settlement, but after a visit of Nehru to Kashmir and conferences with Abdullah there the Indian attitude seemed to stiffen a bit. At one point, Graham had come to Nehru’s home for dinner as the guest of the family, and for three hours after dinner he had conferred with Nehru alone. Graham did not mention terms of settlement or specific issues on this occasion but confined his remarks to a purely personal appeal during [Page 1891] which Graham poured out his heart to Nehru on India’s opportunities for Asian and world leadership. Graham later confirmed his statements with a private paper to Nehru to avoid any subsequent misunderstandings. The remarks and paper were such that Graham would not object to their publication in Times Square or Pakistan. In all official negotiations on terms of settlement the Indians and Pakistanis had been equally represented.
Effect of Indian Elections
Mr. Weil raised the question of the effect of the coming Indian elections and Mr. Stein pointed out that a six weeks mediation period beginning November 1 would end in the midst of the campaign. Dr. Graham replied that some believed no progress could be achieved until after the election, but remarked that if Nehru should win on the basis of promises to hold Kashmir it was doubtful he could change his course of action afterward. Mr. Stein suggested India might be firmer after the elections. Dr. Graham said Nehru might then say he had made a promise to the people.
Effect of Assassination
Mr. Collins asked for Dr. Graham’s estimate of the effect of Liaquat’s assassination on the situation. Dr. Graham replied that he had thought it might be considerable until it was found that the Kashmir issue was not the cause of the assassination. He believes Nazimuddin will follow policies similar to those of Liaquat. His main concern now was that immediate differences between India and Pakistan could connect with centuries old differences and touch off a conflagration. Mr. Meyers inquired what procedures seemed most feasible in the near future in view of this danger. Dr. Graham said it seemed reasonable to try further negotiation and mediation followed by a report and recommendations. Returning to the subcontinent would be dramatic but dangerous.
Publicity
Mr. Stein asked what aid the United States could give to Dr. Graham at this stage. Dr. Graham replied that he wanted the help from the United States to be undirected by the UN Representative. He had disabused the parties of the idea that he was a US–UK stooge and did not want to give them grounds for thinking otherwise. One form of action undertaken informally, however, would be of the greatest value. Editorials in leading newspapers should precede the opening meeting of the Security Council in Paris and should comment favorably on the personal part of Dr. Graham’s report bearing down on the potentialities that a peaceful settlement hold for India and the world. Such editorial comment would be printed all over India. When [Page 1892] a mediator presents a report he inevitably disappoints some people; Dr. Graham accordingly considers that he needs new strength in the form of such support if he is to continue his efforts successfully. The editorials should appeal for an approach based not on 19th century sovereignty and nationalism but on 20th century statesmanship. Such editorial support should be broadly representative without a party focus. The following papers might specifically be included: New York Times, New York Herald Tribune, Christian Science Monitor, St. Louis Post Dispatch, Norfolk Pilot, Richmond Times Dispatch, Portland Oregonian, Louisville Courier Journal, Atlanta Constitution, Atlanta Journal, Chicago Daily News, New York Evening Post, Washington Post, Manchester Guardian, and papers in Minneapolis, Des Moines, Baltimore etc. … Commentators and columnists such as Stokes, Childs and Kaltenborn might likewise point up the importance of the issue and the value of a settlement.
Mr. Collins asked if the United States could take any action to produce an atmosphere conducive to Dr. Graham’s success in Paris, raising the possibility of representations by the Secretary of State to the parties. Dr. Graham replied that independence was a source of his strength. If word reached one of the parties that an idea put forward by the Council or the United States came from Graham and he were asked about it, he could not deny it. He repeated that a wider realization of the importance of the issue would be helpful; that a war between India and Pakistan could in his opinion create a power vacuum that would enable Russia to take over all of Asia and involve the United States in World War III. Further, people in Asia think we push the case aside as unimportant because it does not involve the West, that in our opinion just 400,000,000 colored people make no difference, and that the UN is concerned primarily with problems of interest to the West. The Kashmir is far more important than the Iranian case but has received less attention because it is not so dramatic.
Status of Graham’s Twelve Proposals
Dr. Graham added that it might be useful if the United States could get any information from Minister Steere in New Delhi as to how far the Government of India could go in compromising on demilitarization. Dr. Graham had been privately informed that India could accept a limitation of troops on the Indian side of the cease fire line to 14,000. The latest figure publicly announced was 16,000. Dr. Graham does not believe the Pakistanis would accept the figure of 14,000 and thinks India should reduce the figure further. He believes, however, Pakistan would be making a mistake to stand for equality of troops if such a stand would delay the appointment of [Page 1893] the plebiscite administrator. With the arrival of the administrator the situation would be completely changed because of the broad powers granted to him. If the Pakistanis quibble and fail to get an administrator they will fail to get Kashmir.
Dr. Graham emphasized that he considered the pinning of responsibility directly upon India in the appointment of the administrator to be the key point of his proposals. The language that India should “cause the plebiscite Administrator to be formally appointed to office” was carefully planned.
Dr. Graham remarked that he was convinced his twelve points represented a sound basis for negotiation and that each was aimed at a target. That Pakistan should make a no-war declaration would satisfy an Indian allegation of danger of an attack by the Government of Pakistan. Pakistan would accept it in the context of a broader agreement, but like a no-strike declaration in a labor dispute it would have to be accompanied by certain other agreements. The ban on war propaganda was likewise aimed at satisfying an Indian complaint. The reaffirmation of the plebiscite was designed to satisfy Pakistan’s apprehensions concerning the Constituent Assembly. Similarly, the other points were not created in a vacuum.
Dr. Graham mentioned that he had a private paper from Bajpai transmitted through Marin saying the points that India had not commented upon were acceptable. Dr. Graham noted that the Government of India had not commented on the arbitration point in his proposal.
At present agreement was lacking on only two more points: (1) the number of troops and (2) the fixing of the date on which India would cause the plebiscite administrator to be inducted.
UN Troops Proposal
Dr. Graham had in mind another proposal that he had withheld from the parties thus far lest it be attacked on procedural grounds. He would like to see 4,000 United Nations troops stationed in Azad Kashmir. Tribesmen could not get by them: the Pakistan army would no longer constitute a threat to India in that area; the Azad forces would not be a threat. India’s three main arguments would be undercut. Pakistan might say the proposal was not fair and that UN troops should be placed on the Indian side as well, but India had already rejected an offer of troops and claims sovereignty in the area. Graham could answer that India does not have de facto sovereignty in Azad Kashmir at present if India should object to troops on the Pakistan side of the cease fire line. Dr. Graham said Gross had suggested that UN troops be offered to both sides simultaneously in the interest of fairness and because rejection by India and acceptance by Pakistan could only redound to the credit of the latter. Dr. Graham thought [Page 1894] well of the suggestion but preferred to try to induce India to accept the troops on condition that Pakistan did so, and then to get Pakistan acceptance.
A bold proposal of that sort could not be advanced by the mediator, however, unless it had the support of the world. This bold proposal might be timely since Liaquat’s last comment to Graham was “Your mission is the last—I have held my people in check three years and can do so no longer if you are unsuccessful.” The mission did make progress largely because it took the considerable risk of not getting mixed up in the three issues of constituent assembly, cease fire violations, and troop movements which threatened war even while the mission was on the subcontinent. Graham reached the decision that war would not actually break out while the mission was present, and that to give the parties an opportunity to blow off steam a while on these side issues might make them more ready to talk seriously on demilitarization issues.
New Resolution
Mr. Collins asked Dr. Graham if he needed a Security Council resolution or whether the prestige of a resolution should be held in reserve. Dr. Graham replied that he needed a definite expression. Mr. Hickerson remarked that sometimes a letter from the President of the Security Council had served the purpose of a resolution. Dr. Graham stated that a new resolution would not have to abrogate the March 30 resolution and that the Council could if necessary come back to the arbitration clause in that resolution. Further, a new resolution should not give him any broader terms of reference. The Council must make it clear that acts of the constituent assembly would have no effect.
It was asked whether a resolution mentioning the constituent assembly now might weaken the effect of a later resolution. Dr. Graham said the resolution could be softened to terms that would take note of the promises of India that the assembly action would have no effect.
Mr. Meyers asked what step might follow the six weeks period of negotiation and the writing of the report and recommendations to the Security Council. Mr. Collins asked if it would strengthen Graham’s hand in the negotiations if he were able to say in advance that if agreement was not reached by the parties he would be backed by the Security Council in specific recommendations as to terms of settlement. Dr. Graham remarked that it was a good point but that under those conditions the Pakistanis might just sit and wait during the negotiations. Moreover, the Indians might say that they had rejected arbitration and now Graham was setting himself up as an arbitrator. A decision as to the step that would follow would depend on circumstances. [Page 1895] He did not put a recommendation of the use of UN armed forces in his recommendations this time because of procedural objections that could be raised. It had been his experience that when people cannot meet a proposal on its merits they attack its procedural aspects, and on those grounds he thought he would have been wide open to attack. A mediator cannot spring new proposals on the parties.
Mr. Collins then asked if it would be helpful for him to be able to say that if agreement was not reached he would feel impelled to recommend that the Security Council pass a resolution embodying his proposals. Dr. Graham replied that it would be better for the Council to ask the UN Representative to make recommendations, and incorporate these recommendations in a subsequent resolution. If handled this way Dr. Graham thought his recommendations as mediator would not be subject to criticism as having the character of an arbitral award because they would not be binding on either the Council or the parties.
Mr. Meyers asked whether it would be useful to have a resolution saying that the UN Representative should make a report and recommendations. Dr. Graham said such a resolution would give him great strength, and that it might say something to the effect that at the end of two months the UN Representative should report to the Security Council with recommendations. He mentioned that he had just done that under his present terms of reference.
Return to Subcontinent
Mr. Hickerson raised the question of Dr. Graham’s return to the subcontinent. Dr. Graham stated that President Truman had asked him to accept another post but that, on the basis of Dr. Graham’s estimate of the importance of following through the Kashmir case, the President had said it seemed more desirable at present for him to continue work on that problem. Dr. Graham accordingly would be available to return if necessary, but thought it would be a mistake to do so unless he received word in Paris that there was some likelihood of achieving a substantial effect. He could say no more to Nehru than he had already said in the paper confirming the personal appeal, and to retrace steps without progress would appear to close the issue and increase the danger of war.
Mr. Weil asked for Dr. Graham’s reaction to the proposal that he touch base in the subcontinent en route to the Paris meetings of the Security Council. Dr. Graham stated his belief that it would be a mistake to go back without formal Security Council action.
Mr. Weil interpreted the consensus as being that Dr. Graham should wait until all possibilities had been exhausted in Paris and he had a package to place in Nehru’s hands or an indication from the Government of India that his presence would be useful.
[Page 1896]Dr. Graham said to return without such a new indication would be dramatic but might merely dramatize failure. There was dynamite as well as drama in running back to the subcontinent.
Mr. Meyers added comments on the difficulty of getting Nehru’s attention during his seven weeks’ election tour except under the conditions mentioned.
Schedule of Action
The question of the scheduling of a Security Council meeting was raised. Dr. Graham emphasized that he did not want to be a party to any delaying action, but had no objection to a postponement of a few days in the Paris meeting if the parties were themselves in agreement as to its advisability.
Reaction to Report
Dr. Graham raised the question of the reactions to his report and personal statement to the Security Council saying Rau had thanked him and said it was a magnificent statement and that one Pakistan delegate had told him it was the greatest statement ever made to the Security Council. Dr. Graham thought that it had been as well received as could be expected but that the filing of any report causes disappointments. Accordingly he felt the need of assistance in the form of newspaper support to restore his strength before undertaking new negotiations.
- James M. Ludlow, Foreign Affairs Officer, Office of United Nations Political and Security Affairs.↩