690D.91/7–2351: Telegram
The United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin) to the Secretary of State
priority
133. Re India–Pakistan: We have following comments re Deptel 44, July 19:
(1) Decision whether to risk SO action this time on troop concentrations obviously will be basically determined by evaluation of immediacy of danger of war or communal violence. We are not in position make this evaluation although repeated reports to us from Karachi, New Delhi, and Calcutta and information from UKDel here would seem indicate (1) war not immediately threatened; (2) communal disorders not taking place although chance spark could set them off.
(2) We feel that if war not immediately threatened, risks attendant upon SC debate at this time are so great as to warrant effort being made to accomplish our objective by other means. We understand our objective to be that army build-up and troop concentrations both sides be stopped and trend reversed.
(3) As we see them, principal risks we would run in SC debate being held are:
- (a)
- Each side at table would have to justify actions by making charges against other. This would tend further to exacerbate relations and might increase rather than diminish possibility of communal outbreak.
- (b)
- Would not such exchanges by parties tend to harden positions and lessen Graham’s chances of achieving success?
- (c)
- Would SC action on troop concentrations, for which GOI is receiving most of blame by occidental public and press, tend to confirm any feeling GOI may have that we and UK are biased in GOP’s favor? (We did not call meeting to consider GOI reports of frontier incidents but we did when GOP made charge about GOI, etc.)
- (d)
- Limited-objective res as summarized in reftel has so little substance as to imply SC leading from weakness.
Assuming that war or communal violence is not imminent, probably the most effective work toward our objective, with least risk, could be done privately by UK and US, rather than by public discussions in SC. Menzies’ reported offer of good offices said, in Canberra’s 31 of July 23,1 to have been declined by Nehru, might serve as useful purpose, and might still occur if he would become particularly interested in pressing it, and if parties should welcome it. Thereupon, his good offices, combined with above private talks with GOI and GOP, might have less resistance than would efforts in SC, and accomplish [Page 1791] reversal of trend to build up arms and troop concentrations on both sides. These controversial issues would not fall upon Dr. Graham.
- Not printed.↩