357.AB/1–1851: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom


3487. We regard it imperative have SC mtg re Kashmir soonest, preferably before end Jan, in view Liaquat–Nehru press statements about Commonwealth Conference negots and failure achieve progress in case, with attendant impact GOP internal stability.

We note UK statements Paks do not believe eminent jurist proposal enough and suggest possibility SC res instructing PlebAd proceed implement previous SC ress. (Embtels 3966, 3992, Jan 17–18). However, 5 Jan 49 UNCIP res, accepted by GOIGOP, provides PlebAd’s activities depend on previous truce and demilitarization, which have not been achieved. Still necessary SC officially recognize reasons for failure demilitarization and plebiscite, which can be done by adopting report of eminent jurist or by other means. To save time and press issue, we suggest utilizing other means, including fol, each of which wld occur after (1) SC discussion 28 Oct Kashmir Natl Conference res on basis GOP ltr Dec 14, (2) SC discussion Dixon report and Commonwealth negots:

Res appointing SC sub-comite or individual to draft detailed plans for state-wide and local plebiscites, and meet with parties to report which plan seems most feasible or make other recommendations for solution dispute.
Res requesting Commonwealth provide UN force to assist parties in demilitarization and policing Kashmir area preparatory to [Page 1715] PlebAd conducting plebiscite as agreed to by parties in 5 Jan 49 UNCIP res. PlebAd to report in 3 months if presence Commonwealth troops has created order sufficient enable arrangements for plebiscite to be carried out, and make recommendations if plebiscite appears not feasible or conditions for fair plebiscite not present.
Res dispatching PlebAd to Kashmir to report whether or not conditions precedent for plebiscite exist, and if exist, to proceed hold plebiscite. This approach founded on possible GOI claims 28 Oct Kashmir Natl Conference res implementation established basis for fair plebiscite.

We contemplate result discussion item (1) wld be res in language contained present UKDel-US draft based on 17 Nov plan.1 This may be in separate res or part of single res dealing also with one or combination of concepts (a)–(c) above, (a) and (b) singly or jointly believed most productive. It is still not clear from Embtel 3776, Jan 6, whether UK will co-sponsor with US res re Kashmir Natl Conference action. We regard UK–US co-sponsorship this type res extremely important, irrespective whether contained separate res or combined single res with other elements.

Mohammed Ali conversations with Dept officials Jan 22 urged SO action for end Jan and indicated preference res calling for Commonwealth troop participation and despatch PlebAd to area.

Advise Dept soonest UK reaction above proposals.

  1. Reference is to a tentative plan for future U.K.-U.S. action with respect to Kashmir arrived at in discussions in Washington on November 17, 1950 with Mr. Robert Fowler and Mr. Michael Walker, First Secretary of the British Embassy. See the memorandum of conversation by Mr. Howard Meyers, November 17, 1950, in Foreign Relations, 1950, vol. v, p. 1439.