357.AB/10–651: Telegram
The Secretary of State to the United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin)
priority
Misun 70. For Gross from Hickerson. Re Kashmir (Unmis 64 and 65, Oct 5):
Until the receipt of your messages, UNA and NBA had been reluctant to express fully our views regarding Graham’s approach, because we did not wish to give him cause to believe we were attempting to pressure him. It now appears clear that Dr. Graham really wants our views in order to help resolve the issues which have been troubling him and the Department. Consequently I will spell out our views in some detail, in the hope that these remarks will help Graham to decide what future course of action he should recommend.
Our thinking is conditioned by two basic concepts: There must be UN activity of such nature as (a) to help prevent the parties’ attitudes becoming frozen and adamant, (b) to give Pakistan sufficient hope of a reasonable settlement so that it will not in desparation resort to armed force. This means it is generally advisable that the SC avoid presenting either party with a recommended course of action which at the time would probably be publicly rejected so strongly as to cut off the possibility of immediate and continuing negotiations. It would be better to give the UN representative continuing authority enabling him to deal with the parties.
Consequently, while recognizing the possible value of the forthright approach outlined in your letter of October 2, we have had some doubts regarding Graham’s orginal desire that the SC resolution recommend the detailed course of action he outlined. While the Department would have been willing generally to follow that course of action, there was the exceedingly difficult question of the next step if India refused categorically to accept the recommendation. Moreover, the United Kingdom, in part because of the October 25 general elections, had clearly indicated its desire to avoid a resolution which might not provide room for future negotiations. Finally, there was USUN’s doubt concerning the course of action if possibilities in the council had been exhausted—and I believe an Indian rejection of Graham’s detailed plan at this stage would severely limit if not exhaust the SC’s possibilities.
[Page 1878]With this as background, I believe that it would be wiser for Graham to submit at the earliest possibility, and no later than October 15, a report giving the factual background, including the points previously discussed with the parties, and a recommendation that the council continue his mediatory authority. The parties should be able to make introductory statements, at least, prior to the council’s adjourning to Paris. In November, the UK, US and other sponsors could introduce a resolution which would continue Graham’s mediatory authority, clearly referring to the UNCIP resolutions as the basic authority. Graham could then present new points, such as those described in your October 2 letter, informally to the parties. It probably would be advisable to provide in the resolution that Graham file a progress report concerning his negotiations, and it would be helpful to know Graham’s views on the time-limits for such reports.
If these efforts fail, the SC might well consider passing a resolution broadening Graham’s powers to enable him to explore possible solutions outside his present terms of reference.
Please impress on Graham our pleasure at his willingness to continue his efforts, which everyone agrees is the best factor for success. [Hickerson.]