857.AB/3–2851
Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. Howard Meyers of the Office of United Nations Political and Security Affairs
US/S/1718
Subject: Kashmir
| Participants: | Mr. B. L. Sharma, Indian Delegation |
| Frank D. Collins—SOA | |
| Howard Meyers—UNP |
We saw Mr. Sharma at New India House. We opened the conversation by stating we wished to continue our informal discussions on Kashmir, as suggested by Mr. Sharma when we last met.
Mr. Sharma referred very bitterly to Sir Gladwyn Jebb’s remarks during the March 21 Security Council meeting, saying that he had cast aspersions on India’s intentions in permitting convocation of the Kashmir Constituent Assembly. We remarked that we had noted Prime Minister Nehru’s recent statement at Agra, when he had declared that India’s position had either been misunderstood or deliberately misrepresented by the United Kingdom and the United States Representatives to the Security Council. We said we thought it was unfortunate that Mr. Nehru had expressed himself so strongly when it had not been UK or US intention to challenge India’s motives, but, on the contrary, to point out that the actions of the Kashmir National Conference—when taken in conjunction with various statements about their legal position vis-à-vis India—presented a confusing picture which we thought should be clarified by a definite Indian statement that the Government of India would not permit the Kashmir Constituent Assembly to take action which would prejudice the issue before the Security Council.
When Mr. Sharma insisted that the Government of India could not prevent the people of Kashmir from expressing their opinion about the question of accession, Mr. Meyers suggested that there were two [Page 1756] good legal analogies which indicated that the Government of India might well prevent the Constituent Assembly from expressing an opinion on the question of accession and, at least, should lead India to declare that it would not permit action by the Kashmir State Goverment which would interfere with the issue before the Security Council. The first analogy was that of a jury, which, before the trial began, could not declare its opinion in regard to the issue concerning which it was the trier of fact, since this would prejudice the jury’s decision. The second analogy was that in which the title to property is in dispute and an injunction is issued forbidding action which might interfere with the ultimate determination of title. Obviously, if the Kashmiris, acting through the Constituent Assembly, expressed their “opinion” about accession, this expression could well influence them when the time came to vote in the plebiscite. Mr. Sharma seemed to admit some validity in these analogies, but insisted that Sir Benegal Rau’s statements concerning the inability of the Kashmir Constituent Assembly to issue more than an “opinion” on the subject of accession were sufficient guarantees of the Government of India’s good intent in this situation. He also said that, while India viewed the plebiscite question as whether Kashmir should remove itself from India (accession having already occurred), India’s international commitment under the UNCIP resolutions was in terms of settling accession to either India or Pakistan by a free and impartial plebiscite under UN auspicies. Consequently, Sir Benegal Rau had not meant to suggest that the question put to the people of Kashmir during the plebiscite be phrased other than “do you wish to accede to India or Pakistan?” Theoretically, the question could be asked if Kashmir should be independent, but the Government of India would undoubtedly not like this.
Mr. Collins pressed strongly for an Indian statement of willingness to accept the amended resolution. Mr. Sharma replied that India could not support the entire resolution. He added that the Delegation had just received their instructions, as follows:
- a)
- The Government of India could not accept the paragraphs in the Preamble which referred to the Kashmir Constituent Assembly; nor could they accept the operative section clause calling upon the parties to arbitrate unresolved issues as formulated and reported by the UN Representative.
- b)
- The Government of India would accept that part of the resolution directing the UN Representative to proceed to the sub-continent, and would, of course, cooperate fully with the UN Representative.
We urged Mr. Sharma to see if it were not possible for the Indian Government to acquiesce in the arbitration proposal, pointing out that it was no more than a logical step in the development of this case. While it was true that it went beyond the two UNCIP resolutions, [Page 1757] it was a proper step forward if the Kashmir dispute were to reach a speedy and reasonable settlement. Mr. Sharma argued this point strongly, saying that India did not object to arbitration in principle, but simply could not agree to be bound in advance to arbitrate all issues remaining unresolved at the end of three months of negotiations by the UN Representative. He suggested it would be better to provide that the UN Representative report to the Security Council those matters which the Representative regarded as fit subjects for arbitration; that the Security Council should consider this report and determine which of these issues were proper subjects for arbitration; that the Council should then recommend to the parties that these issues be arbitrated.
Mr. Collins remarked that the development of the case indicated quite clearly now what issues would most probably remain unresolved and thus be the subject of arbitration. Consequently, he strongly suggested the advisability of Indian acceptance of the arbitration provision in the amended resolution. However, Mr. Sharma replied that the Indian Delegation’s instructions left no room for compromise on this point. He hoped that the UN Representative, whoever the Representative might be, could be successful, and pointed out that the present Security Council discussions on the Kashmir dispute had at least served the valuable purpose of clearing the air of misapprehensions and of returning to the August 1948 and January 1949 UNCIP resolutions.
Mr. Meyers took the opportunity to inform Mr. Sharma that Ralph Bunche had withdrawn his name as a candidate for the position of UN Representative and said that we were considering other possibilities, but had not reached any final conclusions. Mr. Sharma indicated no reaction to this news.
We also told Mr. Sharma that we anticipated there were sufficient votes to pass the resolution; that we expected three or four Council members, other than the United Kingdom and the United States, to speak about the resolution at tomorrow’s Security Council meeting. Mr. Sharma thanked us for the information, and said that the Indian Delegation had always been most appreciative of the good relations existing between them and the US Delegation.
Before leaving, we returned to the question of the nature of the forthcoming Indian statement in the Security Council, urging that, if possible, Sir Benegal Rau adopt a moderate tone. Mr. Sharma again indicated that the Indian Delegation’s discretion was circumscribed by the instructions it had received from New Delhi. He spoke most strongly against the statement made by Sir Gladwyn Jebb and said that New Delhi had sent the Delegation much information indicating British duplicity in the Kashmir dispute, but that the Delegation could not use the information because so much of it related to the [Page 1758] January meeting of the Commonwealth Prime Ministers, and was of a confidential nature which could not be disclosed. He said that India was conscious of the good intentions and fair-mindedness of the US, but it was most unfortunate that the US had associated itself with the UK in sponsoring this resolution, since the US would thereby be associated with the UK’s statements and objectives.
We closed our discussion on a cordial note, expressing our appreciation for the frankness with which Mr. Sharma had spoken.