Foreign Relations of the United States, 1951, Asia and the Pacific, Volume VI, Part 2

690D.91/9–751: Telegram

The Acting United States Representative at the United Nations (Gross) to the Secretary of State

secret
priority

New York, September 7, 1951—3:19 p. m.

317. Re Kashmir: This confirms my telecon with Sandifer¹ suggesting supplementary telegram to Henderson recommending Graham suspend decision whether to file final or interim report until his arrival in NY. This suggestion is based on ideas we think should be put before Graham on his arrival.

a. Kashmir case is entering on dangerous phase with Graham unable to effect demilitarization, constituent assembly elections in prospect and troops concentrated on India-Pakistan borders. To meet this situation we put forward following suggestions, all of which to be discussed with Graham for his reactions.

1. Graham at the earliest possible moment would make an interim report to the SC. This report would not imply any failure of his mission and might contain part, but not necessarily all, of his factual material and conclusions. He would also be requested to appear in SC to present his interim report, preferably within the next week or ten days.

2. After brief general debate, SC would adopt a res broadening his powers so that he could act as general mediator of over-all differences between India and Pakistan. Resolution would also extend his term indefinitely.

3. At about the same time, or perhaps delayed to blanket activities of Kashmiri constituent assembly, SC would adopt a second res requesting POC to set up the necessary machinery to observe and report on the situation along the cease-fire line in Kashmir and also along the India-Pakistan frontiers both east and west.

4. Graham would have an opportunity for consultation with UN members here. We would expect during these consultations to urge on Graham the importance of his continuing with the case as he did in Indonesia and we would then put before him possible courses of action or elements of a general plan (discussed below) which, subject to his best opinion, might move this dispute along by giving India and Pakistan something to think about in terms of a more secure future.

b. Starting the POC in motion to get observers into the area would allay tension caused by troop concentrations and would blanket publicity given any decision by Constituent Assembly on question of accession of Kashmir. POC action would help calm Pakistan’s fears of fait accompli. We would think it desirable to have observers in Pakistan even if India did not accept them. India would know that the UN would get unbiased reports of any military incidents and Pakistan would have cogent reasons for restraining the tribesmen. This would also minimize the chances of India goading Pakistan into a first act of aggression.

An additional proposal which merits discussion with Graham is that of placing UN (non-US) forces in the area on either or both sides of cease-fire line.

We think SC should retain case rather than pass it to GA unless SC should be frustrated by Soviet veto. GA cannot contribute to substantive solution and India may well have written off moral opinion of world community on Kashmir as it did in Hyderabad case in 1948. Also, presentation of case in GA would risk several splits in free world majority and might complicate handling of Korean case in 6th GA.

It seems to us important to keep Graham as effective contact and spokesman for a solution of Kashmir dispute which might include various elements mentioned below. Thus we would have him installed in that role and engaged in preliminary discussions before his final report is published. This would avoid freezing Kashmir dispute to status quo which might boil up into hostilities later, and would avoid embarrassing consequences of possible SC futility in light of India’s refusal to accept arbitration.

c. Consultations with Graham about how he would proceed under broader terms of reference would include methods of developing new approach to problem. One new element (which we think may be found necessary) is proposal for joint control and development of Kashmir water resources through some form of India–Pakistan corporation or authority along lines of Lilienthal proposal. Focusing parties’ attention on this might start them cooperating on a mutually advantageous enterprise and at the same time remove real Pakistani fear of water shortage caused by Indian control of headwaters.

We also suggest discussion with Graham of possibilities of partition of Kashmir as well as UN admin of vale. Partition might or might not include plebiscite in the vale. Since India now occupies the entire vale, a retreat might have to be made to total partition.

Graham might feel that even such a drastic proposal as partition of vale might be less undesirable than a proposal for interim UN administration and deferring to some future date a plebiscite, since latter would merely postpone the evil day even in the unlikely event that both parties agreed to such a course of action. Moreover, such a delay would exacerbate India–Pakistan relations by continual intrigue for votes.

d. The need for vigorous exploration with Graham of all practical possibilities arises from fact that Kashmir dispute may be key to other economic and political controversies between Pak and India. It is likely that present plan of statewide plebiscite and arbitration of issues not agreed has been carried about as far as practicable, although this is of course a question to be thoroughly explored with Graham. Neither India or Pak feels obliged to surrender what it now holds of Kashmir because of any moral or legal considerations or because of threat of force. While we would keep separate consideration of constituent assembly and troop concentration, they are companion sources of tension which might lead either govt to mutual disaster. US and UN effectiveness in this controversy would become small should hostilities commence, because UN political or economic sanctions would have little restraining effect and military sanctions seem outside the realm of practical possibility. Also, military conflict would afford to USSR choice of volunteering to assist India in a movement to secure Asia for the Asiatics or could support Pak, thereby rallying loyalty of Muslim world.

For these reasons we have suggested tactic for keeping Graham in the case, for keeping movement toward long term political settlement and for provisional measures to lessen present tension. We see danger in temporizing by general SC discussion of a final Graham report with no further action taken or by dilatory tactics such as establishment interim UN administration.²

Gross

1. Durward V. Sandifer, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for United Nations Affairs.
2. The suggestions contained in this telegram were summarized in an unnumbered information telegram from the Department of State to the Embassies in New Delhi and Karachi, September 10, not printed (New Delhi Embassy Files, Lot 59 F 117, Box 69). Ambassador Warren reported in telegram 272, from Karachi, September 12, that he had delivered the contents of the information telegram to Dr. Graham, with whom he had dined privately on the night of September 11. Ambassador Warren further reported that Dr. Graham had by coincidence explored lines of thought almost identical with the suggestions of Ambassador Gross. (690D.91/9–1251)