Secretary’s Memoranda: Lot 53D444

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Secretary of State

secret

Subject: Kashmir: Future UN Action

Participants: Sir Zafrullah Khan, Foreign Minister of Pakistan
Mr. M. A. H. Ispahani, Ambassador of Pakistan The Secretary
Mr. McGhee, Assistant Secretary
Mr. Weil, SOA

Sir Zafrullah called on me at 6: 00 p. m. He said he was disturbed by reports that consideration was being given to referring the Kashmir case to the General Assembly after Dr. Graham had submitted his report. Sir Zafrullah said he believed the Security Council should continue its efforts to settle the case; that it was still the SC’s duty within the purview of Chapter VI, Article 37 of the Charter to make further efforts; and that he did not see how the GA, with some sixty nations represented, could successfully tackle the problem.

Sir Zafrullah said he believed the SC should take up the question immediately following submission of the Graham report and pass an appropriate resolution. He asked me (1) whether the Department would discreetly ascertain from Dr. Graham the estimated date on which his report would be submitted, and (2) whether the US Delegation would take up the Kashmir question in the SC immediately [Page 1849] following submission of the report. He said there should not be any difficulty in persuading the SC to resume consideration of the case since the membership was the same as when the last resolution on Kashmir was adopted in the spring of this year; and added that his Government had reason to believe that the report would be a clear statement of the problem.

I told Sir Zafrullah that I considered his statement a very orderly presentation of his Government’s position and asked Mr. McGhee for comments. Mr. McGhee asked Sir Zafrullah whether he did not believe that consideration of the case by both the SC and the General Assembly would be more effective than consideration by the SC alone. Sir Zafrullah said he thought not. Mr. McGhee asked whether consideration by the General Assembly would not give the recommendations a broader base. Sir Zafrullah said he did not think so—that it would probably take three months to explain the case to the GA. Mr. McGhee remarked that it was our object to use UN machinery to a maximum extent. I suggested that if the SC acted and India refused to accept its recommendations, then there would be reason for referring the case to the General Assembly. Sir Zafrullah added that likewise if the USSR vetoed SC action then there would be justification for adopting the new procedure and referring the case to the GA. He added, however, that referring the case to the GA would be “too complicated” and would result in delay.

Sir Zafrullah said that earlier in the afternoon he had discussed with Sir Percy Spender1 the question of the Korean cease-fire negotiations. He said he had come to the conclusion that there might be some possibility of a resumption of negotiations if the UN followed “a middle course”. He said if the Communist allegations were not completely brushed aside, the UN would have an opportunity to test the Communists and to find out whether they wanted a cease fire. I agreed that perhaps the UN would have such an opportunity now that it had been admitted that an UN plane had strafed the Kaesong area. I said I would have a look at this.

Following mutual congratulations on our speeches at the San Francisco Conference, I said to Sir Zafrullah that I would like to tell him in confidence that the US would support Pakistan’s candidacy for a seat on the Security Council. Sir Zafrullah said jokingly that we needn’t worry because there were virtually no other competitors for this seat. Mr. McGhee assured Sir Zafrullah that this was not the reason for our supporting Pakistan.

  1. Vice President of the Japanese Peace Treaty Conference at San Francisco; Australian Ambassador to the United States.