357.AB/3–2251: Telegram
The United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin) to the Secretary of State
1321. Re Kashmir: Zafrullah and Mohammed Ali, Jebb and Fowler, and Maffitt and Gross met in UKDel office this morning to discuss [Page 1750] Bunche. Zafrullah outlined three reasons why Bunche is unacceptable to his country: (a) he is thought to be too devoted to Nehru, as champion of colored races, (b) his mediation efforts in Palestine1 were designed to result in establishment of Israel as state, and (c) as a UN figure he has less prestige in this matter than if he were outstanding in American national life.
Zafrullah pointed out these objections have been on record with Dept for a year. He referred to talk he had with McGhee in 1950 shortly prior to appointment of Dixon and to his recent talk with President and Secretary. On latter occasion he had felt President had Bunche in mind, although no name was mentioned, and had attempted, without openly alluding to him, to make clear Pakistanis’ deep objection to him. He also recalled that on same occasion President had indicated list would be prepared from which suitable candidate could be chosen. Despite this commitment, we had pressed on with Bunche in face of known Pakistan position, and it appeared to Zafrullah that we may have given thought to no one else. We assured him that this was not the case, but that Bunche’s qualifications were so high and he seemed so uniquely suitable that we had selected him. It was now obvious that we had not accurately gauged the depth of the Pakistan feeling re him; in fact, from Zafrullah’s demeanor on March 19 Gross and Jebb had concluded Paks would accept him. Zafrullah agreed that there had been a misunderstanding and he hoped he had not contributed to it in his conversation on March 19.
In discussing our reasons for preferring Bunche, Gross stressed that the British and we are not insisting on pushing any particular person, but simply want to get the best man for the job. He pointed out that the decision ultimately is up to the Security Council, and other members will have to be consulted and make up their minds. He said that in our effort to produce a suitable candidate we had two possible methods to choose from: to depend on the assent of both parties, or to confine consultations to Council members and proceed to a selection without giving the parties a voice in it. We had tried to take a middle course, avoiding arbitrariness but at the same time not leaving ourselves open to a veto from one of the parties.
Regarding Bunche’s qualifications, Gross said it was precisely his UN status that gave us confidence he would enter case with strong bias in favor of making plebiscite possible. His UN training would see to that. We could not know that same would be true of a person without Bunche’s background. Dixon, for example, had given up overall plebiscite idea and had proposed compromise. Gross also thought that Zafrullah in his objections might be confusing deep seated mental [Page 1751] reservations with initial reaction on announcement of Bunche’s appointment. Perhaps Bunche would have the greater success at end for having begun under the initial handicap pointed out by Zafrullah. Gross was sure Bunche’s honesty and loyalty to UN would vindicate Council’s judgment if it chose him. Furthermore, there was great advantage in having India cordial to a UN rep who, for our part, we were certain would be scrupulously fair.
Jebb inquired whether Pakistan would still oppose Bunche if India indicated it would accept the resolution so long as Bunche was UN rep. Zafrullah’s first reaction was that this hypothetical attitude by India would indicate that India felt Bunche would favor it. In that case, perhaps; Pakistan would endeavor to dispense with intermediate three months exercise and try for immediate arbitration. Later Zafrullah betrayed the suspicion that Jebb’s question denoted deal whereby we would try to force Bunche on him by dangling bait of Indian acceptance of res. We attempted to disabuse him of this suspicion. Gross wondered what importance India’s knowing of our preference for Bunche would have if Bunche not chosen. Mohammad Ali thought it would be of little importance since last year when Bunche’s name also was prominently mentioned, Indians had accepted Dixon.
Zafrullah seemed to feel that we were inconsistent in bowing to India’s veto of Nimitz last year while attempting to force on Pakistan a man against whom Pakistan had registered opposition fully year ago. He finally summed up his position by saying that he had been hoping to see acceptable UN rep named, had once again stated his govt’s views, and would continue to entertain hope for suitable rep.
Jebb and Gross said more thought must be given to the matter.
Before meeting broke up there was discussion of Pakistan reaction to high ranking military adviser if Bunche named. Zafrullah seemed to assume such adviser would be Gen. Courtney Hodges2 and to our surprise said Lie yesterday had told him Bunche was going out with Hodges as his adviser. We manifested further astonishment. Gross finally summed up our position saying question is whether Bunche is a good man for job or not; if he is good, SC problem is to weigh his qualifications against objections cited by Pakistan and endeavor to decide on his suitability. Jebb concurred. Mohammed Ali felt the problem was not to debate merits of an individual, but to select an individual who will fit the bill.
After Pakistanis left, there was discussion with Jebb in which he wondered whether we might turn to other American. He read from [Page 1752] list including such men as Vannevar Bush,3 Gen. Clay,4 Sumner Wells,5 Norman Armour,6 Harold Stassen.7 Gross and Maffitt countered with suggestion that some outstanding Commonwealth man be picked such as Alexander Cadogan.8 Jebb said he would report developments to his FO and include this suggestion, but he understood! that UK policy was not to have Commonwealth member. Gross pointed out that up to now two Commonwealth men had been utilized and had done well.
If Zafrullah cares to lobby against Bunche among members he will do it well and we might not be able to put him over. It may be that he is play acting lest Indians think Pakistan wants Bunche. Also, he may not have given sufficient thought to consequences if we lose UN rep who very probably has cordial GOI sympathy. However USUN is inclined to feel that he is sincere in his perturbation and has thought matter through. He seems to lay great store by President’s oral assurance that several Americans will be suggested for job, and if, as Mohammed Ali alleges, President also put this in writing to Liaquat, we frankly see no way to honor our commitment, if Zafrullah insists, except by producing someone else. The best we can do at this moment would seem to be to arrange, if possible, for the SC members to try to convince Pakistanis appointment of Bunche is to Pakistanis’ own interest. If this fails, or if we conclude that circumstances cited by Zafrullah outweigh Bundle’s qualifications, we seem committed to looking elsewhere, in the US.
- Mr. Bunche had formerly served as U.N. Acting Mediator on Palestine, 1948–1949.↩
- U.S. Army, retired; former Commanding General, First Army, 1944–1949.↩
- President, Carnegie Institution of Washington.↩
- Gen. Lucius Clay, U.S. Army, retired; former Commander in Chief, U.S. Forces in Europe and Military Governor, U.S. Zone of Occupation in Germany, 1947–1949.↩
- Former Under Secretary of State, 1937–1943.↩
- Ambassador to Venezuela.↩
- President, University of Pennsylvania.↩
- British Permanent Representative to the United Nations, 1946–1950.↩