690D.91/10–1951: Telegram
The United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin) to the Secretary of State
510. Re Kashmir. Graham appeared at office this afternoon and had talk with Gross. Maffitt was present.
1. Re possible swing through subcontinent before next SC Kashmir meeting, Graham opposed, unless invited by GOI and GOP. He did not want to appear to be pushing himself, he thought it suicidal to place himself in position of appearing to seek delay in SC action, and he would cause damage if he returned with nothing to show from trip, whether of base-touching or substantive nature, which could not have failed to arouse considerable speculation at its outset, he would rather have early action by SC which would explicitly extend his term of office and perhaps suggestion he return to capitals if this would serve useful purpose. He had no doubt personally of his authority to talk with parties now, but in view of Rau and Bokhari [Page 1887] hesitation when in presence SC President Muniz yesterday he asked them how matters could now be advanced through his efforts, he wanted for political reasons that SC extend his term.
2. On basis his not making subcontinent swing, Graham thought he would go Washington Oct 22, thereafter attend to certain family affairs at home, and then fly to Paris in time to be there by evening Oct 28. He agreed that there might be SC meeting possibly to hear parties on 29th and another meeting Nov 1 or 2 in order Council make clear its position re Kashmir constituent assembly, already set forth in preamble to March 30 resolution. Graham felt it most important that Pakistan “get headline” immediately after constituent assembly in order pacify restive spirits. Graham felt greatest danger spot for World War III today is subcontinent. He apparently believes that Pakistanis are near end of patience and moderate influences in Pakistan must be strengthened by all means, including speedy SC attention to case and above-mentioned headlines on constituent assembly.
3. In Graham’s opinion solution of Kashmir problem requires settlement of but three more points:
- (a)
- Number of troops on Indian side of line (GOI has officially agreed to 16,000 and privately has reduced this to 14,000 including Indian as well militia and state troops; Graham believes number must not exceed 6,000;
- (b)
- Period for completion of demilitarization (Pakistan will reluctantly take 120 days, but shorter time preferable);
- (c)
- Date of formal appointment of plebiscite administrator, whose broad powers will be tower of strength in carrying out final settlement through plebiscite.
Regarding (a) Graham discussed his closely held secret, use of UN forces, saying he had observed Pakistanis concern over number of Indian troops on Indian side of line was more on ground of their potential ability to intimidate plebiscite voters than of fear of aggression from Indian side. He had endeavored to reassure them on this point.
4. Regarding six-week period recommended in Graham’s report, he defended use of specific time on ground that failure to fix time limit might cause disastrous explosion in already impatient Pakistan. SC might prefer period extending beyond Indian elections.
5. Graham said with his report issued he no longer feels need of publicly maintaining aloofness from all governmental contact. He planned to call at Dept Monday.1
Dept pass GADel Paris.
- October 22.↩