Office of the Historian

690D.91/7–2351: Telegram

The Ambassador in India (Henderson) to the Secretary of State

secret
priority
New Delhi, July 23, 1951—6 p. m.

320. Re Deptel 169 July 19 info to Delhi sent NY 44 London 458 info Karachi 66 in which Dept requests Emb comments:

1. Emb preliminary views on how deal with critical turn Indo-Pak relations incident to recent troop movements were set out in Embtel 283, July 20 which crossed reftel.

2. Our comments on various points reftel are:

(a)
We recognize close link between crisis which has just risen and Kashmir problem and possible future need treat together or as parts of one problem.
(b)
For present however we regard present crisis as problem likely become serious in Bengal and various parts India rather than or before in Kashmir and as one requiring immed action. We believe we fully agreed with Karachi this point.
(c)
We see fol definite disadvantages linking two problems now in manner which wld result full scale discussion in SC:
(1)
Difficulties from mixing short and longer term problems.
(2)
SC wld be greatly handicapped in dealing with crisis urgent nature because low prestige UN and SC in India re Kashmir.
(3)
Also fact that Nehru as recently as July 13 announced “final” rejection SC Mar 30 res.
(4)
SC debate cld easily contribute to increase in Indo-Pak bitterness which it vital shld subside.
(5)
We believe line approach by SC suggested in article 1 section 1a and b particularly B (regardless its full validity) wld meet with cool reception India as “just another res” and wld not make much impression on PriMin, GOI or public.
(d)
We assume Dept suggestion re urging parties accept Menzies offer good offices overtaken by Nehru decline. We understand Nehru has personal aversion to Menzies particularly since last Commonwealth conf London and believe this offer has no usefulness.
(e)
We agree expanded UNMOK wld be desirable particularly if observations cld be extended to Punjab borders. We assume UNMOK might be expanded without SO action if GOI and GOP were to agree. We believe Graham in best position to ascertain informally from PriMins whether they wld agree, and that such inquiry his part wld be facilitated by prior high level approach to PriMins such as suggested Embtel 283.
(f)
We agree suggestion (article I section 3) re UNSYG request for special UNMOK report and believe shld be expedited.
(g)
Emb has been daily consultation with Acting HC Garner. Both he and Emb are apprehensive about effects India of full dress SC debate over troop movements at this time. Wld it be feasible restrict SC debate by device of presenting for SC consideration draft ltr by SC pres along lines suggested numbered para 5 Embtel 283?
(h)
We believe that approach to Nehru, to succeed, must not be one that obviously involves retreat for India or Nehru vis-à-vis SC re Kashmir problem. If attack on troop movement aspect cld be from new angle and be one in which Nehru himself figures prominently we believe chances success wld be enhanced. There is even some reason believe Nehru may have personal gesture in mind (as last year) when he deems moment propitious.

3. Emb assumes Karachi has informed Graham and asked his comments. Graham arriving Delhi 1330 hours today.

Rptd info Karachi 20, London 18, Kabul 3.

Henderson